Wilson v. State
348 S.W.3d 32
| Tex. App. | 2011Background
- Wilson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole; he was 17 at the time of the killing; the offense involved Thomas, a pregnant woman, in Houston; Parker and Senagal observed the burglaries and discovery of Thomas's body; Wilson confessed after interrogation by Sergeant Harris; the State pursued capital murder and imposed an automatic LWOP sentence under Texas law; issues center on voluntariness of the confession and the constitutionality of automatic LWOP for a juvenile; the court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- Hubbard and Babers testified to Wilson’s involvement and threats; Parker testified to prior thefts and the confrontation with the suspect; Thomas died from a gunshot to the head with the gun likely within six inches; Dr. Gonsoulin confirmed the cause and timing of death; initial police interrogation occurred with Miranda warnings and two recurring themes (justice vs mercy) used by Harris; Wilson ultimately admitted to Thomas’s killing and taking Parker’s monitor
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntariness of confession | Wilson argues Harris overbore his will with inducements | State argues no improper inducement; mercy discussion not coercive | Confession voluntary; no improper inducement |
| Automatic LWOP for juvenile violates Eighth Amendment | Meadoux/Graham framework should apply to require mitigation or failure of a constitutional limit | Legislature may justify incapacitation and retribution for homicide; no constitutional error | Automatic LWOP for a juvenile not unconstitutional under current Texas law |
| Right to present mitigation evidence in non-death penalty case (Texas Constitution) | Texas Constitution provides more protection and requires mitigation evidence | No right to mitigate in non-death penalty cases exists under Texas Constitution | Texas Constitution does not grant a right to mitigation in non-death penalty cases |
| Separation of powers and automatic sentences | Automatic LWOP improperly usurps executive parole authority | Legislature can prescribe automatic sentences without depriving Board of Pardons and Paroles of power | No constitutional separation-of-powers violation; legislature did not usurp executive authority |
Key Cases Cited
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (U.S. 1986) (voluntariness depends on totality of the circumstances)
- Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (overborne will requires coercive police conduct)
- Herrera v. State, 194 S.W.3d 656 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006) (improper inducements require a likely influence on confession)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (juvenile LWOP for non-homicide unconstitutional; factors for punishment)
- Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (four-factor framework for reviewing juvenile LWOP)
- Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1987) (retribution and proportionality considerations)
- Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (U.S. 1978) (prosecutorial discretion within chargeable offense)
- Neal v. State, 150 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (prosecutorial discretion and charge decisions)