Williams v. Cavazos
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10345
9th Cir.2011Background
- Williams was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances and a firearm enhancement, resulting in life without parole.
- A known holdout juror (Juror No. 6) was discharged and replaced with an alternate mid-deliberations after inquiry into juror conduct.
- Post-discharge, the jury returned a guilty verdict on Williams's conviction.
- The trial court's basis for dismissal included purported bias and concerns about following the law; the Court of Appeal upheld the 1089 dismissal as proper.
- Williams challenged the conviction in federal habeas corpus, arguing Sixth Amendment violation and improper use of Penal Code section 1089; the district court denied relief and Williams appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit analyzed AEDPA deference and concluded Williams's Sixth Amendment claim was not adjudicated on the merits by state court, requiring de novo review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dismissal of the holdout juror violated the Sixth Amendment | Williams argued the discharge stemmed from the juror's views on the merits | Cavazos contended the dismissal was for good cause under 1089 | Yes; dismissal violated the Sixth Amendment |
| Whether the state appellate court adjudicated Williams's Sixth Amendment claim on the merits | Williams contends state court did adjudicate the claim | State argued adjudication occurred only on the statutory issue | No; no merits adjudication of the Sixth Amendment claim by state court |
| AEDPA deference and Teague considerations in reviewing the claim | Review should be de novo due to lack of merits adjudication | AEDPA deferential standard applies if merits adjudicated; Teague not dispositive | De novo review appropriate for the Sixth Amendment claim; Teague not controlling |
Key Cases Cited
- Perez v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997) (juror dismissal may violate Sixth Amendment in certain circumstances)
- Brown v. United States, 823 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (juror dismissal may violate Sixth Amendment if based on views of guilt)
- Symington v. United States, 195 F.3d 1080 (3rd Cir. 1999) (merits-based dismissal of a holdout juror improper; deference to jury deliberations)
- United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) (secrecy of deliberations; dangers of probing jurors' thought processes)
- United States v. Brown (Symington line), 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999) (applies Brown/Symington reasoning to Sixth Amendment")
- Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2000) (Eighth Amendment/merits review; holdout juror context discussed)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (AEDPA deference framework; look-through doctrine)
- Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991) (look-through approach for state-court dispositions)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (limits on new constitutional rules in habeas corpus)
- Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1985) (mid-deliberation juror illness/disability proper to substitute under 1089)