Background

• Winston was charged with second-degree sexual assault of a child; after an initial mistrial, the charge was amended and a second jury—composed entirely of women—acquitted on the intercourse count but convicted on the contact count.
• Defense counsel in the second trial allegedly used peremptory challenges to strike all men from the jury, a pattern Winston alleges violated Batson and related gender-protection principles.
• Winston pursued ineffective assistance claims in state post-conviction proceedings, arguing the lawyer’s discriminatory strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Strickland v. Washington.
• Wisconsin courts rejected the Batson-based ineffective-assistance claim, finding the strikes were part of a reasonable defense strategy.
• Winston filed a federal habeas corpus petition under AEDPA, which the district court denied; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, addressing both the Batson framework and the Strickland prejudice question.
• The opinion discusses whether a defense lawyer’s intentional discrimination in jury selection can ever be cured by later legal standards and how, under AEDPA, the state court’s conclusions should be evaluated.

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (prohibits race-based peremptory challenges; automatic reversal when proven)
• J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. Thornton, 511 U.S. 127 (U.S. 1994) (applies Batson to gender; prohibits gender as proxy for juror competence)
• Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (U.S. 1991) (extends Batson to exclude a juror when either party or juror is of a different race)
• McCollum v. State of Maryland, 505 U.S. 42 (U.S. 1992) (disallows discriminatory defense actions; discipline for unlawful conduct)
• Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148 (U.S. 2009) (automatic reversal for Batson-type violations; distinguishes from harmless error)