Wood v. Credit One Bank
277 F. Supp. 3d 821
| E.D. Va. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff David W. Wood sued Credit One under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) after an allegedly fraudulent Credit One account was opened in his name and repeatedly reported on his consumer file. Wood alleges Credit One failed to investigate disputes, review CRA-provided information, and accurately report investigation results.
- Wood filed cross-motions for summary judgment; Credit One moved for full summary judgment. The Court heard oral argument and ordered supplemental briefing. Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1681p.
- Credit One received six ACDVs from CRAs in a ~74-day period alleging identity theft; its investigators spent ~5–15 minutes per dispute, did not call the consumer, and repeatedly reported a Compliance Condition Code (CCC) of XH ("previously in dispute—now resolved"). Credit One never used CCC XC (investigation completed—consumer disagrees).
- Wood testified he did not open or authorize the account, submitted an affidavit from his mother stating she opened the account, and swore to emotional and economic harm (lost credit opportunities, lost income, transient housing).
- Procedural defects: Credit One failed to comply with Local Civ. R. 56(B) (no discrete statement of undisputed material facts) and its interrogatory answers lacked proper verification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5); the Court declined to consider unsworn interrogatory responses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wood suffered "actual damages" under § 1681o | Wood adduces sworn testimony and affidavit describing lost credit, lost income/time, housing disruption, and emotional distress | Credit One says Wood offers no corroborating denial letters or specific dates and thus no damages | Court: Wood's sworn testimony and affidavit suffice to survive summary judgment on actual damages (denied Credit One SJ on damages) |
| Whether Credit One willfully violated the FCRA (§ 1681n) | Policies and practices (brief automated investigations, no consumer calls, use of XH to indicate disputes "resolved," never using XC) show reckless or knowing disregard for consumer disputes | Credit One contends no evidence it knowingly or intentionally violated the FCRA; its procedures were followed | Court: Genuine dispute exists on willfulness; Credit One's motion for summary judgment on willfulness denied |
| Whether the reported account was inaccurate as to Wood's responsibility; and whether Credit One conducted a reasonable investigation (§ 1681s‑2(b)(1)(A) & (C)) | Wood: he did not open or authorize the account (deposition + mother’s notarized affidavit); Credit One performed only cursory matches and did not adequately investigate despite repeated disputes | Credit One points to internal matches, Accurint links, and belief it had a good-faith basis to verify the account | Court: No genuine dispute that Wood did not open/authorize the account — grants partial summary judgment to Wood on inaccuracy; Court also grants partial summary judgment to Wood that Credit One’s investigations were unreasonable and that it failed to accurately report investigation results to CRAs |
| Admissibility of Credit One expert James Lynn under Fed. R. Evid. 702 / Daubert | Wood: Lynn lacks FCRA-specific qualifications, offers legal conclusions, and provides no reliable methodology | Credit One: Lynn has extensive banking experience and is qualified to opine on dispute procedures and reasonableness | Court: Excludes Lynn — finds he is not qualified on FCRA matters, his opinions lack reliable methodology and are impermissible legal conclusions (grants Wood’s motion to exclude) |
Key Cases Cited
- Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) (willfulness under FCRA covers knowing and reckless violations; recklessness requires an objectively unreasonable reading of statute)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standards—nonmovant must present specific facts showing genuine issue)
- Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for assessing whether evidence is sufficient to create a genuine dispute at summary judgment)
- Sloane v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 510 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 2007) (emotional distress and other actual damages are recoverable under the FCRA; plaintiff’s testimony can suffice if sufficiently specific)
- Dalton v. Capital Assoc. Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2001) (willfulness and damages inquiries under summary judgment often are fact questions for jury)
- Saunders v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 2008) (evidence that furnisher’s records reflected ongoing dispute while reports to CRAs did not can support willfulness)
- Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2004) ("investigation" under § 1681s‑2(b) requires some degree of careful inquiry; superficial inquiries are insufficient)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial judge must ensure expert testimony is both reliable and relevant)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (Daubert gatekeeping applies to all expert testimony, including non-scientific expertise)
- Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085 (4th Cir. 1990) (nonmoving party entitled to have credibility of forecast evidence assumed at summary judgment)