William J Bottesi Jr v. Grant T Carlson, 327906

Background

Bottesi was court‑appointed counsel for plaintiff in a criminal case; plaintiff pleaded no contest to third‑degree CSC, assault with intent to commit sexual penetration, and OWI pursuant to a plea bargain and was sentenced. He did not appeal.
Plaintiff later filed a motion for relief from judgment alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and various defects; the trial court denied relief and this Court denied leave to appeal.
Plaintiff then sued his former attorney for legal malpractice and related torts, alleging deficient advice, failure to investigate, coercion into pleading, and concealment — claiming damages from incarceration and lost opportunities.
Defendant moved for summary disposition based on collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel; the trial court granted the motion and denied plaintiff’s motion to stay and for reconsideration.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding plaintiff’s malpractice claims were barred by collateral estoppel (issues already litigated and decided in the criminal proceeding) and by judicial estoppel (plaintiff had unequivocally admitted voluntariness of the plea).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether collateral estoppel bars malpractice claims	Bottesi argues malpractice and related tort labels differ from ineffective‑assistance claims and should be litigable	Prior denial of relief from judgment resolved same factual issues; plaintiff had full and fair opportunity to litigate	Collateral estoppel applies; malpractice claims precluded because same issues were actually and necessarily decided against plaintiff
Whether judicial estoppel prevents plaintiff from contradicting his plea testimony	Bottesi contends plea was coerced and involuntary	Plaintiff testified under oath that plea was knowing, voluntary, and uncoerced; court accepted plea — plaintiff cannot now assert contrary facts	Judicial estoppel applies; plaintiff estopped from contradicting his plea colloquy and cannot show causation from alleged malpractice
Whether plaintiff can prove proximate causation for malpractice damages	Bottesi claims but‑for counsel’s errors he would not have been convicted/incarcerated	Defendant argues plea waived challenges to factual guilt and plaintiff’s voluntary plea is proximate cause of incarceration	Court held plaintiff cannot establish causation because voluntary no‑contest plea waives claims about the state’s ability to prove guilt
Scope of attorney‑client duty alleged	Plaintiff claims damages include loss of civil claims against police	Defendant notes he was appointed only for criminal defense, not civil representation	Court found no attorney‑client relationship as to civil claims; those malpractice theories beyond scope are dismissed

Key Cases Cited

Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109 (principles for considering materials on a motion for summary disposition)
Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co., 451 Mich. 358 (summary disposition burdens and shifting)
Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 679 (defensive use of collateral estoppel where full and fair litigation occurred)
Barrow v. Pritchard, 235 Mich. App. 478 (collateral estoppel bars malpractice claim after full and fair criminal litigation)
Schlumm v. Terence J. O'Hagan, P.C., 173 Mich. App. 345 (criminal finding of effective assistance precludes later malpractice claim)
Trakhtenberg v. People, 493 Mich. 38 (civil malpractice judgment cannot collaterally estop ineffective‑assistance claim in criminal case)
Serr v. People, 73 Mich. App. 19 (a defendant cannot later contradict plea colloquy testimony to attack plea validity)
People v. White, 307 Mich. App. 425 (defendant cannot use post‑plea affidavit contradicting plea hearing testimony to avoid plea consequences)
New (People v. New), 427 Mich. 482 (guilty/no‑contest pleas waive claims about state’s ability to prove guilt)