Willoughby v. United States Ex Rel. United States Department of the Army
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19191
| 5th Cir. | 2013Background
- John Willoughby, an employee of contractor Lear Siegler Services, was injured at Red River Army Depot and received workers’ compensation benefits from his employer’s plan required by the Army contract.
- Willoughby sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for negligence and premises liability, claiming the workers’ comp benefits were insufficient.
- The Army contract required the contractor to provide workers’ compensation and treated premiums as an allowable cost paid by the Government.
- The Government moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asserting Texas’s workers’ compensation exclusive-remedy bar applies because the Government qualifies as a Texas “statutory employer.”
- Willoughby argued the Government cannot invoke that defense because it did not comply with Texas filing and employee-notice regulations that apply to private statutory employers.
- The district court dismissed; the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding the Government is in "like circumstances" with private statutory employers and the exclusive-remedy rule bars Willoughby’s FTCA claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the United States is entitled to assert Texas’s workers’ compensation exclusive-remedy defense under the FTCA | Willoughby: Government is not a "statutory employer" because it failed to comply with Texas filing/notice procedures | U.S.: It required the contractor in writing to provide coverage and is thus a statutory employer under Texas law | Held: Government is in "like circumstances" and may invoke the exclusive-remedy defense; FTCA claim dismissed |
| Whether noncompliance with Texas procedural filing and notice requirements prevents the Government from raising the defense | Willoughby: Failure to follow filing/notice rules deprives employees of informed election rights and precludes the defense | U.S.: Procedural noncompliance is a minor difference; plaintiff must show prejudice or lack of notice | Held: Plaintiff did not allege lack of notice or prejudice; procedural differences do not defeat the FTCA waiver analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281 (5th Cir.) (FTCA sovereign-immunity analysis and applicability of state defenses)
- Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559 (5th Cir.) (jurisdictional burden and Rule 12(b)(1) standards)
- Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158 (5th Cir.) (sequence of jurisdictional and merits Rule 12 analysis)
- United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (U.S. 2005) (interpretation of "like circumstances" in FTCA waiver)
- Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (U.S. 1955) (FTCA purpose to apply local law analogies)
- United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (U.S. 1992) (strict construction of government’s consent to be sued)
- Owen v. United States, 935 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.) (minor procedural differences do not defeat "like circumstances" analysis)
- Roelofs v. United States, 501 F.2d 87 (5th Cir.) (Army may assert statutory-employer defense when it requires contractor to carry coverage)
- HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349 (Tex.) (written agreement requirement to create statutory-employer status)