Williams v. Bell, 402 S.W.3d 28

Williams and Christ Temple entered into a Commercial Buyer/Tenant Representation Agreement on April 2, 2008; Bell signed on Christ Temple's behalf as pastor.
Williams agreed to take $20,000 of her $54,000 commission at closing and accepted a promissory note for the remaining $34,000 with 0% interest; Bell also signed the note for Christ Temple.
The note allowed acceleration of unpaid principal and provided a 5% late fee on installments overdue by more than 10 days.
Christ Temple made one payment of $2,833.83 and defaulted on subsequent payments; Williams filed suit April 7, 2011 seeking $93,132.15 plus accrued late fees.
Appellees counterclaimed for usury, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and fraud; they sent a usury notice to Williams.
Williams responded to discovery with the claimed damages figure but did not explain the calculation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Bell's personal liability on the note	Bell signed in his official capacity; Williams argues he is personally liable.	Signature on behalf of Christ Temple creates no personal liability.	Bell not personally liable; no-evidence judgment on Bell liability affirmed.
Usury charge against the appellees	Williams claimed usury based on the note's alleged interest.	Appellees contended no usury charged; damages alleged arise from judicial process.	Usury issue reversed and remanded for further proceedings; not final on damages.
Suit on the note	Note is enforceable; defendant liable for the balance.	Usury defense precludes enforcement of the note as charged, requiring dismissal or reconsideration.	Traditional summary judgment reversed; remand for consideration of Williams's suit-on-note claim.
Fraud claim	Fraud claim was improperly decided because not addressed in the motion.	Fraud claim addressed by the motion; dismissal appropriate.	Fraud claim requires remand for consideration consistent with the motion.

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex.2001) (finality analysis for appeals from partial judgments)
Kan. City Southern Ry. v. Oney, 380 S.W.3d 795 (Tex.App.-Hou. [14th Dist.] 2012) (finality and disposition of claims in summary judgments)
George A. Fuller Co. v. Carpet Servs., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.1992) (pleadings alone do not constitute usury charging)
D & S Kingsway Ventures v. Tex. Capital Bank-Richmond, N.A., 882 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.App.-Hou. [14th Dist.] 1994) (pleadings not constituting usury charge; court processing)
Danziger v. San Jacinto Sav. Ass'n, 732 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.1987) (usury evidence may be in various documents)
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex.2005) (standard for summary judgment and doubt in evidence)
Sturm v. Muens, 224 S.W.3d 758 (Tex.App.-Hou. [14th Dist.] 2007) (usury elements and proof requirements)
LeNotre v. Cohen, 979 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.App.-Hou. [14th Dist.] 1998) (notice requirements for summary judgments; reasonable notice standard)
Skelton v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 56 S.W.3d 687 (Tex.App.-Hou. [14th Dist.] 2001) (notice requirements for summary judgment reset)
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ammons, 836 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.App.-Hou. [1st Dist.] 1992) (pleadings and court communications as not constituting usury charge)
George A. Fuller Co. v. Carpet Servs., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.1992) (pleadings and usury charging)