Wilcox v. Orellano, 115 A.3d 621

Lydia Wilcox filed a medical-malpractice claim with HCADRO in June 2008 but failed to attach the required expert report to her expert-certificate; she later filed a circuit-court complaint and the defendant answered.
Before the court ruled on the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of the expert report, Wilcox voluntarily dismissed the Howard County action by a stipulation signed by both parties (Rule 2-506 stipulation was required because an answer had been filed).
Wilcox refiled a new HCADRO claim (with an expert report attached) and later filed a new circuit-court complaint in a different county; the new complaint added allegations about the original surgery not present in the first complaint.
The defendant moved to dismiss the refiled complaint as time‑barred; the circuit court dismissed after reconsideration, finding the savings provision at CJ §5‑119 did not apply because Wilcox had voluntarily dismissed the first action.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed; the Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed, holding CJ §5‑119’s 60‑day savings period does not apply when the prior dismissal was a voluntary dismissal, including voluntary dismissals by stipulation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does CJ §5‑119(a)(1) exclude voluntary dismissals effected by stipulation (after an answer) from the §5‑119(b) savings period?	Wilcox: “voluntary dismissal” in §5‑119(a)(1) means a unilateral plaintiff notice (pre‑answer) and should not include stipulations requiring defendant assent.	Orellano: §5‑119(a)(1) excludes any voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff, including stipulations after an answer.	Court: The statutory phrase covers voluntary dismissals by stipulation; the savings period does not apply when the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the prior action.
Should “voluntary dismissal” in §5‑119 be given a special meaning different from Rule 2‑506 and ordinary legal usage?	Wilcox: Use a narrow meaning tied to unilateral pre‑answer notices to preserve the savings rule’s remedial purpose.	Orellano: Use the ordinary legal meaning (including stipulations); Legislature presumed aware of Rule 2‑506.	Court: Use ordinary legal/procedural meaning; no special definition was intended.
Does §5‑119(a)(2) (limiting the statute to malpractice claims dismissed for missing expert report) negate the exclusion in (a)(1)?	Wilcox: The later addition of (a)(2) shows malpractice claims should get the savings period despite (a)(1).	Orellano: Both subsections limit the statute’s scope; (a)(2) does not repeal or narrow (a)(1).	Court: (a)(1) and (a)(2) operate together; (a)(2) does not override (a)(1).

Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563 (discusses expert‑certificate/report requirement and dismissal for failure to attach report)
Carroll v. Konits, 400 Md. 167 (explains purpose of the expert‑certificate/report to curb frivolous malpractice claims)
Bi v. Gibson, 205 Md. App. 263 (holds voluntary dismissal under Rule 2‑506 does not toll limitations)
State ex rel. Lennon v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270 (interprets Rule 2‑506 methods of voluntary dismissal)
Milburn v. Milburn, 142 Md. App. 518 (recognizes stipulation dismissals as voluntary dismissals under Rule 2‑506)
Narvarro‑Monzo v. Washington Adventist Hosp., 380 Md. 195 (describes statutory extensions and relief mechanisms for HCMCA deadlines)
McCready Memorial Hosp. v. Hauser, 330 Md. 497 (addresses statutory 90‑day extension for expert certificate deadlines)