Woolridge v. Abrishami, 163 A.3d 850

Background

On May 23, 2014, 18‑year‑old Lauren Abrishami, driving her mother's car, made a left turn at Main & Market in Gaithersburg and struck pedestrian Judith Woolridge in a marked crosswalk; Woolridge sued for negligence (against Lauren) and negligent entrustment (against Lauren’s mother, Brigitte Abrishami).
Lauren admitted she stopped at the stop sign, began a left turn, glanced at a passenger, was warned, braked from ~10 mph to ~1 mph, and then struck Woolridge; officer testimony placed Lauren nearly completed through the turn and Woolridge about halfway across the crosswalk when struck.
Lauren pled contributory negligence as an affirmative defense in her answer but did not articulate specific contributory‑negligence facts in early discovery or the joint pretrial statement; her signed interrogatory answers were provided the day trial began.
The trial court denied Woolridge’s motion to preclude the contributory‑negligence defense, submitted that issue to the jury, and refused Woolridge’s requested instruction that a pedestrian in a crosswalk may assume motorists will obey the law.
The jury found Lauren negligent but also that Woolridge was contributorily negligent, barring recovery; the court earlier granted summary judgment for Brigitte Abrishami on negligent entrustment, finding insufficient evidence that she knew of dangerous propensities.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendant could raise contributory negligence at trial despite limited discovery/pretrial notice	Woolridge: Lauren waived or should be barred from asserting contributory negligence because she failed to disclose supporting facts in interrogatories and pretrial statement	Lauren: Defense was pled in the answer, never withdrawn, discovery gave notice and plaintiff suffered no unfair surprise	Court: No automatic waiver; pleading the defense in the answer preserved it and failure to reassert in discovery/pretrial did not compel exclusion absent waiver or prejudice
Whether evidence was sufficient to submit contributory negligence to the jury	Woolridge: No reasonable juror could find she was negligent—she checked, entered crosswalk, and had no duty to constantly look; defendant failed to show she could have avoided impact	Lauren: Plaintiff failed to see or hear the car; testimony supports inference plaintiff didn’t observe what was present to be seen, generating more than a scintilla of evidence	Court: Issue was properly for the jury; defendant met burden of production to create a factual question on contributory negligence
Whether trial court erred in refusing Woolridge’s requested pedestrian‑right‑of‑way instruction	Woolridge: Pedestrian entitled to instruction that she may assume motorists will obey the law when crossing	Lauren: Insufficient support for special instruction; existing pattern instructions adequately cover duties and reciprocal obligations	Court: Denial not an abuse of discretion; MPJI‑Cv 23:2 fairly covered law and court properly avoided suggesting absolute protection for pedestrians in crosswalks
Whether summary judgment for Ms. Abrishami on negligent entrustment was erroneous	Woolridge: Entrustment claim supported by Lauren’s youth, inexperience and prior minor incident	Abrishami: No evidence of dangerous propensities known to mother; single minor prior incident and corrective action insufficient to make harm foreseeable	Court: Affirmed summary judgment—facts did not support foreseeability of dangerous propensities necessary for negligent entrustment

Key Cases Cited

Gooch v. Miller Mech. Sys., 81 Md. App. 376 (defense pled in answer preserved unless waived)
Scott v. Jenkins, 345 Md. 21 (pleading serves primarily to give notice)
Mitchell v. Montgomery Cnty., 88 Md. App. 542 (discussing exclusion of undisclosed expert testimony)
Coleman v. Soccer Ass'n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679 (explaining contributory negligence doctrine and that it is normally for the jury)
Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477 (negligent entrustment sustained where entrustor knew of repeated dangerous propensities)
Merrifield v. C. Hoffberger Co., 147 Md. 134 (pedestrian duty to use eyes; whether to look again is jury question)