952 F. Supp. 2d 184
D.D.C.2013Background
- Wisey’s sued Nimellis (operators of Café Romeo’s/Wiseats) alleging Lanham Act claims: trademark infringement, unfair competition, and cybersquatting based on alleged copying and domain registration.
- Nimellis filed amended counterclaims alleging four state-law torts: defamation, tortious interference with prospective business advantage, anticompetitive conduct (attempted monopolization), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- Counterclaims rest on alleged campaign by Wisey’s owners/employees to disseminate plaintiff Ashgrizzadeh’s sex-offender registry information and make defamatory statements to customers and third parties.
- The asserted tort acts occurred in multiple encounters (in D.C. and Virginia) and involved different witnesses; Nimellis contends these facts supply motive/context for the Lanham Act claims.
- Wisey’s moved to dismiss the counterclaims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) (and alternatively under Rule 12(b)(6)); the Court granted dismissal under 12(b)(1) for lack of supplemental jurisdiction and declined to reach 12(b)(6).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wisey’s) | Defendant's Argument (Nimellis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the state tort counterclaims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact with the Lanham Act claims (28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)) | The torts are legally and factually distinct from the narrow trademark/domain claims; no operative-fact overlap to confer supplemental jurisdiction. | The parties’ relationship, course of dealings, and motive form a sufficient factual nexus; a "loose" connection supports supplemental jurisdiction. | Court: No. Only background factual overlap exists; no legal overlap—§1367(a) not satisfied. |
| Whether the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction because the counterclaims raise novel or complex state-law issues (§1367(c)(1)) | Several issues are novel for D.C. law (e.g., whether corporate entity may be defamed by personal statements about an owner); thus decline is appropriate. | The issues are not particularly novel or complex. | Court: Partially. Defamation issue (corporate defamation via owner’s personal attack) appears novel; respondeat superior and choice-of-law issues are not novel. |
| Whether the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction because state claims substantially predominate (§1367(c)(2)) | The counterclaims would require extensive state-law proof, multiple witnesses, possible application of two jurisdictions’ laws and would dominate the case. | The state claims are related and fewer resources would be required than Wisey’s claims suggest. | Court: Yes. The varied torts, separate proof, multiple incidents/witnesses and potential multi-jurisdictional issues mean state claims would substantially predominate. |
| Remedy when §1367(a) not satisfied / discretion under §1367(c) | Dismiss the counterclaims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction; even if §1367(a) were met, discretion supports declining jurisdiction. | Opposes dismissal; seeks to keep counterclaims in federal forum. | Court: Grants Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; would also decline jurisdiction under §1367(c)(1) (in part) and §1367(c)(2). |
Key Cases Cited
- U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 231 F.3d 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (plaintiff bears burden to establish federal jurisdiction)
- Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) (federal courts have limited jurisdiction only as provided by Constitution or statute)
- Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (supplemental jurisdiction principles and Gibbs test)
- United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (federal and state claims must derive from common nucleus of operative fact)
- City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997) (scope and discretion of supplemental jurisdiction under §1367)
- Croixland Props. Ltd. P’ship v. Corcoran, 174 F.3d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (elements of defamation under D.C. law)
- Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993) (elements for attempted monopolization and antitrust intent/monopoly proof)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27 (D.C. 1979) (respondeat superior liability where acts are within scope of employment)
- Diven v. Amalgamated Transit Union Int’l, 38 F.3d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (analysis of when state law claims predominate under §1367(c)(2))
- Lindsay v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (predomination relates to the type and scope of state claims)