Williams v. Hobbs, 658 F.3d 842

Background

Arkansas adopted lethal injection as the method of execution in 1983, with anesthesia required and the Director to determine substances and procedures.
In 2009, the legislature enacted the Method of Execution Act, expanding Director discretion over chemicals and procedures and removing mandatory anesthesia and APA/FOIA protections for most death-sentence procedures.
AD 08-28 was challenged in state and federal courts; opponents argued it violated APA notice and comment and Eighth Amendment considerations, but Nooner v. Norris upheld substantial similarity to prior protocols.
During litigation, Williams (death-row inmate) sought habeas relief and §1983 challenges to the Act; district court dismissed for lack of authorization and speculative claims, and declined supplemental state-law jurisdiction after federal claims were dismissed.
Jones and intervenors later challenged the Act; district court dismissal was followed by Rule 59(e) motions based on new evidence, which the court denied.
A state-court ruling later struck portions of the Act allowing broad chemical discretion, leaving a narrowed statute; this proceeding does not moot the federal appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Act violate ex post facto?	Prisoners claim increased punishment and anxiety due to removal of anesthesia and secrecy.	Speculative risks insufficient; FOIA and current protocol access mitigate any asserted risk.	No ex post facto violation; claims speculative and not a significant risk of increased punishment.
Does the Act violate due process by denying access to the courts?	Secrecy and FOIA limitations prevent litigating a potential Eighth Amendment challenge.	Prisoners retain access via current protocol and FOIA; no actual injury shown.	No due process violation; no actual injury or inability to litigate shown.
Was Williams' habeas petition properly treated as second or successive?	Claims arose from the 2009 Act, not available at first petition, so authorization not required.	Judicial error in labeling; however, dismissal harmless as relief sought overlapped with §1983 claims.	Error harmless; no reversible prejudice; district court's approach proper given consolidated relief sought.
Did the district court abuse its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims?	State claims should be heard given relatedness to federal questions.	When federal claims are dismissed, factors favor decline of supplemental jurisdiction.	No abuse; district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction.
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Rule 59(e) relief based on new evidence?	New evidence demonstrates Director’s flexible authority and anesthesia shortages; warrants reconsideration.	New evidence is speculative and cumulative; would not yield different result.	No abuse; new evidence insufficient to change outcome.

Key Cases Cited

Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000) (ex post facto requires a significant risk of increased punishment)
Morales v. D. C., 514 U.S. 499 (1995) (mere speculative risk insufficient for ex post facto claims)
Medley v. United States, 134 U.S. 160 (1890) (execution secrecy doctrine; mental anxiety as a factor)
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (prisoners' access to courts requires meaningful access)
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (actual injury required for access-to-courts claims)
Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826 (2008) (no actual injury shown where access to medical protocols is limited)
Nooner v. Norris, 594 F.3d 592 (2010) (protocols substantially similar to prior, upheld by 8th Cir. and Supreme Court)
Jones v. Hobbs, 604 F.3d 580 (2010) (speculative chance of unconstitutional protocol not sufficient for relief)