Winston & Strawn, LLP v. James P. McLean, Jr.
843 F.3d 503
| D.C. Cir. | 2016Background
- Winston & Strawn sued pro se defendant James P. McLean in D.D.C.; it moved for summary judgment on July 28, 2014.
- The District Court ordered McLean to respond by August 18 and warned that a failure to do so might result in the motion being treated as conceded.
- McLean mailed his opposition on August 18 but it did not arrive and was filed until August 20; on August 19 the District Court granted summary judgment "as conceded" under D.D.C. Local R. 7(b).
- The District Court issued minute orders denying McLean’s motions for reconsideration; McLean appealed and this Court appointed amicus for him.
- The D.C. Circuit considered whether Local Rule 7(b) permits granting summary judgment as conceded in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (post-2010 amendments).
- The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded because the District Court granted summary judgment solely on Local Rule 7(b) without applying Rule 56’s required analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McLean) | Defendant's Argument (Winston & Strawn) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court may grant summary judgment "as conceded" for failure to timely oppose | Local Rule 7(b) cannot displace Rule 56; summary judgment cannot be granted by default | Local rule permits treating unopposed motions as conceded; Bender supports that practice | Court held Rule 56 precludes granting summary judgment merely as "conceded"; district court must apply Rule 56 analysis |
| Whether Local Rule 7(b) conflicts with the 2010 amendments to Rule 56 | 2010 amendments require courts to determine for themselves if movant is entitled to judgment | Local rule is an authorized procedural rule | Court held Local Rule 7(b) is inconsistent with Rule 56 and cannot authorize default grants of summary judgment |
| Appropriate remedy when nonmoving party files late by two days | Late filing here was de minimis; court should have discretion to allow response | Timeliness requirement supports treating motion as conceded | Court reversed and remanded so district court can exercise Rule 56(e) options (e.g., allow response) rather than default grant |
| Whether appellate court may decide merits de novo instead of remanding | McLean urged remand for district court to consider Rule 56 criteria | Winston urged affirmance perhaps by treating issues as undisputed on record | Court declined to grant summary judgment itself and remanded for district court to apply Rule 56 first |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant bears initial responsibility to identify record showing absence of genuine dispute)
- Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (district court must determine for itself whether summary judgment is warranted)
- FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (prior precedent treating unopposed summary judgment as conceded; superseded by 2010 Rule 56 amendments)
- Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (federal courts must follow Federal Rules over inconsistent local practices)