672 F.Supp.3d 395
W.D. Mich.2023Background
- On March 2, 2020, Officer Johnston stopped Dominic Williams after a turn‑signal violation and learning the vehicle’s registered owner had an outstanding warrant; Williams was driving the owner’s car.
- Williams refused to lower his window fully, stated he feared for his life, and said he was recording the encounter; Johnston said he was recording too.
- After Williams stepped out, Johnston attempted to handcuff him; Williams either deliberately dropped his weight into the vehicle or lost his balance (disputed), and Johnston executed a straight arm‑bar takedown, bringing Williams to the ground.
- Dashcam/bodycam footage shows both officers briefly placing knees on Williams’s back while securing handcuffs; Johnston retrieved Williams’s phone from the vehicle and swiped the screen; Williams later testified the recording was erased.
- Williams was ticketed for driving with a suspended license and for resisting/assaulting an officer; he sought medical and mental‑health treatment for injuries. Defendants moved for summary judgment; the court granted in part and denied in part.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force—straight arm‑bar takedown | Williams: takedown was excessive because he was passively/nonviolently noncompliant or fell, not actively resisting | Johnston: Williams actively resisted by dropping his weight and reaching toward the vehicle, justifying force; alternatively qualified immunity | Court: Genuine dispute whether Williams deliberately resisted (so material fact for jury), but Johnston entitled to qualified immunity because rights were not clearly established in the gray area |
| Excessive force—knees on back | Williams: knees on prone, handcuffed or subdued defendant constituted excessive force | Officers: pressure was brief and de minimis, not substantial or asphyxiating | Court: No excessive force; short, limited pressure insufficient to violate Fourth Amendment; summary judgment for officers |
| Failure to intervene (Seide) | Seide observed excessive force and failed to stop it | Seide: force unfolded too quickly and he had no realistic opportunity/notice to intervene; he also briefly placed a knee | Court: No failure‑to‑intervene liability—no notice/opportunity for sudden takedown and knee use was not excessive |
| Unreasonable search/seizure (cell phone) | Williams: Johnston swiped the phone, stopped recording and deleted video—warrantless search and destruction | Johnston: acted to stop recording/for officer safety; possibly only turning phone off; denies or disputes deletion | Court: Viewing facts for Williams, Johnston physically accessed phone and may have deleted video; Riley controls—warrant generally required; genuine dispute and qualified immunity denied |
| False arrest (federal/state) | Williams: arrest lacked probable cause for resisting/assault charge | Johnston: had probable cause at least for driving without license on person / suspended license | Court: Probable cause existed for license offenses; false arrest claim fails; summary judgment for Johnston |
| Municipal liability (Monell—failure to train) | Williams: City’s training inadequate re use of force and resistance distinctions | City: GRPD provides regular use‑of‑force training; no deliberate indifference shown | Court: No genuine dispute that training program was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference; summary judgment for City |
| State torts & gross negligence | Williams: assault & battery, false arrest/imprisonment, and gross negligence | Officers: governmental immunity under Ross; conduct lacked malice or gross negligence | Court: Officers entitled to governmental immunity on intentional torts; false arrest/imprisonment dismissed (probable cause); gross negligence not shown—summary judgment for officers |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (cell phones hold vast private data; warrant generally required for phone searches)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (a physical trespass to obtain information can constitute a Fourth Amendment search)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (governing excessive‑force analysis and relevant factors)
- Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2004) (placing substantial pressure or a knee on a prone, subdued suspect can be excessive force)
- Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (Champion’s rule interpreted broadly re: pressure creating asphyxiating conditions)
- Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2015) (distinguishing passive noncompliance from active resistance for force justifications)
- Stanfield v. City of Lima, [citation="727 F. App'x 841"] (6th Cir. 2018) (officers entitled to qualified immunity where perceived resistance could justify takedown despite later factual dispute)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (qualified immunity requires clearly established law that officer’s conduct was unlawful)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts have discretion which prong of qualified immunity test to address first)