William Faison v. United States, 650 F. App'x 881

Background

Faison was indicted on drug charges; initially represented by court‑appointed attorney Cullen Gault under the CJA while exploring private counsel.
Gault emailed Faison repeatedly requesting a $7,500 retainer and sent a proposed plea agreement; Faison signed and returned the plea agreement asserting intent to plead guilty.
At a January 2010 rearraignment hearing (requested by Gault), Gault sought a continuance to allow Faison to retain Sheldon Halpern; the court continued the matter and Gault remained counsel until Halpern entered.
The government later informed counsel that the original plea offer was void and a superseding indictment was returned; Faison ultimately pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and was sentenced to 132 months.
Faison filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion claiming ineffective assistance: (1) counsel allowed a favorable plea offer to lapse without notifying the court or government that Faison had accepted it, and (2) Gault’s solicitation of a private retainer created a conflict of interest. The district court denied an evidentiary hearing; the Sixth Circuit granted COA and reversed for an evidentiary hearing on the plea‑offer issues but affirmed denial regarding the conflict‑of‑interest claim.

Issues

Issue	Faison's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for allowing a plea offer to lapse by not notifying court/government that Faison accepted it	Faison says he signed and returned the plea and counsel failed to inform the court or government, causing loss of the plea	Government says no clear deadline existed or defendant knew the offer would be void once he sought new counsel; counsel’s actions didn’t prejudice Faison	Reversed: record does not conclusively refute Faison; evidentiary hearing required on whether counsel’s lapse occurred and caused prejudice
Whether Halpern was ineffective for advice/inaction that led to lapse of the plea offer	Faison contends Halpern advised him the plea could still be accepted and influenced decision to change counsel	Government says Halpern was not yet representing Faison before the court at rearraignment and thus could not have rendered ineffective assistance then	Reversed in part: factual dispute exists; evidentiary hearing required to determine whether Halpern’s role supports an ineffective‑assistance claim
Whether Gault’s solicitation of a private retainer created an actual conflict of interest under Cuyler v. Sullivan	Faison asserts fee solicitations show Gault prioritized financial interests and thus adversely affected representation (failed to proffer signed plea)	Government argues fee requests alone don’t prove an actual conflict or adverse effect on performance; record contradicts claim	Affirmed: no evidentiary hearing; record conclusively shows no actual conflict or adverse effect from fee solicitations
Whether Faison demonstrated prejudice under Strickland/Frye from loss of the plea offer	Faison argues he would have accepted earlier plea, which carried a lower Guidelines range and thus less prison time	Government/district court argued his eventual sentence (132 months) was within or comparable to plea range so no prejudice	Reversed: court finds a reasonable probability of different, more favorable outcome under the lapsed plea; evidentiary hearing required to resolve factual disputes

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes ineffective assistance (performance and prejudice) standard)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (counsel’s failure to preserve plea offers can constitute ineffective assistance)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (right to effective assistance extends to plea bargaining; prejudice analysis for lost plea offers)
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (standard for conflicts of interest requiring proof of actual conflict that adversely affected counsel’s performance)
Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (any increase in incarceration can constitute prejudice)
Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (an incorrect Guidelines range can be prejudicial even if sentence falls within both ranges)