Williams v. Woodmen Found.Â
250 N.C. App. 482
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Plaintiffs (Jaekwon Williams, a minor, by guardian ad litem, and parents) sued multiple defendants after a non‑fatal drowning at Lions Water Adventure Park on Aug 11, 2014, asserting negligence and negligence per se.
- Defendants included Woodmen Foundation (waterpark owner), County of Lenoir and City of Kinston (parks & rec), Rocky Mount (day camp) and various employees/lifeguards; complaint filed in Edgecombe County on Mar 17, 2015; amended Mar 20, 2015.
- Plaintiffs later settled with the Rocky Mount defendants and voluntarily dismissed them (file‑stamped dismissal dated Jan 28, 2016); at the venue hearing parties and the court knew Rocky Mount had settled.
- The remaining defendant‑appellants (Kinston defendants and County of Lenoir) moved to change venue from Edgecombe County to Lenoir County, arguing the alleged wrongful acts occurred in Lenoir County and the municipal defendants are public officers for venue purposes.
- Plaintiffs opposed, arguing venue was premature to decide before discovery because facts might show wrongful acts occurring in Edgecombe or other counties.
- Trial court denied the motions to change venue (reasoning some part of the cause arose in Edgecombe); the appellate court reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue was proper in Edgecombe County under N.C.G.S. § 1‑77(2) (actions against public officers) | Venue decision was premature; discovery might reveal acts/omissions by remaining defendants in Edgecombe or other counties | Remaining defendants are public officers/municipalities and the alleged acts occurred in Lenoir County, so venue must be Lenoir | Reversed trial court: venue improper in Edgecombe; action must be tried in Lenoir County |
| Whether venue is assessed at commencement vs. after discovery | Plaintiffs: discovery could alter venue facts; court should wait | Defendants: venue is fixed at filing and determined from complaint allegations | Held: Venue is determined at commencement from the complaint; discovery does not delay venue determination |
| Effect of voluntary dismissal of a party on venue | Plaintiffs: settlement/dismissal should not preclude considering prior assertions about Edgecombe | Defendants: dismissal removes that party for venue purposes; acts by dismissed party cannot vest venue for remaining defendants | Held: Dismissed parties are treated as if never parties; their acts cannot supply venue for remaining defendants |
| Whether trial court has discretion to deny transfer when venue shown improper | Plaintiffs: trial court can wait/consider later evidence | Defendants: statute interpreted as mandatory transfer when county is improper | Held: Trial court has no discretion—must change venue if county is improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159 (addresses interlocutory appeal affecting substantial rights)
- Hyde v. Anderson, 158 N.C. App. 307 (municipal defendants are public officers for venue; denial of transfer affects substantial right)
- Miller v. Miller, 38 N.C. App. 95 (statutory "may change" is construed as mandatory when venue is improper)
- Caldwell v. Smith, 203 N.C. App. 725 (venue determined at commencement from complaint; transfer required if wrong county)
- Morris v. Rockingham County, 170 N.C. App. 417 (analyzes venue for public officers and when cause accrues)
- Coats v. Sampson County Memorial Hospital, 264 N.C. 332 (purpose of §1‑77 to avoid burdening public officers by remote forums)
- Mitchell v. Jones, 272 N.C. 499 (a dismissed party is treated as if never a party for venue purposes)
- TD Bank, N.A. v. Crown Leasing Partners, LLC, 224 N.C. App. 649 (venue determinations under §1‑83 are reviewed de novo)