William R. Crews v. State of Florida
183 So. 3d 329
| Fla. | 2015Background
- Petitioner (a public school teacher) was charged in 2012 with multiple sexual offenses alleged to have occurred 2001–2006; some charges would ordinarily be time-barred by the 3-year felony statute of limitations.
- The State alleged the offenses were “based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or employee,” invoking §775.15(12)(b) to extend the limitations period until two years after the teacher left public employment.
- Petitioner moved to dismiss under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(c)(4) for expiration of the limitations period; the State filed traverses disputing the asserted facts and alleging facts supporting the extension provision.
- Trial court denied the motions; Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere (reserving legal issues) and appealed the denial; the First DCA affirmed and certified the question whether §775.15(12)(b) applies to public school teachers.
- The Florida Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether the statute applies to public school teachers and whether the charged conduct constituted “misconduct in office.” The Court held the statute applies to public school teachers and that the facts alleged established a sufficient connection between the offenses and the teacher’s role to constitute misconduct in office.
Issues
| Issue | Petitioner’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §775.15(12)(b) (“misconduct in office by a public officer or employee”) apply to public school teachers? | “Misconduct in office” implies holding a public office; teachers are defined as "instructional personnel," not "employees," so the statute shouldn’t reach them; rule of lenity favors petitioner. | Plain meaning of “public employee” includes teachers; 1974 amendment added "employee" to expand coverage; no ambiguity. | Yes. Court held the statutory language reasonably includes public school teachers; “office” can mean position of trust/responsibility. |
| When does “misconduct in office” apply—must the criminal acts occur on school grounds or during school activities? | Acts must be connected to official duties and occur on school grounds or during school activities. | A connection between the employee’s role and the offense suffices even if acts occur off-campus, off-hours, or outside school activities. | The Court held a sufficient connection existed where the teacher used his role to cultivate trust, invite students off-campus, and commit offenses. |
| Is the 1974 amendment limited to employees who exercise delegated governmental authority (i.e., act in place of an officer)? | The amendment intended a narrow expansion to employees exercising office-like authority by delegation. | The amendment plainly replaced “state, county, or municipal officials” with “public officer or employee,” showing a broader expansion to public employees generally. | The Court rejected the narrow construction, concluding the Legislature intended a broader expansion to public employees. |
| Does the rule of lenity require resolving ambiguity in petitioner’s favor here? | The phrase is ambiguous; lenity requires construing statute in favor of defendant. | The statute’s plain language resolves the issue; lenity is not triggered. | The Court found the statutory text sufficiently clear and declined to apply the rule of lenity. |
Key Cases Cited
- LaMorte v. State, 984 So.2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (addressing whether misconduct-in-office extension applies to public school teachers)
- State v. Bruno, 107 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1958) (discussing rationale for extending limitations for public officers who can conceal crimes)
- Sturdivan v. State, 419 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1982) (State bears burden to charge within the limitations period like any other element)
- Kasischke v. State, 991 So.2d 803 (Fla. 2008) (rule of lenity and statutory construction principles)
- Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226 (Fla. 2006) (question of whether a statute applies to facts is a legal issue reviewed de novo)