William Bracey v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 986 F.3d 274

Background

William Bracey was convicted of first-degree murder in 1995; the prosecution’s case relied heavily on two cooperating witnesses, Thomas Plummer Jr. and Sylvester Bell.
Years later (2010) Bracey learned from public docket entries that additional charges against those witnesses had been pending and that favorable dispositions/plea outcomes were not disclosed at his trial.
Bracey raised Brady/Giglio claims in state post-conviction proceedings; state courts dismissed them as time-barred because the docket information was publicly available.
In 2011 Bracey filed a federal habeas petition asserting undisclosed Brady impeachment; the District Court dismissed it as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) because he could have discovered the facts earlier via public records.
After this court’s en banc decision in Dennis v. Secretary (2016) (holding defendants need not scour public records for Brady material because the prosecutor’s disclosure duty is absolute), Bracey moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) for reconsideration; the District Court issued a one‑page denial without addressing Dennis or performing the multifactor Cox analysis.
The Third Circuit held a COA was required and should issue; it vacated and remanded, concluding the District Court abused its discretion by failing to consider Dennis’s impact and by not applying the required Cox factors.

Issues

Issue	Bracey's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether a COA is required to appeal denial of a Rule 60(b) motion that seeks reconsideration of a habeas dismissal on procedural grounds	Morris v. Horn principle (COA required) should be reconsidered; Harbison/Gonzalez undermine Morris	Morris remains controlling; Harbison and Gonzalez do not eliminate COA requirement	COA is required; COA granted for this appeal
Whether Dennis materially changed the law relevant to § 2244(d)(1)(D)’s "due diligence" for Brady claims	Dennis altered baseline expectations: defendants may reasonably rely on prosecutors to disclose Brady material and need not search public records	Dennis is inapplicable to § 2244(d)(1)(D); public-record availability keeps claims untimely	Dennis effected a material change: due diligence is context-specific and, for Brady claims, does not require independent searching absent reason to suspect nondisclosure
Whether the District Court abused discretion by denying Rule 60(b) without addressing Dennis or applying the Cox multifactor equitable test	District Court erred by summarily denying relief and failing to weigh Cox factors (impact of intervening precedent, merits, need for hearing, finality/comity, movant diligence)	District Court’s summary denial was appropriate	Denial was an abuse of discretion; vacate and remand for full Cox analysis and further fact development as needed
Whether Bracey’s Brady claim is untimely under § 2244(d)(1)(D) because the factual predicate was discoverable in public records	Bracey reasonably relied on Brady disclosure; accrual is when he had reason to suspect a Brady violation (2010), not when public records theoretically revealed facts	Accrual occurred earlier because public dockets were available; Bracey failed to exercise due diligence	Court did not resolve final timeliness on merits; clarified legal standard that Brady claim accrues when petitioner has reason to believe prosecution may have violated its disclosure duty and remanded for application to the record

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose materially exculpatory evidence)
Dennis v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Brady does not impose a duty on defense to scour public records; prosecutor’s disclosure duty is absolute)
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (defendant may presume prosecutor discharged disclosure duties; cause for failing to investigate may exist)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady materiality and prejudice standards; defendant ordinarily has no basis to suspect nondisclosure)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (distinguishes true Rule 60(b) motions from successive habeas petitions)
Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (2009) (limitations on COA requirement for orders resolving collateral issues)
Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2005) (due diligence under § 2244(d)(1)(D) is context-specific; inquiry focuses on petitioner’s reasonable expectations)
Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2014) (articulates multifactor equitable test for Rule 60(b)(6) relief based on intervening precedents)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (COA standard: claim must be debatable among jurists of reason)