William Thorpe v. Harold Clarke, 37 F.4th 926

Background

Plaintiffs are long-term inmates (some up to 24 years) held in Virginia supermax prisons Red Onion and Wallens Ridge under the VDOC Step-Down solitary system.
Step Down has two tracks (Special Management and Intensive Management); IM prisoners lack a direct path to general population unless reclassified as SM.
Alleged conditions: 22–24 hours/day in small cells, solid metal doors, constant lights, minimal out-of-cell time, intrusive searches, scarce programming, limited mental-health care, and denial/reduction of good-time credits and parole opportunities.
Review procedures: frequent informal status charts by line staff and Unit Manager/BMC (secret, not shared with prisoners); formal ICA reviews every 90 days (brief, rote); ERT reviews for IM prisoners only (rare, no written reasons).
Plaintiffs allege these practices produce severe psychological and physical harms and that Step Down functions to warehouse prisoners for institutional/economic reasons.
Procedural posture: District court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss (including qualified-immunity defense); Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Eighth Amendment conditions claim survives qualified-immunity dismissal (deliberate indifference)	Step-Down conditions cause severe, objectively serious harms and officials knew of and disregarded those harms.	Qualified immunity applies because, before Porter (2019), law did not clearly establish that solitary alone could meet the objective prong.	Denied immunity at dismissal: Plaintiffs plausibly allege deliberate indifference; qualified immunity cannot shield knowing violations.
Whether the objective Eighth Amendment prong must be clearly established before subjecting officials to liability	Plaintiffs: objective harm is a question of fact; subjective deliberate indifference is dispositive for qualified immunity.	Defendants: Porter was first to hold isolation alone could satisfy objective prong, so officers lacked fair notice pre-Porter.	Court rejects severing prongs for immunity; objective prong does not insulate officials where plaintiffs plausibly allege defendants knew of and ignored obvious harms.
Whether plaintiffs have a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to avoid these solitary conditions	Conditions are atypical and significant (comparable or worse than Wilkinson), creating a liberty interest in release from segregation.	Defendants argue conditions allow progression and are not as onerous as Wilkinson or that Wilkinson didn’t create a right to release.	Held: By 2012 law clearly recognized comparable conditions create a liberty interest; plaintiffs plausibly plead atypical, significant hardship.
Whether Step-Down review procedures satisfy due process and whether defendants have qualified immunity	Plaintiffs allege lack of basic due process (no notice of rating charts, secret informal reviews, perfunctory formal hearings, no meaningful opportunity to contest).	Defendants rely on Hewitt and argue periodic and multi-level reviews on paper are sufficient and not clearly defined by precedent.	Held: Plaintiffs plausibly allege absence of elementary due-process protections (notice and opportunity to be heard); denial of immunity appropriate at this stage.

Key Cases Cited

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (solitary conditions can create a protected liberty interest and require meaningful review)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard)
Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019) (recognized that prolonged solitary can create substantial psychological harm relevant to Eighth Amendment)
Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015) (periodic review may be inadequate if it is merely rubber-stamp and lacks meaningful process)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard; balancing test)
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (administrative segregation requires only informal, nonadversary review—but not for indefinite, supermax-like confinement)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity does not protect officials who knowingly violate the law)
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (officials are on notice where the risk is obvious or prior warnings/regulatory guidance exist)
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (objective component of Eighth Amendment analysis)
Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011) (no immunity where officers were adequately informed of risk and failed to act)