Witaschek v. District of Columbia, 254 A.3d 1151

Appellant Mark Witaschek was convicted after a bench trial of two counts of attempting to evade or defeat D.C. tax for tax years 2011–2012 based on his claiming part‑year D.C. residency and large nonresident income deductions.
In 2014 OTR opened an investigation after Witaschek’s ex‑wife provided residency and financial records; OTR Special Agent Hessler issued 26 summonses to third parties (banks, hotels, employers, schools, etc.) to verify residency claims.
Witaschek’s returns (prepared with TurboTax) claimed part‑year residency; OTR’s cross‑checks (hotel records vs. debit card transactions) showed he could have spent at most 89 days in NH in 2011 and 67 days in 2012.
Witaschek moved to suppress the summonsed third‑party records, invoking Carpenter (arguing they created a chronicle of movements); the trial court denied suppression, finding either no expectation of privacy under the third‑party doctrine or that the government acted in objective good faith relying on the statute.
At trial the court found Witaschek domiciled in D.C. (leases, school enrollment, D.C. license/vehicle registration, moving household, sale of NH home, etc.), discredited his NH‑residency and TurboTax defenses, and concluded his filing was willful under the Cheek standard.
On appeal Witaschek argued (1) the summonses violated Carpenter and the Fourth Amendment, and (2) the trial court applied the wrong legal standard for willfulness; the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Witaschek	District (Respondent)	Held
Whether summonsed third‑party records required a warrant under Carpenter	Records created a "comprehensive chronicle" of movements and thus needed a warrant	Pre‑Carpenter third‑party doctrine allowed summonses; records were relevant and material	Court avoided deciding Carpenter’s reach; held suppression unnecessary because agents reasonably relied on then‑existing law (good‑faith exception)
Whether the third‑party doctrine covers debit card/bank/hotel/employment records	Such records reveal location and associations like CSLI and implicate privacy	These are business/third‑party records historically not protected	Court found OTR’s reliance on precedent reasonable; records admissible
Proper mens rea standard for criminal tax willfulness	Trial court required belief to be reasonable to qualify as good‑faith — allegedly inconsistent with Cheek	Cheek permits a genuine good‑faith belief to negate willfulness even if objectively unreasonable	Any misstatement that reasonableness was required was harmless; court expressly found no good‑faith belief, so conviction stands
Sufficiency of evidence of domicile/willfulness	Evidence was insufficient or attributed to software error (TurboTax)	Multiple objective indicia showed D.C. domicile and willful conduct	Trial court’s findings were supported by the record; willfulness proved and convictions affirmed

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (historical cell‑site location info can implicate Fourth Amendment privacy; narrow holding)
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (willfulness in tax crimes requires knowing breach of a legal duty; good‑faith belief negates willfulness)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good‑faith exception to exclusionary rule for objectively reasonable reliance)
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records held by a third party)
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (pen‑register phone number collection not a search under the Fourth Amendment; third‑party doctrine)
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (longer‑term GPS monitoring implicates privacy expectations)
United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (business/credit card records do not generally carry a privacy expectation akin to CSLI)