Williams v. Columbus
67 N.E.3d 826
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- On Nov. 21, 2013 Officer Brandon Petry, while responding to assist another officer, attempted a left U-turn across four lanes of Sullivant Avenue at night and collided with Mikel Williams' minivan. The City admitted Petry was acting within the scope of employment.
- Dash-cam video shows Petry activated his emergency lights ~2 seconds before beginning the turn and impact occurred ~7 seconds after lights were activated; no siren or horn is audible.
- Oncoming left-lane traffic was stopped waiting to turn, blocking Petry’s view of Williams in the curb (right) lane; Williams became visible to Petry only ~2 seconds before collision.
- Williams’ van was totaled and he alleges ongoing injuries; Williams asserted wanton misconduct by Petry (not willful misconduct).
- The City and Petry moved for summary judgment asserting governmental immunity (R.C. 2744) — claiming Petry’s conduct was not wanton — and the trial court denied the motion.
- The Tenth District affirmed, holding a reasonable juror could find Petry’s driving wanton, so summary judgment on immunity was inappropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the City is immune under R.C. 2744 for negligence in motor-vehicle operation when an employee was responding to an emergency | Williams: Petry’s conduct was wanton (an exception to immunity), so the City is liable | City: Petry was responding to an emergency and did not act wantonly; statutory defense bars recovery | Denied — disputed fact (wantonness) precludes summary judgment; reasonable jurors could differ |
| Whether Officer Petry is entitled to individual immunity (R.C. 2744.03) because his conduct was not malicious, in bad faith, or wanton/reckless | Williams: Petry’s U-turn was wanton (failure to exercise any care) given limited visibility, short warning, and speed | Petry: activated lights, slowed somewhat; did not act wantonly and is therefore immune | Denied — issue of wanton (or reckless) conduct is fact-specific and for the jury; summary judgment inappropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (standards for summary judgment)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (summary-judgment burden on movant)
- Byrd v. Smith, 110 Ohio St.3d 24 (summary-judgment review; construing evidence for nonmovant)
- Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351 (standard for wanton misconduct in employment-immunity context)
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (definition of wanton misconduct and distinction from recklessness)
- Matkovich v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 210 (wanton misconduct as jury question)