John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee

John Doe 1, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,

v. Milwaukee, Archdiocese Defendant-Respondent, Defendant. #1, Company Alias Insurance 3, Doe 2 and John John Doe Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,

v. Milwaukee, Archdiocese Defendant-Respondent. Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, Charles Linneman,

v. Milwaukee, Archdiocese Defendant-Respondent, Franklyn Becker, Defendant. Court

Supreme argument April 2007. No. 2005AP1945. Oral July Decided 2007 WI 95 827.) (Also in 734 reported N.W.2d plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were For by Jeffrey A. Anderson, Minn, Marci Paul, St. R. briefs Washington, Smith, S. Hamilton, Pa., and James argument by Hamilton. Marci A. and oral Brookfield, by defendant-respondent there was brief For the Muth, & Rothstein, Quarles and David P. John A. Brady by argument John A. Milwaukee, oral LLP, and Rothstein. by

An amicus curiae brief filed was Richard Jasperson Jasperson P.A., Richard St. Paul, Biegert Minn., and Drill, Matthew A. S.C., Doar Leadership Richmond, New on behalf of the Council Interpersonal on Child Abuse & Violence.

¶ 1. PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. This unpublished is a review of an decision of the court of appeals dismissing that affirmed the circuit court's order complaints 1, of John Doe 2, John Doe John Doe against and Charles Linneman the Archdiocese of Mil (the Archdiocese).1 appeals agreed waukee The court of against with the circuit court the claims negligent supervision Archdiocese for and fraud relat ing priests' to the Roman Catholic sexual molestation of by children were barred the statute of limitations. John 1Doe v. Archdiocese Milwaukee, No. 2005AP1945, (Wis. 2006) unpublished slip op., App. Aug. ¶ 1 Ct. (John 1). Doe 2. We conclude that the claims asserted

the Archdiocese for are barred according the statute of limitations because to control- ling precedent such claims are derivative and accrued as a matter of law the time of the last incident of sexual However, assault. we also conclude that the claims of misrepresentation independent fraud for intentional are alleged knowledge claims based on the Archdiocese's priests' prior sexual molestation of children and the Archdiocese's intent to deceive children and their fami- lies. We further conclude that the date of the accrual of the fraud claims is "when the or, discovered diligence, the exercise of reasonable should have discov- alleged ered" that the Archdiocese's fraud was a cause of 1 Judge Guolee, Michael D. County Milwaukee Circuit Court, presided. injuries. Milwau Archdiocese BBB Doe v.

their John of (BBB (1997) 340, 94 312, 2d 565 N.W.2d kee, 211 Wis. Doe). by a motion resolved cannot be This determination complaints. Therefore, affirm we to dismiss supervision negligent claims; reverse we of dismissal for claims; remand the fraud and we of the dismissal proceedings. further

I. BACKGROUND2 of arises from the consolidation This review against the Archdiocese that was filed three lawsuits In John Doe to state a claim. for failure dismissed (the plaintiffs), filed 2 Doe 1 John Does and 3 plain- nearly complaints The Doe identical.3 that were allege that from 1973 to adults, are tiffs, who they Roman children, a now-deceased when were sexually priest, Siegfried Widera, abused them Catholic sexually criminally convicted after he had been molesting the Archdiocese knew another child and criminal conviction It was after Widera's his conviction. parish in from a Archdiocese moved Widera that the Washington, Parish in Wisconsin, to St. Andrew's Port the Doe molested Delavan, Wisconsin, where Widera plaintiffs. informed 4. The Archdiocese also was boy sexually at St. Andrew's molested an altar

Widera 2 reasonable complaints in the and all The facts set forth purposes of our are taken as true inferences therefrom John BBB Doe v.Archdiocese of the motion to dismiss. review (1997) 312, 320, (citing 94 Milwaukee, 2d 565 N.W.2d Wis. (1987)) 506, 512, Watts, 2d 405 N.W.2d v. 137 Wis. Watts (BBB Doe). jointly complaint filed one John Doe 3 John Doe the Archdiocese. Parish and confronted Widera, who admitted he had slip." contempo- made "a The Archdiocese's notes made raneously with this assault are attached to the com- plaint. They "try keep reveal that it would to the lid on thing, police so no record would be made" and also boy reprisals that it knew the mother of the "feared go police."Subsequently, from Church if she would to in 1976, the Archdiocese transferred Widera to California. people The Archdiocese told Widera to tell in Delavan going telling that he was on vacation rather than boys truth. Widera molested numerous after his trans- fer to California. plaintiffs negligent supervi- 5. The Doe claim

sion because the "Defendant Archdiocese or knew reasonabl[y] dangerous should have known of Widera's exploitative propensities exploiter and as a child sexual agent despite knowledge, an as unfit such and/or negligently Defendant Archdiocese retained and failed provide supervision to reasonable of Widera." The Doe plaintiffs also claim fraud because the Archdiocese Siegfried history sexually that "knew Widera had a of molesting danger children and he that was a to chil- notwithstanding knowledge, dren," but that the Arch- (1) affirmatively represented diocese: that "did it Siegfried history molesting know that Widera had a Siegfried children" and "did not know that Widera was (2) danger children"; failed to disclose its knowledge history sexually molesting of Widera's children. plaintiffs they

¶ 6. The Doe contend did not dis- diligence cover, in nor the exercise of reasonable should they negligently discovered, have that the Archdiocese supervised or Widera that the Archdiocese knew of history sexually abusing Widera's children until plaintiffs allege they 2004. It inwas 2004 that the Doe sexually convicted of had been that Widera discovered boy prior molesting of them. abuse a minor Widera's they not dis- did also contend The Doe diligence should reasonable cover, in the exercise of nor they fraud was a the Archdiocese's discovered, that have they injuries learned of Widera's their until cause of conviction. Linneman, an addition, in Charles In alleging approximately complaint in

adult, filed a Franklyn priest, W Roman Catholic 1982 another sexually he a child.4 him while was Becker, abused acquainted Linne- Lyons, Linneman became while Becker and boy Joseph Church an altar at St. man was parish subsequently moved to Becker was Wisconsin. to maintain Milwaukee, Wisconsin, but continued sexually abused Linneman. Linneman was contact with stayed overnight living quarters priest's he when in the in in the Archdiocese's churches Milwaukee at one of boy day. the next an altar order to serve as plaintiffs' complaints, Lin- to the Doe 8. Similar Franklyn "Archdioceseknew that neman claims that the molesting history sexually children and had a Becker danger to children" before he molested that he was a Linneman sued the Archdiocese Linneman negligent supervision claims and fraud.5 Linneman also him until did not the Archdiocese defrauded he know recently exercise of discover, and did not nor diligence discovered, that should he have reasonable injuries until re- a cause of his the Archdiocese was cently. approxi complaint that Charles Linneman was The states years the time of the abuse.

mately 12 old at Franklyn Becker for "fidu Linneman also sued W Charles fraud"; however, appellants do' not assert this claim on ciary appeal.

¶ 9. The Archdiocese moved to dismiss the Doe plaintiffs' complaints asserting, among things, other by applicable that the claims were barred statute agreed of limitations. The circuit court that the stat- plaintiffs' ute of limitations barred the Doe claims years because the last sexual assault occurred 29 they brought subsequently before suit. Linneman stipulated to the circuit court that his claims were "substantially plaintiffs' identical" to the Doe claims problems and had similar statute of limitations be- cause his last sexual contact with Becker occurred 23 years agreed before his lawsuit was filed. He to the consolidation and claims, dismissal of his but he right preserved appeal. his plaintiffs appealed

¶ 10. All the and the court of appeals complaints affirmed the dismissal of the concluding Archdiocese, the claims were barred the statute of limitations. John Doe unpublished op., slip 2005AP1945, No. 1. The court appeals concluded that claims Doe, were controlled BBB which concluded that victims of non-incestuous sexual assault knew or they injured they should have known were when were duty assaulted, therefore, the victims had "a inquire injury [ed] [the] into the result from activity." tortious 2005AP1945, John Doe No. un- published slip op., (quoting ¶¶ Doe, 10-11 BBB 340). discovery 2d such, Wis. at As "the did rule priests the save victims' claims because the began statute of limitations to run no later than the (citing ¶ date of the last sexual Id., assault." 11 BBB Doe, 344-45; 211 2dWis. at v. Archdiocese Pritzlaff of Milwaukee, 302, 316-17, 194 Wis. 2d 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995)).

47 appeals that the ¶ also concluded 11. The court of 893.93(l)(b) § Stat. fraud claims were barred Wis. (2005-06)6 began limitations the statute of because constituting fraud could have been the facts run when upon diligent inquiry Doe, under BBB discovered appellants law, to deemed, as a matter of have "the are injuries sexual no later than the last discovered their they duty Accordingly, had a to seek out the assault. . . . injuries 1, at that time." John Doe No. cause of their ... unpublished slip op., ¶¶ All the 13-15. 2005AP1945, plaintiffs petitioned supreme review, court which we for granted.

II. DISCUSSION of A. Standard Review independently

¶ 12. review a dismissal for fail We question Enters., a claim as a of law. Kaloti ure to state Kellogg 2d Co., 111, 10, Inc. 2005 WI 283 Wis. v. Sales 555, 205; John Doe 67C v. Archdiocese 699 N.W.2d 19, 307, 2d Milwaukee, 2005 WI 284 Wis. (John 67C). "A Doe motion to dismiss N.W.2d sufficiency legal failure to state a claim tests the complaint." reviewing Doe, BBB 211 Wis. 2d at 331. The liberally accepts pleadings court construes complaint, all facts as set forth as well as reason inferences Kaloti, able from those facts. 283 Wis. 2d However, 2d at 311. the court is 11; Pritzlaff, Wis. legal pled required to assume as true conclusions "not plaintiffs." Doe, BBB 211 Wis. 2d at 331. "Dismissal any improper a claim is if there are conditions under could Id. which recover." subsequent All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to otherwise indicated. the 2005-06 version unless grant ¶ should 13. In order to decide whether we dismiss, we must determine the Archdiocese's motion plaintiffs' claims for whether applicable statute of limita- fraud are barred such, determine "when the tions. As we must diligence, or, the exercise reasonable discovered they injured, and the discovered that were should have injury." diligence at 340. Reasonable is cause of their ordinarily question Id. at 341. a of fact for the fact-finder. Id. and reasonable inferences that "However,when the facts undisputed, a be from them are whether can drawn diligence plaintiff reasonable discover- has exercised question ing In action a of law. his or her cause of is ques- is a addition, whether an inference is reasonable (citations omitted).7 tion of law."Id. analysis may case, In of this we consider 14. our complaints fraud due to the state claims for

whether on the Archdio- disclose, failure to which turns whether history priests' duty cese had a to disclose duty question of exists is also a sexual abuse. "Whether independently...." Kaloti, 283 review law we Wis. 2d

B. Motion to Dismiss reviewing question 15. "A threshold when timely complaint

complaint has been is whether be sufficient claim will filed, because an otherwise 7 Therefore, person knew or should whether a reasonable than alleged fraud more six known of the Archdiocese's have of law complaints may question filed be a years before the were undisputed facts. on the reasonable inferences from depending Doe, BBB 211 Wis. 2d at 341. See

dismissed if that claim is time barred." Pritzlaff, statutory general, controlling 2d at 312. In Wis. period in limitation is the one effect when the claim for Co., relief accrued. Betthauser v. Med. Protective 172 (1992). "legis 141, Wis. 2d 493 N.W.2d40 Substantive prospective statutory presumptively lation is unless the language clearly [indicates] an intent that the statute applies retroactively." (quoting Id. at 147 United States WesleyCo., 305, 319, Fire Ins. Co. v. E.D. 105 Wis. 2d (1982)). proce However, 833 if "a is 313 N.W.2d statute remedial, substantive, dural or rather than the statute generally given application." is retroactive Id. Statutes generally of limitations are viewed as be substantive they extinguish claims, cause can otherwise valid and applies therefore, the statute of limitations that is the one effect when the claim for relief accrued.8 Id. at 149. Negligent supervision

1. A16. claim for of an em- ployee requires plaintiff plead prove all of the (1) following: employer duty had a of care owed to (2) (3) plaintiff; employer duty; the wrongful breached its employee act or omission of an a was cause- (4) plaintiffs injury; in-fact of the an act or omis- Dictionary Black's Law defines "accrue" as follows: "To Black's right." come into existence as an enforceable claim or (8th Dictionary 2004). Law explained ed. We have that before accrue, a claim relief capable can there must exist "a claim of enforcement, present party against may a suable it be whom enforced, party present right and a who has a to enforce it." Wis., Soc'y Meracle v. Children's Serv. 19, 26, 2dWis. Minahan, (1989) (quoting Barry v. 570, N.W.2d 532 127 Wis. (1906)). 573, 107 N.W. 488 wrongful employer was a cause-in-fact sion employee. 67C, John Doe 284 Wis. 2d act of the (citations omitted). ¶ 43 us, 17. In the case before the last sexual assault plaintiffs occurred no later than 1976.

of the Doe negligent supervision ac- Therefore, if their claim for then, the statute of limitations would be three crued 893.205(1) § years from that date 1976. Wis. Stat. (1975-76). However, because all of the Doe years age than 18 at the time their claims were less accrued, of limitations would for relief the statute have year been tolled for one after each Doe claimant 893.33(1) (1975-76). § age reached the of 18. Wis. Stat. repealed In ch. 893 was and recreated § revamped entirety 893.33 in its and Wis. Stat. was § § 28, 323, as Stat. 893.16. ch. and renumbered Wis. negligent if the claim for Therefore, Laws of 1979. supervision alleges he 1982, accrued in when Linneman by Becker, the statute of limitations was last assaulted 893.54(1) § years, still be three Wis. Stat. would (1981-82), years it tolled for after but would be two § age 893.16.9 Linneman reached the of 18. Wis. Stat. negligence The current statute of limitations for is still years the claim accrued. three from the date when 893.54(1). negligent § Therefore, unless the claims for years supervision accrued within three of when they complaints filed in are barred. Accord- were ingly, determine the claims accrued. we must when Doe, BBB case, to this all the 19. Similar against plaintiffs' included a claims the Archdiocese training, negligence placement claim for in the sexually supervision priests allegedly assaulted who 9 applies § to claims for relief The current Wis. Stat. 893.16 893.16(5)(c). § 1980. See July Wis. Stat. that accrued after they Doe,

them BBB while were minors. Wis. 2d at determining In accrued, 324. when the claims first we policy underlying reviewed considerations the stat- ute of limitations and noted: hand,

On allowing the one we are concerned with tort opportunity legitimate victims a fair to enforce claims hand, against wrongdoers. On the other we are con- protecting cerned with having defendants from to de- claims, fend stale passed where so much time has allegedly filing between the tortious act and the of the may claim that witnesses and relevant evidence be unavailable.

Id. at 334. policy

¶ 20. With these in mind, considerations we development discovery reviewed the rule in Wis discovery consin. Id. at 334-38. We noted that the rule adopted Co., was first in Hansen v. A.H. Robins (1983). 550, 560, Wis. 2d 335 N.W.2d578 There we held already governed that "all tort actions other than those by legislatively discovery created rule ... accrue on the injury diligence date the is discovered or with reasonable [have been] discovered, should whichever occurs first." discovery Hansen, Id. After we decided that the rule also applied discovery injury. Doe, of the cause of the BBB (citing Co., Wis. 2d at 335 Borello v. U.S. Oil (1986)). 397, 411, Wis. 2d 388 N.W.2d140 opinions Doe, In BBB we reviewed in which discovery applied negligence allegations rule was arising (citing from sexual assault. Id. at 335-38 Ham (Ct. Hammer, mer v. 142 257, 267, Wis. 2d 418 N.W.2d23 319). 1987);10 App. Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at In Pritzlaff, 10 Hammer, In Hammer v. 142 2dWis. 418 N.W.2d (Ct. 1987), App. appeals the court of applied discovery the rule to claims of incest. alleged plaintiff coerced into that she was sexual against priest a and filed claims the negligent

relations with priest against and also the Archdiocese retaining, training supervision. hiring, and Twenty-seven years 2d at 306-07. Pritzlaff, Wis. alleged relationship passed end of the had since the plaintiff priest, therefore, and one and the between had the statute of limitations of the issues was whether explained during Id. at 312. We been tolled that time. discovery limitations that the rule "tolls the statute of diligence plaintiff or with reasonable until the discovers has have discovered that he or she suffered should wrongs by particular, damage committed a actual due to omitted). (citations person." identified Id. at 315-16 identity both the of the tortfeasor Since Pritzlaff knew deterjnined injurious conduct, and the we she alleged complete her cause of action could have relationship therefore, the claims ended, time the and Id. at 316-17. were time barred. plaintiffs Doe, In BBB one or more of the negligent

alleged "for claims Archdiocese training, placement, supervision priest, li- authority, ability apparent and for under the doctrine of [(1995-96)] § duty 48.981 breach of under Wis. Stat. report mitigate Doe, BBB 2d harm." Wis. abuse During explained review, at 322. our we discovery duty diligence rule: to conduct due under the injury duty inquire Plaintiffs into have activity. diligence The from tortious measure results the elements of his or required plaintiff of a to discover diligence great her cause of action is such as majority persons would in the same or similar use may ignore means of circumstances. Plaintiffs them, but must in reasonably information available to particulars attention to those good apply faith their may be which inferred to be within their reach. ... If plaintiff providing the has information the basis an objective injury cause, belief as to his or her and its he injury or she has discovered and its cause. (citations omitted). Applying Id. at 340-41 the discov ery case, rule we concluded as a matter of law "plaintiffs that each or, five discovered in the diligence, exercise of reasonable should have discov injury by ered" their and the cause thereof at least time of the last incident of assault. Id. at 342. We noted recognized "[a]s injury we in Pritzlaff, actionable immediately flows from a nonconsensual, intentional touching. plaintiffs may sexual While not have injuries known the extent of their at the time of the assaults, sexual dependent upon knowing in Wisconsin accrual anof action is not inju

the full extent of one's 317). (citing Pritzlaff, ries." Id. at 343-44 194 Wis. 2d at Accordingly, we decided "as a matter of law that the plaintiffs by claims of these accrued the time of the last incident of sexual assault." Id. at 346. plaintiffs'

¶ 23. We concluded that the claims "ac- crued the time of the last incident of assault," sexual though they id., even claimed that re- pressed their memories of the sexual abuse. Because delayed, they their recollections were were unable to identity discover the of the abuser and the fact of the memory until abuse their had returned. Id. at 357. We reasoned that: contrary public

[I]t would be policy, and would defeat purposes statutes, of limitations to allow claims of repressed memory discovery to invoke the rule and to indefinitely statutory toll the limitations for these plaintiffs. We hold repressed memory that a claim of past delay sexual abuse does not the accrual of a cause assault, of action for regardless non-incestuous sexual minority position and the of the victim's trust alleged perpetrator. occupied Id. at 364.

¶ 24. our discussion in BBB Doe on While focused against priests, the direct claims the we extended our analysis negligent supervision against to the claims of Archdiocese, held the which we were derivative addressing explained claims.11We that we were not plaintiffs' statute of limitations relative to the claims negligent employment on theories because based against "[pllaintiffs derivative causes of action and the churches accrued at the same time Archdiocese underlying accrued, and that the intentional tort claims similarly by barred the statute of limitations." would be 312). (citing Id. at 366 194 Wis. 2d at Pritzlaff, in decided that the 25. We note that we Pritzlaff against discovery rule did not save the claims priest negligent supervision and that the claim for

11 from, of, grows out A derivative claim is one "that derives or results from an earlier or fundamental state or condition." Dictionary Unabridged Third New 608 Webster's International (1961 ed.). by a example, For a derivative action is a suit on a corporate shareholder to enforce a cause of action based 180.0740(2). Accordingly, § right corporation. Wis. Stat. against employer negligent supervision an of an em claim employee's wrongful of an act that causes ployee is derivative injury another, wrongful alleged act to have been which is Stores, by negligence. v. employer's caused Miller Wal-Mart (1998). Inc., 250, 267-68, 2d 233 A claim for Wis. N.W.2d by claim of employer an contrasts with a employer, fraud an is not a derivative claim. The which the fraud claim. For contrast is demonstrated the elements of require proof example, proof of a claim based on fraud does wrong by employee injury an that causes to another. Kaloti Enters., Co., Kellogg 283 Wis. 2d Inc. v. Sales WI 555, 699 N.W.2d against

accrued on Archdiocese the same date as priest. 2d Pritzlaff, those Wis. at 312. At the time of in assumed, our decision we Pritzlaff, deciding, negligent hiring, without that a claim for training supervision existed Wisconsin. Id. at opinions jurisdictions 325-26. looked We from other for the elements of such a claim. Id. at 326. Wereasoned if Wisconsin, such a claim existed in Pritzlaff prove negligent would have to that the Archdiocese was hiring retaining priest or because he was unfit for priest. explained the role aof Id. We the First prevents Amendment of the United States Constitution determining per- Wisconsin courts from what makes a competent priest. son to serve as a Catholic Id. There- plaintiffs negligent fore, we concluded that even if the supervision time-barred, claims were not the claims prohibited by were the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. ¶ Doe, In 26. BBB relied we on for its Pritzlaff discovery applied

discussion of the rule as to claims of Doe, sexual BBB assault. Wis. 3d at 336-38. We negligent supervision then concluded that because the against priests were claims derivative of the claims they assault, for sexual were also barred the statute of limitations. Id. at 366.

¶ Clauder, 27. In L.L.N. v. 2d Wis. (1997), N.W.3d 434 we also addressed a claim for negligent supervision priest brought of a that was against the Diocese of Madison. We assumed that a negligent supervision claim in Wisconsin, existed as we did in However, Id. at 685. refused to we Pritzlaff. reach that claim because we concluded that the case consenting involved sexual contact adults, between two priest's celibacy therefore, a vow could be in volved. Id. at 695-96. Wereasoned that a civil court "has authority no to determine or enforce standards of religious duty" conduct and and held First precluded negligent Amendment L.L.N.'s claim for su- pervision. at Id. 696. us, In the before do 28. case we not address prohibits negligent

whether the First Amendment supervision or fraud claims because issue was not brought explicitly to us. The Archdiocese stated in its grounds that "there are no Amendment brief First or presented appeal." issues on this record or The Arch- position questioned diocese maintained the same when during argu- about First Amendment oral defenses ment. Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the con- Doe, in BBB clusions we reached Clauder and Pritzlaff negligent supervision. to claims of relative plaintiffs Doe, The BBB 29. herein contend that controlling Clauder and are not because the Pritzlaff regarding negligent employment supervision law has since The evolved those decisions. also argue employer's derivative, that an torts are not but independent plaintiffs underlying of a claim an employee injury. They rely Miller who caused the on v. Stores, Inc., 267-68, Wal-Mart 219 Wis. 2d (1998). N.W.2d233 recognized Miller, In that in we Wisconsin

claim for is a "valid claim." Id. jurisprudence prior However, of our to and review subsequent that Miller in to Miller demonstrates no way holdings Doe, in BBB undermines or overrules our Clauder or Pritzlaff. Miller, 31. Prior to we had not decided whether against employer negligent

a common law claim an hiring, training employee supervision or an could be maintained in Wisconsin courts. Id. at 259. Our deci- Doe, BBB it sion Miller does not mention nor does opine negligent hiring, training whether the tort of or supervision employee of an is, not, or is a derivative underlying wrongful claim of the conduct of the em- ployee. say However, we did in Miller that in order for negligent hiring, training supervision a claim of or against employer, wrongful arise an there must be employee. finally, conduct an Id. at 263. And since employee priest employed by in Miller was not a an archdiocese, the First Amendment was not mentioned. recognize

¶ 32. We also that there are cases de scribing negligent supervision the claim of as a claim separate that focuses on conduct that is from the underlying wrongful employee. e.g., act of See, Doyle Engelke, v. 219 Wis. 2d n.6, 580 N.W.2d (1998) ("While negligent supervision require does underlying wrong by [an] employee an to be committed actually as an element, the tort focuses on the tortious, negligent, employer."); i.e., conduct of the Clauder, 209 (reasoning "liability Wis. 2d at 698-99 n.21 does solely relationship not result because of the of the employer employee, but instead because of the independent negligence employer"). However, Doyle determining neg and Clauder were not whether ligent supervision was or was not a derivative claim for purposes determining whether the statute of limita tions bars the action. example, Doyle, deciding 33. For we were duty

whether an insurer had a to defend its insured negligent supervision. Doyle, claims of explaining Wis. 2d at 291 n.6. We were argument insurer's that it did not have to defend the liability grounds persuasive claim on vicarious was not because the claim for was not a liability. claim based on vicarious Id. at 291-92. We also said that while the intentional acts exclusion in the may exempt defending policy the insurer from employees for what characterized individual was as negligent supervision conduct, intentional the tort of negligence employer. on the of the Id. at 291. As focused Doyle, Miller, Doe, did not mention BBB with we negligent super- we did not discuss whether claim of underlying was or was not derivative of the vision wrong employee. language plain- Clauder, In 34. to which the explaining tiffs refer arose when we were that a tort negligent supervision claim for was distinct from a tort liability liability claim for because vicarious is vicarious principles agency implicated in based on that are not negligent supervision. Clauder, claims of 2d at Wis. 698-99 n.21. May released 35. Clauder was on 1997 and

BBB Doe released one month later on June was any argument persua- Therefore, 1997. that Clauder is authority proposition negli- a claim sive for the gent supervision is not a derivative claim as we said it unavailing. in BBB Doe is was Accordingly, BBB we conclude that Doe negligent control the outcome of the claims for

Pritzlaff supervision They controlling that are us. are before negligent precedent that have decided that the claims of supervision underlying made here are derivative of the priests. such, sexual molestations As those accrued, law, claims as a matter of the time of Does, this last incident of sexual assault. For would Linneman, it be no later than 1976 and for would be no later than 1982. As all claims for years complaints accrued at least 23 before the were tolling periods plaintiffs' filed, due to the minorities length Furthermore, are of insufficient to save them. injuries though that their contend even recently not discovered until and the cause thereof were coping psychological mechanisms, the statute due to repressed on claims of limitations is not tolled based Doe, Therefore, BBB 2d at 357. the memories. Wis. negligent supervision are barred claims for applied prior negligence, as of limitations for statute controlling precedent. 2. Fraud of limitations for an action 37. The statute years, regardless fraud is six of whether the

based on any claim accrued in the mid-1970s or time thereafter. 893.19(1) 893.93(1)(b); § § e.g., see, Wis. Stat. Wis. Stat. (1973-74). negli- As with the statute of limitations for gent supervision, this statute be tolled for one or would years person brings after the who the claim reaches two age injury during minority 18, if occurred (1975-76); § of the claimant. Wis. Stat. 893.33 Wis. § limitations, Stat. 893.16. Based on this statute of years unless the claims for fraud accrued within six complaints were filed in the claims are when Accordingly, barred. we must examine when the claims analyze However, for fraud accrued. before we claim fraud, accrual for we decide whether the sufficiently allege all of the elements of a claim based on fraud. allegations

a. Fraud misrepresentation A38. claim for intentional proof

requires that: (1) representation; the defendant made a factual (2) (3) untrue; which was the defendant either made representation knowing it was untrue or made it recklessly caring without false; whether it was true or (4) the defendant made the representation with intent upon it; to defraud and to induce another to act (5) plaintiff believed the statement to be true and relied on it to detriment. his/her allegations Kaloti, 2dWis. 12.12The of fraud complaints in the that are before us are of two (1) types: alleged representations affirmative that the priests history molesting did not have a children and (2) they danger alleged were children; priest failures to disclose the material fact that each history had a of sexual molestation of children. Either representation an affirmative disclose, or a failure to duty support there disclose, when is a to can a claim of misrepresentation. Id., ¶ intentional 13. §§

¶ 39. that We note Wis. Stat. 802.02 and 802.03 requirements pleadings generally set forth the and 802.02(l)(a) pleadings for claims of fraud. Section re- quires plain "[a] short and statement of the claim." 802.03(2), § pertaining pleadings However, fraud, constituting "the states circumstances fraud or mistake particularity." interpreted shall be stated with We have party We have concluded that a to a business transaction duty has a to disclose a fact when: (1) (2) transaction; party the fact is material to the with knowledge party of that fact knows that the other is about to enter (3) fact; into the under a transaction mistake as to the the fact is

peculiarly exclusively knowledge party, and within the of one party reasonably it; expected the mistaken could not be to discover (4) circumstances, objective on account of the the mistaken party reasonably expect would disclosure of the fact. Kaloti, 283 Wis. 2d 20. require "allegations

this statute to of fraud must specify particular involved, individuals where and misrepresentations occurred, and to whom mis- when representations Id., ¶

were made." representations i. Affirmative representations, ¶ 40. As affirmative factual plaintiffs allege represented Doe that the Archdiocese history it did not know that Widera had a molesting danger children and it did he not know was plaintiffs allege to children. The Doe the Archdiocese responses parishioners' did so its letters wherein it parishioners' positive affirmed the comments about frequent Widera's interactions with children. For ex- ample, February 12, 1974, on the Vice President of the St. Andrew School Board wrote: literally The children in our school follow him

(Widera) around, he is so kind and shows so much interest in them. February 19, 1974,

On Theisen, the Reverend John J. Secretary responded: Archdiocese, Executive for the happy you pleased We are most to hear that are so Sig Father happy with Widera. Weare to hear that he is doing inwell the school and shows so much interest the children. plaintiffs' complaints incorporate

The Doe attach and showing these letters and other documents that Widera § was convicted of a violation of Wis. Stat. 944.17 (1973-74) (sexual perversion) August 13, on 1973. It is alleged that the Archdiocese knew of this conviction responded reaffirming when it in a manner parishioners' letters. 41. The Doe and Linneman complaints also that the

allege Archdiocese's act of placing priests in parishes with unsupervised access to children consti- tuted affirmative representations that the Archdiocese did not know that had priests a history of sexually molesting children and that the Archdiocese did not know the priests were a danger to children. For ex- ample, Doe plaintiffs' complaints allege: By placing Siegfried Widera at St. Andrews in Delavan, the Archdiocese affirmatively represented to minor children and their families at parish, includ- ing families, [the] Plaintiffs and their [] Siegfried that Widera did not history have a molesting children, that Defendant Archdiocese did Sieg- not know that fried history Widera had a of molesting children and that Defendant Archdiocese did not Sieg- know that fried Widera danger was a to children.

36. Particularly, Defendant Archdiocese knew Siegfried Widera had sexually molested numerous children and Siegfried danger Widera was a children before Widera [] molested Plaintifffs].

50.' Defendant Archdiocese Siegfried knew that Widera had a history sexually molesting children before Plaintiff[s].

(See John Doe 1 Similar Compl.) allegations are made in Linneman's relative complaint to the Archdiocese's representations about Becker. 42. We have held that acts can be the equivalent

of a representation. Greenhouse, Scandrett v. 244 Wis. (1943). 108, 113, 11 Scandrett, N.W.2d 510 In who attorney had represented Greenhouse in a prior including suit, an settle the entire suit received offer to responded subrogated He Id. at 110. claim, for $250. by saying he would have to check with to offer settling position regard to on insurance carrier in its attorney accepted subrogated The later claim. Id. However, further comment. Id. when check without accepted check, he he had not contacted the insur- pay not claim. Id. at 110-11. carrier, ance and he did its to its Later, carrier sued collect when insurance question subrogated there about claim, was $41.20 attorney's accepting act of the check could whether the representation as an sufficient be construed affirmative support a claim fraud. Id. at 111. We concluded explained: did and it necessary person It for a to make oral is misrepresentation guilty fact in order to be of of conduct, representations may be fraudulent —such by party. the acts The rule is made or conduct Bigelow,Fraud, p. stated in 467: into "Any capable being conduct turned a state- fact is a no representation. ment of There is distinction misrepresentations by effected words and mis- between representations by other effected acts." (citations omitted). Id. at 113 jurisdictions recog Courts other also have representations may, nized cer that affirmative under circumstances, See, tain made be non-verbal conduct. e.g., Co., Haberstick v. A. Gundaker Real Estate Gordon (Mo. 1996) App. (concluding 104, 109 Ct. S.W.2d may satisfy undertaken mislead an conduct affirma representation); Daugherty, tive v. Bedell 242 S.W.2d (Mo. 1951) (concluding misrepresentation "[a] 572, 575 may be made conduct calculated to mislead and to fraudulently advantage"); Guaranty obtain an undue Kelley, State Bond Bank Pleasant v. 13 S.W.2d69, of Mt. (Tex. 1929) (concluding App. Comm'n that even if the the bank, husband consummated deal with the the wife's representation conduct "amounted anto affirmative that good conveyed had, faith, and her in she husband the assigned and homestead reserved the lien thus to the bank"). plaintiffs allege Here, 44. the all that the placing priests parishes

Archdiocese's act in of the they unsupervised had where to children access affir- matively represented to the minor children and their priests families that the Archdiocese did know the not history molesting had of children and that the Arch- priests danger did diocese not know the were to representations children. Because can acts constitute of solely allegations complaints fact, based the on in the us, we before cannot conclude that acts such as are complaints described the are not sufficient to consti- representation. an tute affirmative ¶ 45. The four other elements of intentional mis- representation pled by plaintiffs. also were the First, plaintiffs allege representa- that the the affirmative priests' tions that the Archdiocese did not know of the history of and molestation that the Archdiocese did not priests danger the know awere to children were untrue. plaintiffs allege Second, the that the Archdiocese knew representations the were untrue when made.13 plaintiffs' complaints The Doe state that Widera had been criminally convicted of child molestation and the Archdiocese complaints The knew conviction. also state that detailing priest Archdiocese received a letter comments of a that allege complaints Archdiocese Third, 46. plaintiffs and induce them intended to deceive telling representations by parishio- on the act sexually of molest- ners of Widera's criminal conviction ing sexually boy history a minor Becker's molesting children. allege they plaintiffs relied Fourth, representations such because the defendants were

on positions superiority influence, which caused sexually damages. molested and suffer them be alleged Therefore, conclude that the have we to state claims for fraud. facts sufficient criminally parish at Widera at when con- worked worked grade The who victed. letter stated a male school teacher boys "fooling saw Widera around with the of another teacher" way priest told the that if Widera "fooled around in the same students, face"; his he would Father in that punch with parishioners had come forward after the criminal conviction they they gave and reported warnings and incidents had noticed children; to their own and that would all in the Widera shower boys then an adult "[w]hen nude with male entered shower, Fr. a Siegfried covered himself with towel." alleged that the Archdiocese Becker had

Linneman knew sexually danger numerous children and that a molested he was complaint to Linneman's states that Becker fondled children. genitals attempted boy approxi- a minor sodomize on Milwaukee, mately ten occasions to 1972 in separate from 1971 Wisconsin, 1978, boy approximately and in another fondled pastor numerous in California. The at church in times California that Becker be transferred back to Milwaukee. asked Linneman's also that the received complaint states Archdiocese "an report parishioners a from two 1980 Becker had teenage boy, incident" with a the Arch- whereupon unfortunate to therapy diocese sent Becker and transferred him to another complaint parish. Linneman's also states the Archdiocese re- complaints parents regarding ceived from other concerned children. inappropriate Becker's behavior with ii. Failure disclose complaints alleged

¶ through 48. The also fraud the Archdiocese's failure to disclose the fact that the priests had histories sexual abuse of children. In general, or a silence failure to disclose a fact is not an misrepresentation person intentional unless the has a duty Kaloti, 555, 13; to disclose. 2dWis. Doe 676C, 307, 49; 2dWis. v. Ollerman O'Rourke (1980). Co., 17, Wis. 2d 288 N.W.2d 95 "If there duty fact, is to disclose a failure to disclose that fact equivalent representation is treated the law as to a Ollerman, of the nonexistence of the fact." 94 Wis. 2d satisfy 26. Therefore, at whether non-disclosure can an element of fraud turns on whether the Archdiocese duty had a to disclose to the the fact that the priests had histories of sexual molestation of children. Although question legal of whether a duty question exists is a law, id. at it is an extremely complex question may have factual components that make it unsuitable to on address motion to dismiss. When we review a motion to may, compelled dismiss, we to, but we are not address complaint whether the states more than one claim for Ass'n, relief. Attoe v. Madison Policemen's Prof'l (1977). 199, 205, Wis. 2d 255 N.W.2d 489 Because we plaintiffs' allegations have concluded that the of affir misrepresentations mative fraudulent sufficient, are sufficiency plaintiffs' do not we address the of the misrepresentation fraudulent claims based on failures sexually to disclose Widera's and Becker's histories molesting children that were known the Archdio prior plaintiffs. cese the sexual abuse Accrual of fraud claims14

iii. claims for fraud conclude that 50. Since we intentional misrep- Archdiocese based on determine we now sufficiently pled, are resentations the statute by are barred such claims whether fraud based on intentional The claims for limitations. negligent from distinguishable are misrepresentations above, fraud As we explained claims. supervision rather, inten- claims, but are not derivative claims act is wrongful where tional torts that it did not fraudulent representation Archdiocese's sexually molesting histories of of the priests' know were did not know the priests children and that it claims, if proven, provide children. Fraud dangerous to plaintiffs' injuries.15 separate cause opinion BBB did not address intentional Our Doe Doe, (explaining 2d at 319 BBB 211 Wis. misrepresentation. for against the Archdiocese plaintiffs alleged claims that the of the defen training supervision "negligent employment, abuse"). opinion report the Our priests, dant and for failure to of the statute of Doe also no discussion BBB contains fraud, viability of a fraud it would have if limitations as there has analyzed. point this out because claim had been We BBB Doe addressed confusion about whether been some (intentional misrepresentation) the Arch claims of fraud It not. diocese. did negligent super above, the explained As we reason underlying as the sexual

vision claims accrue at the same time priest is because when sexual assault assault claims is alleged, supervision claims are derivative causes negligent Doe, tort claims. BBB underlying to the intentional of action misrepresentation intentional 2d at No claim for Wis. in BBB was made Doe.

¶ 51. The statute of limitations for fraud codifies discovery rule and states: "The cause of action in is such case not deemed to have accrued until discovery, aggrieved party, of the facts constitut- 893.93(l)(b). § ing explained the fraud." Wis. Stat. We discovery pertains rule as it to fraud as follows: complete Actual and knowledge of the fraud on the part plaintiff necessary is not in order to set the period running. limitation

When the information brought ag- home to the grieved party is such toas indicate where the facts constituting the fraud can be effectually discovered upon diligent inquiry, duty it is the of party such to inquiry, make the and if he fails to do so within is, nevertheless, reasonable he chargeable time with notice all to inquiry might facts which such have led. above, quoted

Under the rule it necessary is not party a defrauded knowledge have of the ultimate fact of fraud. required possession What is it is that be in will, of such essential facts diligently investigated, as if diligent disclose fraud. The burden inquiry is upon party the defrauded as soon as he has such information as constituting indicates where the facts the fraud can be discovered. Haechler,

Koehler v. 275, 278, 27 Wis. 2d 133 N.W.2d (internal (1965) omitted). quotations and citations pur- Koehler, In we concluded that stock chaser was barred the statute of from limitations claiming corporate allegedly fraud in the sale of stock excess the number of shares authorized because no presented pur- fact was that should have alerted the probate proceeding chaser to look to the for information ownership prior regarding he did so. of shares when complaints out no fact that Here, set Id. at 278-79. attempt to discover have alerted the should priests had knew that the the Archdiocese whether prior of of children.16 histories sexual abuse discovery appeals applied the The 53. court of Casting Co. in Die v. a fraud claim Stroh rule to (Ct. App. Co., 132 91, 2d 502 N.W.2d 177 Wis. Monsanto 1993). hydraulic plaintiff in a fluid user The Stroh was liability products brought the a action that alleging Monsanto, the fluid was defec manufacturer, high biphenyl compounds polychlorinated due to tive (PCBs).17 summary moved for Id. at 98. Monsanto claiming judgment, time that the cause of action was appeals that The court of noted the barred. Id. at 99. generally question discovery" for is a of fact the "date of only jury question the facts are a of law where and is parties agreed undisputed. Id. at 104. The in Stroh necessary purposes accrual, "it is not for of claim knowledge party of the fact of defrauded have ultimate possession required is in of is that it be fraud. What investigated, diligently will, if essential facts as such (quoting 117-18 Milwaukee W. the fraud." Id. at disclose Lienemann, 61, 65, 15 112 Wis. 2d N.W.2d Bank v.A.A. (1961)). after were made we Although voluminous submissions case, they may accepted of not be used the motion review this failing state a claim because complaints the to dismiss sufficiency complaint. only legal that motion tests Doe, at BBB 211 Wis. 2d biphenyls) [compounds "are (polychlorinated PCBs toxic environment, in the in the and tend to accumulate persist

that] beings and animals." Stroh Die food chains of both human Co., 91, 97, 502 N.W.2d 132 Casting Co. v. Monsanto Wis. 2d 1993). (Ct. App. appeals ¶ 54. The court of in Stroh concluded that action was time barred under Wis. Stat. 893.93(l)(b). § Chapter theWith enactment of NR 157 of September the Wisconsin Administrative Code in "Management Containing entitled of PCBs and Products expenses PCBs," Stroh had incur substantial for PCB testing and incineration due to its use of continued PCBs hydraulic regulation in its fluids. Id. at 118-19. The also pervasiveness persistence "to alerted user PCB-containing products in the environment." Id. Fur- problems thermore, the user noted that the associated PCB-containing products pub- with created "tremendous outcry throughout lic Therefore, mid-1970s."Id. appeals "[a]s September court of concluded that enterprise position conscientious Stroh should suspicious [representation] have become of Monsanto's Pydraul its that fluids be could continue to used in casting operation." die Stroh's Id. at 119. Since the court appeals "diligently of gated concluded that had Stroh investi- [in] September

the facts known to it the alleged part fraud on the of Monsanto would have been Accordingly, misrep- discovered."Id. Stroh's intentional resentation claim was time barred. Id. provide support

¶ 55. does Stroh sufficient us to cause dismiss the fraud claims for at least three First, reasons. Stroh was decided after motions for summary judgment develop- trial a full for factual contrast, ment. Id. at 99. In the case now before us presents only as a motion to dismiss where the facts developed complaints are those stated in the or the pled. reasonable inferences that flow from BBB facts Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at Second, 331. Stroh's failure to comply regulations regard with in federal to PCB disposal injuries. Stroh, was a cause of its 177 Wis. 2d at By was contrast, none of the children who assaulted

112. anything own did to cause their and Becker Widera reasoning investigation injuries. the that about Third, reasonably may required context is not in a business be relationship directly that is based on transferable relationship particularly in a the trust arises trust, when priest parishioner. religious as that of context such being it from fact of Therefore, does not follow suspect any plaintiff sexually that would molested priests prior knew that the had histories the Archdiocese yet placed of children and them of molestation sexual they position children. where would molest more argued It has been that we should follow 56. also reasoning Appeals of the Utah Court Colosimo Bishop City, 104 P.3d646 v. Catholic Salt Lake Roman (2004) plain the fraud claims because the and dismiss long the Archdiocese's fraud tiffs should have discovered on had We of limitations fraud run. before the statute decline the invitation to do so. brought Colosimo, In suit 57. City, against Bishop of Lake the Catholic Salt d/b/a (the City, and other

Diocese of Salt Lake archdioceses grounded parish Bishop) in their sexual assaults alleged priest. at Fraud one of the claims Id. was Bishop. Id. trial all The court dismissed judgment. summary The Id. at 650. court claims on appeals based on its conclusion affirmed dismissal correctly interpreted had the Utah the trial court barring all Id. It of limitations as claims. at 652. statute plaintiffs at the of that the knew time concluded because injured by priest they the that were the sexual assault they priest's relationship knew of the because they turning required defendants, were after other years age diligence" reasonable in discov- of "exercise they Bishop. ering at had Id. claims whether 653. persuasive. Initially,

¶ is not Colosimo we note summary judgment that Colosimo is a decision where pleadings facts outside of the were considered coming at court to its conclusions. Id. 650. We have pleadings not considered facts outside of the and the deciding therefrom, reasonable inferences when Doe, now BBB case before us. 211 Wis. 2d at 331. any give Furthermore, Colosimo does not reason for its reaching conclusion the assaulted children on majority investigated Bishop should have whether the priest's history sexually assaulting knew of the Bishop placed priest children before the in the parishes Accordingly, where he assaulted Colosimo. as complaints they review the we us, we before conclude provide from conclude, do a basis which we can as a person position law, matter that a reasonable in the investigated should have whether the prior Archdiocese Widera's and knew of Becker's sexual yet placed posi- molestations of children them in they sexually where tions could more molest children. ¶ 59. The Archdiocese also contends that the stat- ute of sexual a child, limitations for abuse of Wis. Stat. § legislature's public 893.587, demonstrates that policy plain- is to toll the statute limitations for the birthday.18 tiffs' claims no later than their 35th Wiscon- § sin Stat. 893.587 states: damages

An injury action to recover caused an act 948.02, 948.025, would constitute violation of s. 948.06, 948.085, 948.095 or or would create a cause of didWe not address this contention under the claim for we because concluded those claims ac at crued the time of abuse or 1982 and mid-1970s were by the barred statute of limitations then in effect. Wisconsin § Stat. 893.587 created and did was not until 2003 not take May until 6.§ effect 2004. 2003 Wis. Act the shall be commenced before action under s. 895.442 years or barred. injured age reaches of 35 be party in listed Wis. Stat. 893.587 60. The statutes exploi- assault, incest, or refer to acts of sexual sexual allege complaints caused act that tation.19 The misrepresenta- injury is Archdiocese's fraudulent representation did i.e., that the Archdiocese tion, sexually abusing priests had know histories of not dangerous priests did not know the were children and § of the listed in 893.587 to children. None statutes misrepresentations. Therefore, the to refers fraudulent apply to of these claims fraud. statute does recognize important policy consid- 61. do We defending protecting from stale eration of defendants may claims, and relevant evidence be when witnesses Doe, However, we BBB 211 Wis. 2d at 334. unavailable. recognize given a fair that tort victims should be also opportunity legitimate wrong- claims

to enforce Id. doers. Keeping policy in these considerations deny claims

mind, we the motion to dismiss the fraud solely that, on the com- because we conclude based plaints, knew we cannot determine when the alleged known the Archdiocese's or should have § of a "[s]exual Stat. 948.02 refers to assault Wisconsin child"; "[e]ngaging repeated § Wis. to acts Stat. 948.025 refers child"; § same Stat. refers to of sexual assault of the Wis. 948.06 "[sjexual child"; § with a Wis. Stat. 948.085 refers "[i]ncest care"; § 948.095 placed child substitute Wis. Stat. assault "[sjexual person or a assault of child a school staff refers children"; who with and Wis. Stat. person works or volunteers by a exploitation member of § "[s]exual 895.442 refers to clergy."

knowledge priests' past histories of sexual moles- may may Therefore, tation children. their claims or 893.93(l)(b), depend- not be time-barred Wis. Stat. ing on when the claims for fraud accrued. The date of discovery usually question Borello, is of fact. See dispute 2d However, Wis. at 404. if the facts are in only or if there is one reasonable inference to be drawn discovery them, from determination of the date of is a question independently. of law that we will review See Vocational, Educ., DILHR, Technical Adult Dist. 13 v. (1977). 2d 230, 240, Wis. N.W.2d present

¶ 63. Since a motion to dismiss does not opportunity fully develop surrounding the facts argument plaintiffs' the Archdiocese's fraud claims years accrued more than six before the date on which they filed, were we conclude that the claims for fraud survive the motion to clarify However, dismiss. we want to precluding summary judgment

that we are not if undisputed facts demonstrate that the claims for fraud years prior accrued more than six to the on dates which the claims were filed.

III. CONCLUSION ¶ 64. We conclude that the claims asserted against the Archdiocese for are by according barred statute of limitations because controlling precedent such are claims derivative accrued as a matter of law the time of the last incident of However, sexual assault. we also conclude misrepresenta- that the claims of fraud for intentional independent tion are claims based on the Archdiocese's alleged knowledge priests' prior of the sexual molesta- tion of children and the intent Archdiocese's to deceive children and their families. We further conclude that the date of the accrual of the fraud claims is "when the of reasonable in the exercise or, discovered

diligence, discovered" have should injuries. alleged their a cause of fraud was Archdiocese's determination at 340. This Doe, 211 Wis. 2d BBB the com- a motion to dismiss resolved cannot be neg- plaints. affirm the dismissal Therefore, we ligent supervision the dismissal claims; we reverse proceed- further remand for claims; the fraud ings. and we appeals By of the court decision the Court.—The part part; remanded to in in reversed is affirmed court. the circuit (concur- ABRAHAMSON, C.J. S. 65. SHIRLEY dissenting pari).

ring part, two This case involves types Archdiocese of Milwau- of claims plaintiffs, negligent supervision The and fraud. kee: sexually they allege were as children adults, that now by priests the defen- and that Catholic abused Roman super- negligently Milwaukee, the Archdiocese of dant, disclosing by priests fraud and committed the vised by actively covering up, previ- about, and information by priests. The Arch- the abuse ous incidents sexual by claims are barred that these diocese asserts the last sexual assault limitations because statute of years prior commencement of to the occurred lawsuit. majority opinion agree that "the I 66. with misrepresentation are fraud for intentional

claims of alleged independent on the Archdiocese's claims based prior knowledge priests' sexual molestation of the chil- intent to deceive the Archdiocese's children and Majority op., ¶ I2. further dren and their families." agree fraud claims is the accrual of the that "the date of in the exercise of or, discovered 'when diligence, reasonable should have discovered' that the alleged inju- Archdiocese's fraud was a cause of their omitted). Majority op., (quoted join ¶ 2 ries." source I part majority opinion that of the that remands the proceedings cause to the circuit court for further on the plaintiffs' fraud claims. join part opin- I cannot, however, plaintiffs' negligent

ion that affirms the dismissal of the supervision agree claims. I do not the "claims negligent supervi- asserted the Archdiocese for sion are barred according the statute of limitations because controlling precedent such claims are de- rivative and accrued aas matter of law the time of the Majority op., ¶ last incident of sexual assault." 2.1 think majority opinion turns the case law on its head. (I) majority opinion's ¶ 68. I reason as follows: negligent supervision classification of the tort of as comport "derivative" does not standings with traditional under (II) controlling pre claims"; "derivative Doyle2 cedent, the cases, Miller1 and clear is that claims brought against employer an (III) independent

are claims; the BBB Doe3 and (and cases) cases similar do not control. Pritzlaff4

HH majority opinion negligent ¶ 69. The holds that supervision claims are "derivative claims" that accrue at Stores, Inc., Miller v. Wal-Mart 250, 267-68, 219 Wis. 2d (1998). 580 N.W.2d 233 2 Doyle Engelke, v. 277, n.6, 219 2dWis. 291 580 245 N.W.2d (1998). 3 Milwaukee, John BBB v. Doe Archdiocese 211 2dWis. (1997). 312, 565 N.W.2d 94 4 Milwaukee, Archdiocese 302, 194 Wis. 2d 533 Pritzlaff v. (1995) N.W.2d 780

77 employee, wrongful not at act of the time of the employer. wrongful act of the time of the majority opinion has no trouble with ¶ The 70. I "derivative." do. the classification by this court between The distinction drawn independent of action has causes derivative and con- fact, In "this court has or consistent. been clear "separate" [of and "derivative" that these labels cluded claims] particularly . . ."5 The distinc- useful. are not purpose depends the dis- for which often on tion being Moreover, our cases have made.6 tinction is divergent a claim is conclusions about whether reached 'separate concept not. "The of what is derivative or claim' has caused this and what is a 'derivative claim1 "7 confusing.' difficulty, great and 'the cases are court majority troubling is that 72. Even more by classifying opinion, "derivative," dis- this claim as accepted understanding of the traditional and torts (Third) of Torts claims." The Restatement "derivative plain- claims" occur "where a that "derivative instructs tortiously injury due to the defendant's tiff claims 5 Kenosha, City v. 508, 527, 344 Theama 117 Wis. 2d (1984). N.W.2d 513 6 Comp. Finnegan Skoglind ex rel. v. Wis. Patients See Fund, 574, n.9, 44 2d 666 797 2003 263 Wis. N.W.2d WI C.J., (Abrahamson, concurring) (discussing how the character contributory addressing depends on whether the court is ization of limita recovery, on amount of or statutes negligence, limits tions). Co., v. Motor Wangen Ford 316, 294 97 Wis. 2d N.W.2d Lunder, omitted). v. (1980) White In (quoted source (1975), 563, 574, the court confessed 2d 225 N.W.2d

Wis. [medical declare both of these causes of action "[t]o might consortium] and loss of derivative expenses for his wife entirely logical" anyway. but did so not be person."8 injuring a third The Restatement also ex- plains plaintiffs recovery "[c]laims in which the committing against depends on the a tort defendant's person claims,'" third are often called 'derivative and wrongful include death claims.9 Traditionally, ¶ 73. claims are "derivative" when person experienced damage one asserts that he or she aas result of a tort committed a tortfeasor person.10 injury another The claim derives from the 8 (Third) Apportionment Restatement of Torts: of Liabil note) (1999). § ity, (reporter's 6 cmt. b 9 (Third) Apportionment Liability, Restatement of Torts: (1999). § cmt. a 6

10 (2005-06) §655.007 See provides also Wis. Stat. which July 24, 1975, any patient patient's that "On and after or the representative having any spouse, parent, a claim or minor sibling patient having or child of the a derivative claim for injury malpractice subject or death on account of is to this Wisconsin, chapter." Physicians In v. Pierce Insurance Co. of Inc., 14, 12, 82, 558, 2005 WI 278 2d 692 Wis. N.W.2d explained § court application "[t]here the obvious of 655.007: is dispute [the mother] no that Pierce has the claim of derivative parent wrongful daughter] for the [her death of Brianna Hall, 100, § under Wis. Stat. 655.007." In Maurin v. 2004 WI 29, 28, 866, explained 274 Wis. 2d N.W.2d court also parent's society companionship "[a] claim for the loss of awith minor child is a derivative claim."

See also State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 113, 33, 35, Langridge, 75, 2d WI 275 Wis. 683 N.W.2d Shimon, discussing agreeing with Gocha v. 215 Wis. 2d (Ct. 1997), App. Family 573 N.W.2d 218 and Richie v. American (Ct. Co., App. Mutual 2d Insurance Wis. 409 N.W.2d 1987), "distinguish independent two cases that between claims and derivative claims. Both conclude that when an insured another, payment arising bodily injury seeks out of person insured's claims are 'derivative' of the claim of the suffering bodily injury ...." negligent supervision claims, In how-

another suffers. directly plaintiff that he or she ever, a asserts was negligent super- injured by separate persons. In a two by wrongs: wrong claim, there are one the vision two wrong by employer. employee separate A and a the negligent supervision claim does not fit the traditional concept of "derivative claim." majority support opinion

¶ The tries to find negligent supervision for its characterization of the by corporate namely law, as claim "derivative" resort suit, suits.11 In a shareholder the share- shareholder company wrongs done to holder sues on behalf of the way, company. the Put another the shareholder is asserting company's her claim, not his or own analogy personal claim.12The to shareholder suits thus support negligent the treatment of a claim for does not supervision plaintiff

as a claim. The with a derivative asserting personal claim is a personal injury claim for a employer. that caused was Finnegan, 574, 26, In 2d the court plurality 263 Wis. a ¶ explained jurisprudence types "[o]ur that outlines of claims society, that are considered derivative. Claims for the loss of companionship, though and consortium are derivative even they technically 'belong' making the claim." to the close relative 11 majority opinion The that "a action is a states derivative corporate a suit shareholder to enforce a cause action right corporation." Majority op., 24 n.ll. based on a ¶ 12 Roggensack explained concurring opinion Justice in a law, corporate "[i]n the context of a derivative claim for permits relief an to enforce a claim for individual shareholder belongs corporation by claiming the action of relief Culea, See Einhorn v. injured corporation. another 2000 WI Monnier, 612 N.W.2d 78." Gottsaker v. 65, 16, 646, 235 Wis. 2d ¶ 69, n.4, 361, 2d 2005 WI 281 Wis. 697 N.W.2d ¶ J., (Roggensack, concurring). leading negli- course, 75. Of the conduct to the underlying

gent supervision claim is related to the wrong by plurality employee. But a of the court as explained Finnegan Skoglind ex rel. v. Wisconsin Compensation Fund, 98, 27, Patients 2003 WI 2d a claim can be nonderiva- Wis. N.W.2d "although [the claim] tive arises from shared set of underlying Despite facts" as another claim. the shared underlying plaintiff negli- facts, set of who sues for gent asserting supervision is that he or she has been the independent tort, of an not that he or has a victim she separate dependent damages deriving but claim from a (as injury as tort to another a derivative claim such society) injury by loss of consortium or or from a tort employee. A76. derivative claim does not have its own negligence elements distinct from the claim to which it juries instance, attaches. For are instructed that loss of society companionship and of and are consortium categories loss damages, negligence inquir- separate of not negligent supervision, A claim on the other ies.13 for the claim hand, has its own elements distinct from tort against employee.14 the

13 (loss See Wis JI —Civil 1815 consortium); 1837 (minor (parent's society companionship); and child's loss (all jury society companionship) appearing loss of and in the subheading "Damages"). Jury manual under the instruction Hiring, "Employer Negligence: Negligent instructions for Training, Supervision" jury or are in the located instruction subheading Negligence." manual under the "Other Wis JI —Civil 1383. negligent supervision employee "A claim for of an re quires plaintiff plead prove following: the and all of the (1) (2) duty the employer plaintiff; had a of care owed to the (3) employer duty; wrongful breached act or omission of an its Applying ¶ statement of the the traditional 77. independent claims, I difference between derivative negligent supervision is an conclude that the claim for independent claim. Contrary majority opinion,

¶ well- support precedent the conclusion established does negligent supervision case claims the instant that the that accrue at the time of the are derivative actions injury. makes this conclusion A review of case law abundantly clear. claim &f was not 79. The

recognized by action until this court as a valid cause of Stores, Inc., 2d 1998 in Miller v. 219 Wis. Wal-Mart (1998).15 267-68, 580 N.W.2d court, 2d at makes 80. The Miller Wis. negligent clear that "there must be a nexus between the hiring, training, supervision or and the act of the explained, "[w]ith employee." in Miller As the court negligent hiring, respect train- to a cause of action ques- ing supervision, that the causal or we determine employer of the to exercise tion is whether the failure (4) plaintiffs injury; an employee was a cause-in-fact of employer act or was a cause-in-fact of omission wrongful employee." Majority op., act 17. See also Wis Negligence: Negligent Hiring, Train- ("Employer JI —Civil 1383 of the tort claim ing, Supervision"). or The elements instance, employee battery For claim would are different. require employee to determine whether the the fact-finder intentionally bodily harm to the and that the caused the harm. 2005 plaintiff did not consent Wis JI —Civil (battery). 15 Milwaukee, WI 123, John Doe 67C v. Archdiocese 2005 of 307, n.3, 2d 21 700 N.W.2d 180.

284 Wis. wrongful the act of care was a cause-in-fact due plaintiffs injury." employee that in turn caused the 2d at 262. Wis. wrongful employee's act, however, did 81. The Miller court, itself. The have to be actionable

not stop requir- explained that short of 2d at "we Wis. clearly underlying ing set tort." The court forth an required a claim elements "[w]e there be an Miller: do conclude that must

in underlying

wrongful employee as act committed hiring, training negligent or of the tort of an element supervision. wrongful may a not tort, act be but A well necessarily." 263-64, 2d court, The Miller 219 Wis. at point: employer emphasize The "should on to went liability negligent escape act or for its omission employee's underlying wrongful simply act because the not an actionable tort." is Miller,

¶ 82. Steinmetz dissented Justice ground he "would hold that 2d at Wis. on hiring, training, supervision negligent or the tort underlying necessary element, an include, should as employee." Justice Steinmetz tort committed employee position explained his as "Since follows: underlying the court tort, should did not commit an judgment simply the circuit court. have reversed upon taken it itself to craft court, however, has The theory particular this of law to allow new, untested damages plaintiff from the exonerated to recover (Stein- employer." employee's Miller, 2d at 276 219 Wis. dissenting). metz, J., underlying tort, If no need for an there is supervision negligent claim be derivative? can the

how exactly majority opinion The is it derivative of? What questions, result, and as a these does not answer Miller. rewrites Doyle

¶ Engelke, 84. In v. 219 Wis. 2d (1998), n.6, 580 N.W.2d245 the court further discussed negligent supervision making the nature of claims, negligent supervision independent clear that claims are causes of action. Doyle, employee allegedly In 85. an had commit- plaintiff,

ted an intentional tort the and the plaintiff employer, claiming negligent supervi- sued the sion. duty At issue was whether the insurer had a (the employer) against defend its insured claims of negligent supervision policy when the insurance ex- empted duty intentional torts from the to defend.16The appeals circuit court and the court of had concluded that the intentional acts exclusion clause of the insur- policy company ance any released the insurance from duty negligent supervision stemming to defend for from employee. the intentional torts of the This court reached a different conclusion. Doyle recognized 86. This court that al-

though negligent supervision claim was related to employee's intentional misconduct, the claim of independent was nonetheless employee's distinct Doyle from the intentional tort. The explained "[w]hile negligent supervision court does require underlying wrong an to be committed employee actually element, as an the tort focuses on the negligent, employer." tortious, i.e. conduct of the According Doyle Wis. 2d at 291 n.6. to the court, negligent .supervision claim [the "focuses on employer's] negligence supervising employees— its

16 Specifically, the intentional act exclusion indicates that the insurance company" bodily 'won't cover injury ... that's . .. intended protected person.'" 219 Wis. 2d at (quoting policy). insurance "protected The person" employer. was the employees underly- committed the whether or wrong intentionally." ing 2d at Wis. 291. explained Doyle The court further negligent supervision not claim based

claim for was liability. on 219 Wis. 2d at 291-92. vicarious Doyle Miller, ¶ in abun- 88. As decision is dantly underlying for a clear that there need be no tort negligent supervision an to arise. claim of Without underlying negligent supervision tort, a claim what is of? derivative Doyle Although

¶ Miller not 89. and cases do "independent" "derivative," or the cases use the word supervision negligent employee of an is make clear independent an claim. majority opinion's attempt The distin- 90. to

guish Doyle the instant case from Miller and is weak majority points unpersuasive. The out several and Doyle in Miller did refer to times that court and not Majority op., ¶¶ does matter BBB Doe. 33. It slightest Doyle did not to BBB that Miller and refer conclusively anything BBB Doe did not decide Doe. negligent supervision in BBB The court about claims. super- answering negligent even Doe avoided whether Why a later cite to claims existed. would case vision regard negligent supervision?17 BBB Doe in to majority opinion gives The short shrift 91. apparently ground Doyle cases, on the the Miller and priests, any they Archdiocese, or do not involve religious religious employers employees or of a order order. instruction, jury Wis The to the relevant comments hiring, train negligence: negligent ("employer

JI —Civil 1383 BBB Doe or The refer ing, supervision"), or do not Pritzlaff. on Miller heavily guidance on rely instead comments and of the tort claim. elements of nature majority opinion's ¶ 92. The reliance on Pritzlaff simply they and BBB Doe because share a factual (or thereof) supervision lack context — misplaced. recog- Archdiocese—is These cases did not negligent supervision nize that the claim of existed in definitively law, Wisconsin let alone determine whether independent such a claim was derivative or or shared the same statute of limitations as a cause of action priest. involving priests I turn to the cases dioceses.

I—i majority opinion ¶ 94. The asserts that "BBBDoe control the outcome of the claims for Pritzlaff Majority op., that are before us." majority opinion ¶ "[t]hey 36. The states that are controlling precedent that have decided that the claims negligent supervision of made here are derivative of the underlying by priests." sexual molestations the Id. Not true! ¶ 95. BBB Doe and do not control the Pritzlaff

outcome in the instant case. These did cases not decide whether a claim of was a deriva- independent tive or cause of action. In fact, when these cases recognized decided, were the court had not even negligent supervision, that training, a claim of hiring or brought against employer could be an under Wisconsin law. ¶ 96. In 1995, this court decided v. Pritzlaff Milwaukee,

Archdiocese 194 Wis. 2d 302, 533 N.W.2d of (1995). plaintiff, brought The an woman, adult suit against priest whom she claimed had coerced her into having plaintiff sexual relations. The also sued the claiming negligent hiring, in retain- Archdiocese, it was priest. ing, training, supervising and the ¶ its at- The court focused much of 97. Pritzlaff plaintiffs the direct claim tention and discussion on against priest. pages In the fact, over court's the exclusively analyzed 35-page this claim. decision finally got the court around 98. When Pritzlaff discussing Archdio- the claim the deciding, "assumed, cese, the court without Pritzlaff supervi- negligent hiring, training and that a claim Majority (citing op., ¶ in sion existed Wisconsin." 325-26). assumption 2d The at 194 Wis. Pritzlaff, supervision negligent claim existed in Wisconsin employed by only assumption was not Pritzlaff "assume[d], The court also without court. Pritzlaff discovery applies deciding, Archdio- rule to the cese." not occasion to The court did have 99. Pritzlaff actually if existed, so, and the claim

decide whether any independent or derivative of tort whether it was priest, of First Amendment committed because (citing Majority op., ¶ 194 Wis. 2d Pritzlaff, issues. 326). that "the claims at The court concluded Pritzlaff hiring, retaining, training supervision negligent case." 194 Amendment in this are barred First 2d 326. Wis. 2d at 307. See also 194 Wis. at never whether The court decided Pritzlaff negligent supervision a claim was viable Wisconsin discovery apply to it. The rule would whether analysis engage any did court Pritzlaff against plaintiffs the Archdiocese. claim nature assumptions but did not a case that made Pritzlaff, helpful. controlling issue, is neither nor decide the negli- again 1997, In court addressed the against gent brought supervision the Archdio- claims 87 cese in John BBB Doe v. Milwaukee, Archdiocese of (1997). plaintiffs Wis. 2d 565 N.W.2d94 The in BBB alleged they sexually Doe were adults who were by priests they molested when were children but had repressed their memories of these traumatic events. The plaintiffs brought against priests direct claims the who allegedly sexually abused them. The also brought against claims the churches and the Archdiocese negligent employment, training supervision priests, report the and for failure to the abuse.

¶ 102. As in Pritzlaff, court BBB Doe focused exclusively brought directly against almost on the claims (from priests. opinion pages The devotes over 50 366) analysis Wis. 2d at 312 to 211 Wis. 2d at discussing against priests. the claims Only

¶ 103. in the "Conclusion" section of the opinion, only very majority that is, at the end of the opinion, against does the court discuss the claims Archdiocese. The BBB Doe court states: light

In of our conclusion that all plaintiffs' seven claims based on intentional sexual assault are barred applicable limitations, statute of we need not address their claims respondeat based on superior and negligent employment theories. Plaintiffs' derivative causes of against action the Archdiocese and the churches accrued at the same time that the underling accrued, intentional tort claims similarly would be barred the statute of limitations. Pritzlaff, See (statute Wis. 2d at 533 N.W.2d 780 of limitations period for actions begins Archdiocese on same date the cause of action accrued against defendant). priest individual paragraph Doe, BBB 2dWis. at 366. This consti- subject tutes the court's entire discussion on the negligent supervision. Two sentences later is the man- date line. barely any paid

¶ BBB Doe decision 104. The These to the claim the Archdiocese. attention afterthought in the and decision, a mere claims were only support that the were for the conclusion claims by the statute of limitations was "derivative" and barred decision, which, above, discussed did not as the Pritzlaff decide issue. telling more the BBB Doe 105. Even is 366, 2d at characterized the claims

court, Wis. respondeat supe- against the Archdiocese as "based on employment sug- negligent theories" which rior and grounded gests claims as in that the court viewed these liability. The court later clarified Miller and vicarious negligent supervision Doyle was that this view of claims actually recognized wrong. These later cases—which negligent supervision claim of existed in Wiscon- that a explained that a claim sin law— independent wrongful on based act was employer. only ¶ 106. If and BBB Doe were based Pritzlaff they assumptions speculation, how can be

on controlling precedent? and BBB and Doe cannot Pritzlaff instant do not hold the answer to the case. BBB Doe and case, 107. Another decided after supports BBB Doe and the conclusion Pritzlaff, surrounding questions did resolve the Pritzlaff supervision negligent Archdio claims. John Doe 67C v. Milwaukee, 284 Wis. 2d WI cese brought Doe, 180, like BBB involved claims N.W.2d by against priests the Archdiocese adults who sexually alleged they as children abused were Specifically, plaintiffs alleged priests. Arch that the priests. negligently supervised the diocese majority opinion 67C, John Doe The negligent however, did whether a claim not answer supervision was a claim and did not derivative answer supervision negligent whether a claim of could be saved discovery majority opinion rule. The in John Doe upholds plaintiffs' negligent super- 67C dismissal the of very grounds: complaint on vision claims limited the insufficiently alleged support facts to the claim of negligent supervision. The John Doe 67C court makes leaving questions clear that it was the resolution of regarding negligent supervision day.18 for another any

¶ If 109. there were doubt about the majority's position Bradley's 67C, in John Doe Justice opinion concurring "[ijnstead emphasized in Doe John 67C that answering questions majority of the . . . dodges correcting them. It case in decides this an error sufficiency particular allega- fashion on based complaint." tions in 67C, an individual Doe John 284 (Bradley, concurring). ¶ 307, J., Wis. 2d 62 Justice Bradley questions announced "the in that this context open." (Bradley, concurring). ¶ Id., remain 63 J., compelled support ¶ If 110. to find in a case involving parties, majority opinion similar should closely Clauder, more examine L.L.N. v. 209 Wis. 2d (1997). 674, Clauder, 434 In N.W.2d the court was plaintiff, faced awith situation similar to The Pritzlaff. explained essence, The John Doe 67C court "[i]n Doe alleges that the Archdiocese committed tort of negligent supervision because it or 'knew should have known that its employee, Nuedling, fact pedophile." was in a notorious Wis. 2d 21. Footnote three in paragraph explains: this recognize 'negligent supervision' did not This court the tort of until Stores, Inc., 250, 267-68, v. Miller Wal-Mart 219 Wis. 2d (1998). argues N.W.2d233 Doe that because he did not discover his years Miller, claims until four after our in he decision can holding despite benefit from the fact that the Archdiocese's allegedly wrongful in conduct occurred 1960-62. our Given hold case, ing argument. in we this need not address this alleged negligent that the diocese was woman, adult an priest hospital supervising the who served as a in pastoral chaplain position coun- and used his as who the woman to have sexual relations. selor to coerce court, 111. The Clauder like the Pritzlaff recognize whether the claim courts, BBB Doe refused to existed Wisconsin law. None- it theless, Clauder court elaborated on what reaching thought might like, conclusions this claim look Doyle cases, to those in the Miller and which similar recognized the claim. negligent 112. The Clauder court stated that "liability solely

supervision, does not result because relationship employer employee, of the but independent negligence instead because of (Sec- (citing employer." 2d at Restatement 209 Wis. ond) d). According § Agency to the Clauder of 213 cmt. court, negligent supervision is distinct from

a claim for liability, in that the former is based claim for vicarious agency and the latter is based on principles on tort liability specifically, with a vicarious principles. More claim, alleged vicariously liable for employer an is to be employee negligent or omission committed its act Thus, liability employment. vicarious is scope in the relationship a master and solely agency on the based contrast, supervision negligent In with a servant. negligent claim, alleged to be liable for a employer an is its supervising it has committed in act or omission Therefore, solely employee. liability does not result relationship employer of the and em- because of the independent negli- ployee, but instead because of gence employer. of the 2d at 699 n.21.

209 Wis. ¶ 113. The Clauder court elaborated "Liability further: results under the rule stated in this (Second) [of Agency] Section the Restatement parties, because of the relation of the but because the employer antecedently had reason to believe that an employ- undue risk of harm would exist because of employer subject liability only ment. The is for such Clauder, harm as is within the risk." 2dWis. at 699. controlling precedent. ¶ Clauder, too, is not recognize Like BBB Doe and it Pritzlaff, does not only claim of ruminates might about what it engages Nonetheless, look like. Clauder beyond in a richer discussion the few sentences located in and BBB Doe. Pritzlaff Bradley's concurring opinion 115. Justice explained against John Doe 67C the direct claims application Archdiocese and the of the statute of limi- discovery indepen- tations and the rule: "Because Doe's against dent, direct claims the Archdiocese involve any potential different elements from cause of action against priest], [the discovery may rule still benefit underlying Doe's claims even when the claim perpetrator already has been time barred. As coun- explained argument, allegations sel for Doe at oral in this case 'do not arise out of the moment of the sexual They secrecy attack. arise out of the Archdiocese, only which we could learn about as of 2002.'" 284 (Bradley, concurring). Wis. 2d J., Bradley's reasoning 116. Justice in John Doe applies 67C in the instant case.

* ‡ ‡ ‡ elapsed alleged ¶ 117. Decades have since the wrongful conduct of the Archdiocese occurred. But that prevent having day should not from their proving plaintiffs shoulder the burden of in court. The including against Archdiocese, demon- their case discovery applies strating rule to their inde- that the pendent the Archdiocese. I causes of action opportunity give rather than dismiss- would ing them that terminating complaint their cause. their foregoing reasons, I concur in the 118. For the majority opinion parts that reverse the decision grounded regarding plaintiffs' action causes of majority parts I dissent from the fraud and dismissing negli- opinion affirm the decision gent supervision I remand the cause to claims. would proceedings on all of the court for further the circuit plaintiffs' claims. I that Justice ANN am authorized state opinion. joins BRADLEY this

WALSH

Case Details

Case Name: John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee

Court Name: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 11, 2007

Citation: 734 N.W.2d 827

Docket Number: 2005AP1945

Court Abbreviation: Wis.