Wiley v. United States
19-CM-323
| D.C. | Dec 23, 2021Background
- Dinesh Tandon purchased 4891 Colorado Ave., N.W., repaired the vacant house, and replaced its locks; he was the lawful owner.
- Roman Wiley repeatedly entered the property without permission over months, and on one occasion Tandon and contractors saw him leave the basement.
- On October 9, 2018, someone had removed/changed locks on a wrought-iron back-gate; photographs showed the lock assembly disassembled on the ground.
- Wiley returned the next day, told Officer Perez he believed he owned the house, displayed a packaged lockset and a screwdriver, and admitted he had unscrewed and replaced the lock cylinders.
- At a bench trial Wiley was convicted of unlawful entry (D.C. Code § 22-3302(a)(1)) and malicious destruction of property (D.C. Code § 22-303); on appeal the court affirmed unlawful entry but reversed the destruction conviction for insufficient evidence of malice and inadequate proof that removal equaled damage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wiley had the requisite mens rea for unlawful entry (knew/should have known entry was against lawful occupant's will) | Wiley’s belief that he owned the house was unreasonable given overwhelming proof Tandon owned it, Wiley left when confronted, and Wiley had no ownership documents | Wiley genuinely believed he owned the house, negating the knowledge element | Affirmed: court held Wiley’s belief was unreasonable and did not negate the element |
| Whether removal/disassembly of locks satisfied the "damage" element of malicious destruction of property | Removal of the locks constituted damaging property; photos and Tandon’s testimony show locks were damaged/broken | Wiley only unscrewed and replaced the cylinders; mere removal/disassembly is not necessarily damage | Partial reversal: court concluded mere removal generally does not equal damage; photographic evidence arguably showed some damage but not enough to support malice |
| Whether the government proved the requisite malice (intent to damage or conscious disregard of substantial risk) | Wiley intentionally removed another’s locks; purposeful removal supports malice even under a mistaken belief of permission | Wiley removed locks with a screwdriver to secure what he thought was his property; no evidence he intended to damage or acted recklessly | Reversed: insufficient evidence that any damage was inflicted with the required intent or reckless disregard; conviction vacated and judgment of acquittal directed |
Key Cases Cited
- Nero v. United States, 73 A.3d 153 (D.C. 2013) (standard for de novo review of sufficiency challenges)
- Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125 (D.C. 2001) (Jackson standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (conviction must be supportable by any rational trier of fact)
- Ortberg v. United States, 81 A.3d 303 (D.C. 2013) (elements of unlawful entry and bona fide belief requirement)
- Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291 (D.C. 1979) (reasonableness requirement for good-faith belief defenses to trespass)
- Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438 (D.C. 1971) (reasonableness baseline for bona fide belief)
- Thomas v. United States, 985 A.2d 409 (D.C. 2009) (disassembly of a "boot" constituting substantial damage for destruction statute)
- Gore v. United States, 145 A.3d 540 (D.C. 2016) (elements of malicious destruction of property)
- Russell v. United States, 65 A.3d 1172 (D.C. 2013) (intent to destroy property under mistaken but unreasonable belief of permission)
- Harris v. United States, 125 A.3d 704 (D.C. 2015) (distinguishing intent to damage from intent merely to gain entry)
- Guzman v. United States, 821 A.2d 895 (D.C. 2003) (malice defined as enhanced intent beyond mere commission of the act)