Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209

Petitioner Wilkinson, a Trinidad and Tobago native, remained in the U.S. beyond his tourist visa expiration and was detained by immigration authorities.
Wilkinson applied for cancellation of removal based on the alleged “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” his removal would cause to his U.S.-citizen son, M., who suffers from a serious medical condition.
The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that while M. would face hardship, it did not meet the statutory threshold of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" substantial enough for cancellation of removal.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed without opinion.
The Third Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s application of the hardship standard, finding it to be discretionary and thus unreviewable.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the IJ’s application of the hardship standard is reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether application of the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard is reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact	Wilkinson argued that applying the hardship standard to established facts is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewable by appellate courts	The government contended that the hardship determination is discretionary and primarily factual, falling under the jurisdictional bar to review	The Supreme Court held that the application of the hardship standard is a mixed question of law and fact, not pure discretion, and is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D)

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (defining that a syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion)
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (holding that mixed questions of law and fact are reviewable as "questions of law" under §1252(a)(2)(D))
Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (clarifying that pure questions of fact in discretionary relief decisions are not reviewable)
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (discussing the definition of mixed questions of law and fact and their reviewability)