Wilkins v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 299

Background

Wilkins, an employee over 40, worked for Time Warner Cable (or predecessors) from 1983 until April 2010 as a commissioned sales representative (MDU/DSR); he was long‑tenured and nicknamed “Grandpa Joe.”
On April 2, 2010, supervisor Edwards told Wilkins his MDU role would change, suggested he should retire, and said he “didn’t fit in anymore”; Edwards told Wilkins he would lose his current accounts and would need to get new buildings.
Wilkins sought relief via a brief meeting with regional president Keib and an HR meeting; Keib said he would contact HR but follow‑up meetings never occurred; with HR assistance Wilkins signed a retirement letter stating intent to retire after his vacation but claims he intended to retain or transfer to another full‑time role.
Time Warner asserts Wilkins voluntarily retired and that company records document his retirement; Wilkins says he was constructively discharged and did not receive severance (he received medical and pension benefits but no severance).
After Wilkins left, his MDU duties were filled by significantly younger employees, and another internal applicant was told he was “too old” for the role, supporting an inference of age bias.
Procedural posture: Wilkins sued under the ADEA, ERISA § 510, and for breach of contract. The court granted Wilkins leave to amend his complaint to correct fee statutes; it granted summary judgment to defendant on the breach‑of‑contract claim (preempted/ERISA procedural defects) but denied summary judgment on ADEA and ERISA § 510 claims and denied the employer’s Faragher/Ellerth affirmative‑defense invocation (waived).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Wilkins suffered an adverse employment action (constructive discharge) under ADEA/ERISA	Wilkins contends Edwards’ statements and the threatened change to his job/compensation forced him to resign (constructive discharge).	Time Warner contends Wilkins voluntarily retired and no tangible adverse action occurred.	Court: A reasonable factfinder could find constructive discharge; prima facie adverse action satisfied.
Whether circumstances permit an inference of age discrimination	Points to replacement by much younger hires and comments (e.g., another applicant called “too old”).	Argues lack of discriminatory circumstances and that replacements were over 40 in some respects.	Court: Age‑related evidence is sufficient to create an inference of discrimination for summary judgment purposes.
Availability and effect of Faragher/Ellerth vicarious‑liability defense	Wilkins: defense inapplicable or waived; employer failed to prove elements.	Time Warner: may raise Faragher/Ellerth to avoid liability because no tangible employment action occurred.	Court: Defense applies to constructive discharge claims but Time Warner waived it and in any event failed to show both elements; defense not available to grant summary judgment.
ERISA § 510 claim (intent to interfere with benefits) and breach‑of‑contract claim	Wilkins: constructive discharge intended to avoid severance; § 510 protects interference with vesting/opportunity to obtain benefits.	Time Warner: no discharge occurred; even if discharged, Plan excludes constructive discharge; breach claim preempted by ERISA.	Court: § 510 claim survives summary judgment because plaintiff showed prima facie elements and employer didn’t articulate a non‑discriminatory reason; breach‑of‑contract claim preempted/dismissed or subsumed by ERISA remedies (and benefits claim requires exhaustion).

Key Cases Cited

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for assessing summary judgment and genuine disputes of material fact)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant’s burden and allocation at summary judgment)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (nonmovant must present evidence to create a genuine issue)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (evaluating circumstantial evidence and employer’s proffered reasons at summary judgment)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (ADEA requires but‑for causation)
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (employer affirmative defense to vicarious liability)
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (same as Faragher)
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004) (Faragher/Ellerth defense may extend to constructive discharge absent a tangible company act)
Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1988) (ERISA § 510 requires intent to interfere with benefits)