Wilkie v. Luzerne County
207 F. Supp. 3d 433
M.D. Penn.2016Background
- Don Wilkie (plaintiff) was a Luzerne County 911 dispatcher represented by AFSCME (the Union); he sought 30 days from the Union’s collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) "sick day bank" to obtain counseling for anxiety in Nov–Dec 2011.
- Plaintiff submitted applications on Nov 15, 2011 and Dec 12, 2011; the sick bank committee reviewed the first on Dec 9 (tabled for more information) and denied the second on Dec 20; an appeal was denied in Feb 2012.
- Plaintiff alleged the Union violated the ADA and PHRA by denying sick-bank leave; Counts VII–VIII assert disability discrimination by the Union. The Union moved for summary judgment on those claims.
- At summary judgment the court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for circumstantial-evidence ADA claims and considered whether (1) Wilkie was disabled under the ADA, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, (3) the Union proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, and (4) those reasons were pretextual.
- Key factual disputes include: whether Wilkie’s anxiety substantially limited a major life activity (thinking), whether denial of sick-bank leave constituted an adverse employment action, and whether the Union’s stated reasons for denial (insufficient accrued sick hours and that Wilkie worked while requests were pending) were pretextual.
Issues
| Issue | Wilkie's Argument | Union's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wilkie is disabled under the ADA | Anxiety substantially limits "thinking"; daily episodes and physician/counseling evidence show impairment | Argued he is not disabled under ADA standards | Court: Genuine fact issue exists; reasonable jury could find disability |
| Whether denial of sick-bank leave is an adverse employment action | Denial altered terms/privileges of employment by withholding paid leave needed for treatment | Denial was an internal benefits decision, not a serious tangible employment action | Court: Denial could be an adverse action; fact issue exists for jury |
| Whether Union offered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for denial | Reasons were pretextual given meeting minutes and delay in processing | Denial based on CBA rules: lacked required sick-hour balance and Wilkie worked while leave was pending | Court: Union met light burden to articulate nondiscriminatory reasons |
| Whether Union's reasons are pretext for discrimination | Committee minutes, timing, and the nature of mental-health treatment support inference of pretext | Proffered objective CBA-based grounds (insufficient hours; worked during requested leave) | Court: Genuine disputes of material fact on pretext; summary judgment denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407 (3d Cir. 1997) (summary judgment standard overview)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (genuine dispute and materiality for summary judgment)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (movant may show nonmovant lacks evidence to carry burden)
- Int'l Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1990) (view facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
- Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1996) (use of McDonnell Douglas framework in ADA cases)
- Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (pretext standards under McDonnell Douglas)
- Abramson v. William Patterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (employer burden to proffer nondiscriminatory reason)
- Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702 (3d Cir. 2006) (plaintiff must contradict core facts of employer’s reason)
- Storey v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. 2004) (definition of adverse employment action)
- Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1999) (less than discharge can be adverse action)
- Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999) ("thinking" is a major life activity)
- Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2012) (minimal employer burden at second McDonnell step)
- Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2013) (pretext burden articulation)
- Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008) (summary judgment and pretext principles)
- Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101 (3d Cir. 1997) (employer’s reason must be plainly wrong to show pretext)
- Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 2009) (burden-shifting in ADA disparate treatment claims)
- Gafliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 2002) (PHRA claims analyzed like ADA claims)
