709 S.W.3d 102
Ky.2024Background
- Victim Amanda Berry moved to Louisville to live with appellant William Sloss; neighbors testified to repeated arguments and physical abuse by Sloss. Amanda disappeared in late 2019; her decomposed body was found Jan. 30, 2020, stuffed naked in a large plastic storage tote in the basement of the house Sloss and Amanda shared. Medical examiner concluded death from blunt force trauma and manual strangulation; decomposition made visual ID impossible.
- John Sloss (owner) discovered the body area, recorded video clips, and led police to the tote; Sloss gave varying accounts to family and police about Amanda’s whereabouts. DNA testing recovered only the decedent’s DNA.
- At trial Sloss repeatedly refused to attend: he threatened court personnel, filed pro se motions including a pretrial waiver, refused transport, and twice declined to appear for jury selection and sentencing. Defense counsel objected to proceeding in his absence.
- Trial court concluded, after on-the-record discussions with counsel and personal knowledge of Sloss’s prior refusals and competency evaluation, that Sloss intentionally refused to appear "short of physical force" and proceeded in absentia; jury convicted Sloss of murder, abuse of a corpse, and PFO‑1, recommending 50 years.
- On appeal Sloss challenges: (1) the trial court’s failure to conduct a formal RCr 8.28(1) hearing and to obtain a personal waiver of presence; (2) denial of a mistrial after a detective’s comment that Sloss did not give a statement; (3) denial of directed verdicts (insufficiency of evidence/identity); (4) admission of prior bad‑acts evidence and hearsay (state‑of‑mind); and (5) cumulative error.
Issues
| Issue | Sloss's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of right to be present / RCr 8.28(1) hearing | The court erred by failing to hold a formal evidentiary hearing and obtain a personal, on‑the‑record waiver before trying him in absentia. | Sloss voluntarily and intentionally refused to appear; the on‑record discussions with counsel plus the court's personal knowledge satisfied RCr 8.28(1) and constituted the required "hearing;" no express oral waiver from Sloss was required. | Affirmed — court’s on‑the‑record colloquies and facts established refusal short of force; waiver implied by conduct; no palpable error. |
| Motion for mistrial after detective’s remark that Sloss didn’t give a statement | The comment improperly referenced post‑arrest silence and warranted a mistrial. | The remark was an isolated, fleeting statement; court immediately admonished jury; prejudice cured. | Affirmed — denial of mistrial not an abuse of discretion; admonition cured the error. |
| Directed verdicts / sufficiency (murder and abuse of corpse) | Commonwealth failed to prove Sloss killed Amanda or that the body was Amanda. | Circumstantial evidence (domestic abuse history, last seen argument, inconsistent statements, exclusive occupancy of house, discovery circumstances) permitted a reasonable jury to convict and infer identity. | Affirmed — evidence sufficient; circumstantial proof supported convictions and identity beyond reasonable doubt. |
| Admissibility of prior bad acts (KRE 404(b)) and notice | Commonwealth’s 404(c) notice was late and testimony of prior abuse was prejudicial and inadmissible. | Notice, though close to trial, was sufficient; prior abuse testimony was relevant to motive/intent and not too remote; prejudicial effect diminished after similar testimony already elicited. | Affirmed — trial court did not abuse discretion admitting prior‑act testimony. |
| Hearsay (state‑of‑mind exception KRE 803(3)) | Testimony that Amanda said she wanted to leave was inadmissible hearsay. | Statements admissible under KRE 803(3) as contemporaneous declarations of intent to leave abuser; relevant to motive and identity of threat. | Affirmed — state‑of‑mind exception applied; admission not an abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (defendant may lose right to be present by disruptive or obstructive conduct)
- Wilson v. Harris, 595 F.2d 101 (2d Cir.) (custodial defendant’s deliberate refusal to attend trial can constitute waiver by conduct)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for constitutional errors)
- Talbot v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76 (Ky.) (applying Chapman harmlessness test in Kentucky)
- Dillon v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.) (KRE 803(3) requires contemporaneity; statements of present intent admissible)
- Rucker v. Commonwealth, 521 S.W.3d 562 (Ky.) (victim’s statements about plans to leave offender admissible under state‑of‑mind exception)