Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209

Background

Situ Kamu Wilkinson, a noncitizen from Trinidad and Tobago, was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement after overstaying his tourist visa.
Wilkinson sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), arguing his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his U.S.-citizen son, M., who suffers from a severe medical condition and relies on Wilkinson for support.
The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Wilkinson credible and recognized M.'s hardship, but held it was not sufficiently “exceptional and extremely unusual” under the statutory standard, thus denying the application for relief.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed without opinion; the Third Circuit dismissed Wilkinson’s petition, holding it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ's hardship determination, viewing it as a discretionary, unreviewable decision.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether an IJ's application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard is a reviewable mixed question of law and fact under § 1252(a)(2)(D), or a purely discretionary, unreviewable determination.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is application of the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard a reviewable mixed question of law and fact?	Yes; it requires legal analysis applied to facts, reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), per Guerrero-Lasprilla.	No; it is a discretionary, primarily factual judgment barred from judicial review under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and Patel.	It is a mixed question of law and fact, and thus reviewable as a “question of law” under § 1252(a)(2)(D); jurisdiction is restored for such questions.
Does Guerrero-Lasprilla control reviewability of hardship determinations?	Yes; Guerrero-Lasprilla established that application of legal standards to facts is reviewable.	No; Guerrero-Lasprilla concerned judicially-created standards, not statutory ones, and should not apply here.	Guerrero-Lasprilla governs; statutory standards applied to facts present mixed questions reviewable as “questions of law.”
Should factual underpinnings of the hardship determination be reviewable?	Only the application of law to found facts—not the fact-finding itself—should be reviewable.	No part (including mixed questions) should be reviewed if the provision is discretionary.	Only the legal application to found facts is reviewable; agency fact-finding remains unreviewable.
Does precedent or statutory history bar review of hardship determinations?	No; prior precedent and history do not distinguish judicial from statutory standards or restrict review.	Yes; prior history and cases like Williamsport show "exceptional hardship" determinations as non-reviewable.	No bar found; the Court rejected reading prior history or unrelated precedent as limiting § 1252(a)(2)(D).

Key Cases Cited

Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020) (holding that application of a legal standard to facts—a mixed question—is reviewable as a question of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D))
Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022) (distinguishing fact questions as not reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), but mixed questions are)
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (noting that application of facts to statutory standards raises mixed questions of law and fact)
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (recognizing the distinction between factual findings and application of law to fact)