WILDER v. the STATE.
343 Ga. App. 110
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- James Glenn Wilder was convicted in 2009 of aggravated child molestation, child molestation, statutory rape, and two counts of sexual exploitation of a child for acts in 2003–2004.
- After appeals and remands, the trial court resentenced Wilder in August 2013 following this Court’s directive and later proceedings.
- At a February 2017 hearing the parties agreed Wilder should be resentenced on Count 2 (child molestation) under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 to include a split sentence (prison plus probation).
- The trial court resentenced Count 2 to six years total (five years to serve plus one year probation), consecutive to aggravated child molestation, producing a total effective sentence of 36 years, 25 to serve.
- Wilder appealed, arguing § 17-10-6.2 (enacted in 2006) did not apply because his offenses occurred in 2003–2004; he claimed the split-sentence requirement was therefore impermissible retroactive application.
- The Court affirmed, holding the imposed sentence fell within the statutory range in effect at the time of the offenses and that any error induced by the parties afforded no grounds for reversal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OCGA § 17-10-6.2 may be applied to crimes committed before its enactment | Wilder: § 17-10-6.2 (2006) cannot be applied retroactively to 2003–2004 offenses | State: The resentenced term falls within the statutory range; sentence is authorized | Court: § 17-10-6.2 does not apply retroactively, but the sentence is lawful because it is within the statutory limits at time of offense |
| Whether the split sentence imposed was unauthorized or void | Wilder: Split/probation portion was required by the court’s reliance on § 17-10-6.2 and thus impermissible | State: Even if court relied on § 17-10-6.2, the resulting sentence was permitted under the law at the time of the offenses | Court: Sentence is legally authorized and not void because within statutory range |
| Whether induced sentencing error requires reversal | Wilder: Relies on mistaken statutory application to seek relief | State: Wilder and parties agreed to split sentence; induced error doctrine bars relief | Court: Induced error is not a ground for reversal; defendant cannot complain of a result he aided in procuring |
| Whether appellate review is proper where sentence is within statutory limits | Wilder: Seeks reversal based on statutory misapplication | State: If within limits, appellate courts will not review sentencing discretion | Court: Sentences within statutory parameters are not subject to reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Fleming v. State, 271 Ga. 587 (establishes that crimes are to be punished according to law at time of commission)
- Hicks v. State, 228 Ga. App. 235 (time-of-offense law determines penalty and criminality)
- Few v. State, 311 Ga. App. 608 (sentence is void only if court imposes punishment law does not allow)
- Monroe v. State, 250 Ga. 30 (trial court discretion within statutory parameters; appellate courts will not review lawful sentences)
- Torres v. State, 272 Ga. 389 (induced error is impermissible and not grounds for reversal)
- Gorman v. State, 318 Ga. App. 535 (one cannot complain of a result he procured; induced error cannot establish prejudice)
- Wilder v. State, 304 Ga. App. 891 (prior direct appeal and remand authority cited in the procedural history)