William Fisher v. Lufkin Industries, Inc.
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2457
5th Cir.2017Background
- William Fisher, an African American Lufkin employee with 10 years’ seniority, complained that supervisor Steve Saxton called him “boy,” prompting an internal inquiry.
- Management (Ty Thornton, David Jinkins) investigated; a coworker (David Rhoden) later conducted a sting purchase and produced DVDs taken from Fisher’s locker; Lufkin concluded Fisher sold DVDs at work.
- Fisher denied ownership of the DVDs, claimed they were planted, and left before a requested car search; he admitted selling/trading videos at the later hearing but disputed that they were pornographic.
- Lufkin terminated Fisher for a “serious violation of company policy”; the magistrate found Rhoden and Jinkins acted with retaliatory animus but also found Fisher lied and failed to cooperate, which independently justified termination.
- The district court adopted the magistrate’s report and dismissed Fisher’s Title VII retaliation claim; Fisher appealed and the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fisher showed causation for Title VII retaliation (but-for cause) | Fisher: complaint about Saxton precipitated a retaliatory investigation by Rhoden/Jinkins that led to termination; investigator’s lack of animus not dispositive under cat’s paw | Lufkin: decisionmakers (Thornton, Perez) lacked retaliatory animus; independent investigation and Fisher’s resistance justified termination | Reversed: Court found sufficient causal link under cat’s paw; retaliatory acts by coworker/supervisor were a but-for cause of termination |
| Whether Fisher’s refusal to cooperate/some lying broke causal chain (superseding cause) | Fisher: resistance to a retaliatory investigation is foreseeable and does not supersede initial retaliatory acts | Lufkin: Fisher’s noncooperation and dishonesty independently justified firing, severing causation | Held for Fisher: court held resistance was foreseeable and not a superseding cause; proximate cause remains with retaliatory actors |
| Applicability of cat’s paw theory where ultimate decisionmaker lacked animus | Fisher: Staub and Zamora allow liability where an agent with animus caused the adverse action via the decisionmaker | Lufkin: absence of animus in final decider insulates employer when independent investigation occurred | Court: Applied Staub/Zamora—employer can be liable if biased agent’s actions were intended to cause the adverse action and were a but-for cause |
| Standard of review for factual findings from bench trial | Fisher: magistrate’s finding of retaliation should control unless clearly erroneous; but legal application merits de novo review | Lufkin: magistrate’s and district court’s factual conclusions should be upheld | Court: Reviewed facts for clear error and reversed district court’s acceptance of magistrate’s finding that Fisher’s resistance severed causation |
Key Cases Cited
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (cat’s paw liability where biased subordinate’s actions cause adverse employment action)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (retaliation requires but-for causation)
- Zamora v. City of Hous., 798 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2015) (applies cat’s paw in Title VII retaliation; biased actors must have caused termination)
- Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Tex., L.L.C., 753 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2014) (coworker can be the biased earlier agent under cat’s paw theory)
- Exxon Co. U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996) (discusses superseding cause analysis in proximate causation context)
- Deperrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc., 842 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2016) (bench-trial factual findings reviewed for clear error)