Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Bridgeport
174 A.3d 137
| Conn. | 2017Background
- Fire at a Bridgeport public-housing apartment killed a mother and three children; plaintiff (Williams, administratrix) sued municipal defendants for failing to perform statutorily mandated fire-safety inspections.
- Plaintiff alleged the city knew it had a duty to inspect the subject premises, made no inspections, and that a mandated inspection would have revealed code violations (e.g., non‑interconnected smoke detectors) that caused the deaths.
- Municipal defendants moved for summary judgment asserting governmental immunity under General Statutes § 52-557n(b)(8): liability only if (a) actual notice of violation/hazard, or (b) reckless disregard for health or safety under all relevant circumstances; they produced uncontested evidence of no notice and of inspection practices focused on complaints.
- The majority held the plaintiff raised a triable issue that the city maintained a policy of broadly not inspecting public/three‑family housing, and that such a policy could show reckless disregard even for unlikely but catastrophic harms.
- Justice McDonald (dissent, joined by Justice Palmer) contends the majority adopted a new, overly broad standard equating non‑inspection with recklessness, failed to distinguish recklessness from negligence, and improperly relied on a theory the plaintiff never pleaded or proved.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether knowing failure to perform any statutorily mandated fire inspection at the subject premises can constitute "reckless disregard for health or safety" under § 52-557n(b)(8) | Williams: knowing non‑performance of any inspection of the subject apartment despite statutory duty was reckless and proximately caused deaths | City: mere awareness of the duty and failure to inspect is, at most, negligence; defendants had no actual notice of hazard and produced evidence of complaint-driven inspections | Majority: a municipal policy of broadly not inspecting relevant class (public/three-family housing) may permit jury to find reckless disregard when failure creates risk of catastrophic harm; Dissent: no—plaintiff’s pleaded theory was premises‑specific and evidence showed no notice or policy, so summary judgment should have been affirmed for defendants |
| Proper legal standard for "reckless disregard" under § 52-557n(b)(8) (degree of risk, burden of prevention, scope of circumstances) | Williams: statute supports waiver where inspection failure could have prevented catastrophic harm even if unlikely | City: recklessness requires more than statutory violation—an extreme departure from ordinary care, awareness of substantial risk at the specific premises, and consideration of burden of prevention | Dissent: recklessness requires conscious choice to ignore a substantial risk; compare magnitude of danger to burden of inspection; failure to inspect generally does not equal recklessness absent facts showing heightened risk at the subject premises |
| Whether evidence of citywide practices/deposition testimony (Fire Chief Rooney) could support a policy‑of‑noninspection theory not pleaded by plaintiff | Williams (as construed by majority): Rooney’s deposition and other evidence indicate a long‑standing policy of not inspecting public/three‑family housing, and lack of training/knowledge supports recklessness | City: plaintiff never pleaded a citywide noninspection policy; discovery/deposition evidence was offered late and does not establish a deliberate policy or notice of increased risk at the subject premises | Dissent: courts should not adopt a new theory on appeal absent pleading; Rooney was not the statutorily responsible fire marshal, and the record does not show a policy of noninspection or that the plaintiff relied on such a theory |
| Whether aggregation of risk across a class of properties (noninspection of many units) can substitute for premises‑specific proof of risk under the reckless‑disregard prong | Williams: aggregate noninspection of a class can show a policy creating catastrophic risk and enter recklessness inquiry | City: aggregation cannot replace evidence showing heightened risk at the particular premises; aggregation risks converting negligence into per se recklessness | Dissent: aggregation alone is improper—relevant circumstances must show increased risk at the subject premises or similar properties to support reckless‑disregard waiver |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am. Corp., 323 Conn. 303 (recklessness requires conscious choice and is more than negligence)
- Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364 (statutory waiver of municipal immunity must be narrowly construed)
- Martel v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 275 Conn. 38 (municipal immunity and narrow waiver principles)
- Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822 (recklessness requires extreme departure from ordinary care; statutory violation alone insufficient)
- Munn v. Hotchkiss School, 326 Conn. 540 (negligence balancing: low probability but grave harm can still impose duty where burden of prevention is slight)
- Frillici v. Westport, 264 Conn. 266 (recklessness involves an extreme departure where a high degree of danger is apparent)
- Craig v. Driscoll, 262 Conn. 312 (discusses degree of risk required for recklessness)
- Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79 (classic statement on probability of harm and recklessness)
- White v. Mazda Motor of Am., 313 Conn. 610 (pleadings limit plaintiff's theories at summary judgment; court may not entertain new theories unsupported by complaint)