870 N.W.2d 675
Wis. Ct. App.2015Background
- The City of Madison's Transit and Parking Commission adopted a rule prohibiting persons from traveling on city buses while armed (the "bus rule") under a city ordinance authorizing the commission to adopt "rules and procedures."
- Wisconsin Carry, Inc. and member Thomas Waltz sued for a declaratory judgment that Wis. Stat. § 66.0409 preempts the bus rule.
- The statute (§ 66.0409) bars a "political subdivision" (defined as a city, village, town, or county) from enacting an "ordinance" or adopting a "resolution" that regulates firearms unless it mirrors state law.
- The City moved to dismiss, arguing the commission is not a "political subdivision" and the bus rule is not an "ordinance" or "resolution" under the statute. The circuit court dismissed Wisconsin Carry's petition.
- The court of appeals reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and accepted petition allegations as true for the dismissal posture.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wis. Stat. § 66.0409 preempts the commission's bus rule | § 66.0409 preempts local regulation of firearms generally, so the bus rule is invalid | § 66.0409 applies only to ordinances or resolutions adopted by a city, village, town, or county; the commission rule is neither | Held: No preemption; § 66.0409 applies only to "ordinances" and "resolutions" of a political subdivision and does not reach the commission's rule |
| Whether a municipal agency rule qualifies as an "ordinance" or "resolution" under § 66.0409 | Implicitly argued that agency rules should be covered to prevent indirect local regulation | The bus rule is not an ordinance or resolution as those terms are commonly understood; agencies have limited, not legislative, powers | Held: Agency rule is not an "ordinance" or "resolution"; Wisconsin Carry conceded the rule was not an enacted ordinance or adopted resolution |
| Whether courts should infer broader legislative intent beyond statutory text | Wisconsin Carry urged courts to read broader preemption to avoid absurd results (allowing agencies to do what municipalities cannot) | The court must honor the enacted statutory language and presume the legislature understood established definitions; if broader scope was intended, legislature could have drafted it | Held: Court refused to rewrite statute; applied plain meaning and legislative language controls |
| Whether aggregate agency regulations render the statute's limited scope absurd | Argued in theory municipal agencies collectively could effectively regulate firearms broadly | City responded that agencies have constrained scopes and aggregate hypotheticals do not make the statute absurd | Held: Not absurd; legislature may have reasonably distinguished municipal legislative acts from limited agency actions |
Key Cases Cited
- John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 303 Wis. 2d 34 (2007) (pleading facts accepted as true on dismissal)
- State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 271 Wis. 2d 633 (2004) (statutory interpretation starts with statutory text and plain meaning)
- Cross v. Soderbeck, 94 Wis. 2d 331 (1980) (distinguishing municipal ordinances as general/permanent and resolutions as more temporary/administrative)
- Apartment Ass'n of S. Cent. Wis., Inc. v. City of Madison, 296 Wis. 2d 173 (2006) (de novo review of statutory preemption issues)
- State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627 (1992) (appellate courts need not address undeveloped arguments)
- Tydrich v. Bomkamp, 207 Wis. 2d 632 (1996) (presumption that legislature knew and accepted existing case-law definitions)
- Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. City of Atlanta, 560 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (Georgia case cited by plaintiff; court distinguished it as addressing different issues)