Woods v. Start Treatment & Recovery Centers, Inc.
864 F.3d 158
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Cassandra Woods, a substance-abuse counselor at START, was fired in May 2012 after persistent documentation and performance problems tied to a new note system (APG); START cited poor performance and failure to maintain patient notes.
- Woods had intermittent serious medical issues (severe anemia), sought FMLA leave several times, had hospitalizations in Aug 2011 and Apr 2012 (both acknowledged as FMLA-protected), and was on probation when terminated.
- Woods sued for FMLA interference and retaliation; at deposition she repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked about a prior alleged misconduct/investigation.
- District court allowed the jury to draw adverse inferences from Woods’s Fifth Amendment invocations and instructed the jury that Woods must prove “but for” causation (that taking FMLA leave was the but-for cause of termination) to prevail on her FMLA retaliation claim.
- The jury returned a complete defense verdict; Woods appealed, arguing the causation instruction was wrong and the adverse-inference evidence/instruction was prejudicial.
- The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding (1) FMLA retaliation claims like Woods’s are grounded in 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) and the Department of Labor regulation permitting use of FMLA leave as a “negative factor” is entitled to Chevron deference, so a motivating/negative-factor causation standard applies, and (2) admission of adverse inferences from Woods’s deposition invocation of the Fifth Amendment was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statutory source for FMLA retaliation claims | Retaliation actionable without requiring § 2615(a)(2); fits within § 2615(a)(1) interference language | START relied on prior practice treating retaliation under § 2615(a)(2) | § 2615(a)(1) is the proper statutory basis for retaliation claims like Woods’s |
| Causation standard for FMLA retaliation | Motivating-factor/negative-factor is sufficient (per DOL regulation); not "but for" | "But for" causation required (district court/START), analogizing to Nassar/Gross | Chevron deference applies to 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c); motivating/negative-factor standard governs § 2615(a)(1) retaliation claims |
| Adverse inferences from invoking Fifth Amendment at deposition | Invocations not probative; permitting adverse inferences and instruction prejudiced Woods | Invocation permitted and jurors may draw adverse inferences in civil cases | District court abused discretion admitting/instructing on those inferences (prejudicial error) |
| Harmless-error analysis / need for new trial | Erroneous instruction and Fifth Amendment evidence prejudiced outcome; new trial required | Evidence of poor performance was strong, so error harmless (no new trial) | Errors were not harmless given the combination of instruction error and prejudicial Fifth Amendment inferences; vacatur and remand required |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (but-for causation required for certain statutory retaliation claims)
- Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (but-for causation in ADEA claims)
- Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (civil plaintiffs may face adverse inferences from invocation of Fifth Amendment)
- Brink’s Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983) (adverse inferences in civil cases must be relevant and not unduly prejudicial)
- Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2011) (applied Title VII standards to FMLA adverse-action analysis)
- Abascal v. Fleckenstein, 820 F.3d 561 (2d Cir. 2016) (standard of review for admitting Fifth Amendment invocations)
- Renz v. Grey Advert., 135 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 1997) (harmless-error analysis when jury instruction on causation is incorrect)