William Snethkamp, III v. Shawn Brewer
714 F. App'x 541
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- In April 2013 Snethkamp pleaded guilty in Emmet County to manufacturing methamphetamine; a PSIR scored Prior Record Variable 7 (PRV 7) at 0 because two Livingston County felony charges were pending but not yet convicted.
- The trial court delayed sentencing under Mich. Comp. Laws § 771.1 for up to one year and imposed conditions (sobriety, drug treatment) to give Snethkamp an opportunity for leniency.
- While the Emmet sentence was delayed, Snethkamp pleaded guilty and was convicted in Livingston County (convictions entered after the Emmet offense’s commission date but before the delayed Emmet sentencing).
- At the delayed sentencing the MDOC rescored PRV 7 to 20 (two subsequent or concurrent convictions), raising the guideline range from 12–20 months to 36–60 months; the court nevertheless departed downward and imposed a 12-month sentence (6 months to serve, 6 months held) plus 36 months probation.
- Snethkamp later violated probation and was resentenced in 2015; he filed a federal habeas petition claiming § 771.1 is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specify when PRVs must be scored and that this ambiguity permits gamesmanship and undermines finality.
- The Sixth Circuit granted a COA only on the void-for-vagueness claim and affirmed: § 771.1 is not unconstitutionally vague when read with the PRV statute; PRV 7 is scored by date of conviction and may be applied at the delayed sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mich. Comp. Laws § 771.1 is unconstitutionally vague as to when PRVs (esp. PRV 7) must be scored | Snethkamp: § 771.1 fails to specify when PRVs are scored; scoring should be "locked in" at the initial sentencing hearing to protect finality and avoid prosecutorial gamesmanship | State: § 771.1 merely permits delay; scoring rules are provided by the PRV statute and guidelines; vagueness challenge improperly raises state-law interpretation | Held: Not vague. PRV 7 is scored by date of conviction under Mich. Comp. Laws § 777.57; delay in sentencing means scoring occurs at actual sentencing. |
| Whether the court must treat the initial delayed-sentence guideline calculation as final (finality/double-jeopardy/ex post facto) | Snethkamp: Interest in finality requires scoring be locked at initial hearing; otherwise prosecutorial "bites" and reliance harm | State: Delay is not a sentence; sentencing may occur later and courts may consider events known at sentencing | Held: Not reached on the merits by COA; these claims were not addressed on appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (sentencing statutes subject to void-for-vagueness challenge)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (nonmandatory guidelines not subject to vagueness challenge)
- People v. Lockridge, 870 N.W.2d 502 (Mich. 2015) (severed mandatory portions of Michigan sentencing guidelines)
- Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (federal habeas courts generally do not reexamine state-law determinations)
- People v. Hendrick, 697 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 2005) (trial court may consider post-probation factors on resentencing)