Williams v. Amazon.com, Inc.
312 F.R.D. 497
N.D. Ill.2015Background
- Gregory Williams filed a putative class action under the FCRA after being denied employment.
- Defendants served a Rule 68 offer of judgment on June 1, 2015; Williams rejected it.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment (Chapman-based estoppel/waiver defense) arguing rejection of full relief foreclosed continued litigation; the court denied that first motion.
- Defendants then served a more generous Rule 68 offer just before Williams moved for class certification; Williams rejected it and moved to “strike” the offer and declare it invalid.
- The court denied Williams’s motion to invalidate or strike the second Rule 68 offer and declined to void the offer outright.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 68 applies in putative class actions | Williams: Rule 68 is incompatible with class actions and should be invalid in that context | Defendants: Rule 68 applies; no textual or statutory exception for class suits | Court: Rule 68 applies to putative class actions; no categorical exception |
| Whether an unaccepted Rule 68 offer can moot a putative class action | Williams: An offer of full relief should bar further litigation (mootness) | Defendants: Under Chapman, an unaccepted offer does not automatically moot the case but can have other consequences | Court: Chapman controls — unaccepted offers do not jurisdictionally moot suits; they may support estoppel/waiver defenses but do not void the offer |
| Whether attaching an unaccepted Rule 68 offer to a dispositive motion violates Rule 68(b) and renders the offer invalid | Williams: Rule 68(b) bars use of unaccepted-offer evidence except for cost proceedings; attaching it to summary judgment invalidates the offer | Defendants: Even if inadmissible for some purposes, attaching it should not void the offer; inadmissibility for one purpose doesn’t make it universally invalid | Court: Attaching the offer might implicate Rule 68(b) admissibility limits, but it does not justify voiding the offer; evidence inadmissible for one purpose can be admissible for another |
| Whether cost-shifting under Rule 68 is inappropriate in putative class actions | Williams: Rule 68(d) would chill class representatives and skew incentives | Defendants: Cost-shifting is consistent with Rule 54(d) practice; class representatives and counsel can absorb/allocate risk | Court: Cost-shifting is permissible; Seventh Circuit precedent allows imposing costs on putative class representatives and counsel can adapt (fee structures, incentive awards) |
Key Cases Cited
- Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2015) (unaccepted Rule 68 offers do not jurisdictionally moot cases; rejection may create estoppel/waiver defenses)
- Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 595 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2010) (pre-Chapman precedent treating unaccepted full-offer Rule 68 as mooting suits)
- Greisz v. Household Bank (Ill.), N.A., 176 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1999) (Rule 68 offers of full relief previously held to moot suits)
- Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1991) (similar pre-Chapman rule)
- Knox v. Service Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012) (Article III mootness principles informing Chapman)
- White v. Sundstrand Corp., 256 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001) (Rule 54(d) cost awards are applicable in putative class actions)
- Myrick v. WellPoint, Inc., 764 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming cost awards in putative class litigation)
- In re Synthroid Marketing Litigation, 264 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2001) (incentive awards can compensate class representatives for risk)
- Smith v. Greystone Alliance, LLC, 772 F.3d 448 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussion of Rule 68 and scope of relief in pre-Chapman context)
- Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013) (Justice Kagan’s dissent argued that Rule 68(b) limits use of unaccepted-offer evidence to cost proceedings)