Wrobel v. County of Erie, 692 F.3d 22

Wrobel, a long-time Erie County highway department employee, sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation and freedom of association violations.
A new Republican county executive appoints Naylon as senior highway maintenance engineer and Rider to run the highway department; Wrobel is accused of belonging to the 'old regime'.
Wrobel is transferred from the Aurora barn to the Tonawanda plant after disciplinary proceedings, increasing his commute and causing stress-related absences.
Wrobel’s wife and colleagues expose Naylon and Rider for mistreatment; Wrobel makes anonymous complaints to public officials and an FBI report is filed.
Wrobel alleges retaliation for political association (with the former administration) and for speaking about departmental matters of public concern; district court grants summary judgment for defendants.
The Second Circuit reviews de novo; evidence shows Naylon’s repeated references to 'old regime' and 'new regime' but no clear political motive tying mistreatment to protected conduct.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Wrobel’s associational conduct was protected	Wrobel argues mistreatment arose from apolitical stance and failure to support the new regime.	Defendants contend conduct relates to office reform, not political association protected by the First Amendment.	No genuine issue; not linked to protected association.
Whether mistreatment stemmed from speech about public concerns	Wrobel asserts retaliation for reporting misuse and corruption in the highway department.	Speech concerns were internal, not of public concern; retaliation insufficiently proven.	Speech touched some public concerns but failed to show actionable retaliation.
Whether there was a causal link between protected conduct and adverse action	Disciplinary transfers and investigations followed speech and political association.	Actions followed standard reform and management concerns, with no causal tying to protected conduct.	Insufficient evidence of causation; actions not shown to be motivated by protected activity.
Whether the retaliation standard requires proof of a 'deterrent' effect for ordinary firmness	Aggregate minor incidents could form retaliation if they detered a reasonable employee.	Only conduct likely to deter a reasonable employee qualifies; minor incidents not enough.	Majority requires deterrence; here, incidents were insufficient.

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (public concern requirement; not all speech protected)
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (patronage-based firing violates First Amendment)
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (patronage-based firing intolerable under First Amendment)
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (political affiliation as a factor in public employment decisions)
Zelnik v. Fashion Institute of Tech., 464 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2006) (adverse action must deter a person of ordinary firmness)
Galli v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2007) (context of political motivation in public employment actions)
Gann v. Cline, 519 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2008) (extension of political association protections to neutral employees)
Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927 (1st Cir. 2008) (protection for politically neutral employees under First Amendment)
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (clear showing required to survive summary judgment)
Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2004) (First Amendment rights extended to associational conduct)
Phillips v. Bowen, 278 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2002) (aggregation of minor incidents can form retaliation claim)