360 F. Supp. 3d 1112
E.D. Wash.2018Background
- Plaintiff Karen Wilcox alleged Chief Batiste disclosed unredacted police traffic collision reports (PTCRs) containing personal information obtained from Department of Licensing (DOL) motor-vehicle records and that those disclosures violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and other privacy laws.
- Chief Batiste moved for summary judgment asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity (official-capacity), qualified immunity (individual-capacity), and that his disclosures complied with Washington State Patrol (WSP) policies.
- Wilcox argued Batiste exceeded redaction policies by disclosing PTCRs with personal data and sought injunctive and monetary relief; she also named 300 John Doe defendants but never identified them.
- The court previously entered a preliminary injunction requiring redaction of specified fields from disclosed PTCRs; the present motion seeks final resolution on immunity, statutory liability, and related claims.
- The court analyzed whether Batiste acted ultra vires (no state authority at all), whether the DPPA clearly protected collision-report data at the time, and whether Wilcox abandoned other claims or complied with state claim-filing procedures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eleventh Amendment immunity (official-capacity) | Batiste acted beyond lawful authority, so state is real party and immunity doesn't apply | Batiste acted with state authority and is entitled to immunity | Held: Batiste entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in his official capacity because disclosures arose from state authority, though he exceeded what state law required in practice |
| Ultra vires conduct | Batiste disclosed beyond WSP redaction policies, so acted personally beyond authority | Batiste contends he did not act ultra vires and had codes permitting disclosure | Held: Court finds he did not act wholly without authority (not ultra vires); Wilcox challenges his personal implementation rather than state policy, so official-capacity immunity applies |
| Qualified immunity re DPPA and §1983 damages | DPPA clearly covered collision-report personal data and disclosure for marketing was prohibited | Batiste argues law was unsettled as to whether collision reports were DPPA motor-vehicle records | Held: Qualified immunity granted — disclosure-for-marketing prohibition was clearly established, but whether collision-report data were DPPA-protected was not beyond debate; overall Batiste has immunity from monetary damages |
| Other claims, Doe defendants, injunction | Wilcox pursued constitutional privacy, common-law invasion, John Does, and sought injunction | Batiste moved to dismiss/unopposed on some claims; court to enforce civil-procedure rules and claim-presentation statutes | Held: Wilcox abandoned constitutional and common-law invasion claims (summary judgment for defendant); invasion claim also dismissed for failure to present to ORM; 300 John Does dismissed without prejudice for failure to identify; preliminary injunction dissolved upon final judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Yakama Indian Nation v. State of Wash. Dep't of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir.) (defining ultra vires standard for state officials)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S.) (qualified immunity two-step framework)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S.) (flexibility in qualified-immunity prong order)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (U.S.) (reasonableness standard for qualified immunity)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (U.S.) (clearly established law and breathing room for officials)
- Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48 (U.S.) (DPPA prohibits obtaining personal information for attorney solicitation; clarifies impermissible marketing use)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (U.S.) (focus on whether particular conduct was clearly established)
- Moran v. State of Wash., 147 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.) (plaintiff bears burden to show rights were clearly established)
- Marsh v. Cty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir.) (discussion of what authorities can create a clearly established right)
- U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V., 590 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.) (preliminary injunction dissolves upon final judgment)