Wilbur Macy v. GC Services Ltd. P'ship
897 F.3d 747
6th Cir.2018Background
- Plaintiffs Macy and Stowe received GC Services debt-collection letters about Synchrony Bank accounts that omitted the FDCPA’s "in-writing" requirement for disputing a debt or requesting the original creditor’s name and address.
- Plaintiffs sued GC under the FDCPA, alleging the letters violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) and (5) and § 1692g(b) by implying oral disputes would trigger the same protections as written disputes.
- GC moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing; the district court denied the motion, finding the letters created a substantial risk that consumers would waive statutory protections.
- The district court later certified a class of Kentucky and Nevada consumers; GC sought interlocutory review contesting standing and class certification.
- The Sixth Circuit reviewed standing de novo and class certification for abuse of discretion, and affirmed the district court: plaintiffs have Article III standing and class certification was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing: whether plaintiffs suffered a concrete injury from alleged FDCPA notice defects | Omission of the "in-writing" requirement creates a material risk that consumers will unwittingly waive FDCPA rights; a statutory procedural violation protecting a concrete interest suffices under Spokeo | Mere procedural violation without additional harm is insufficient; plaintiffs allege only speculative or future risk and not actual injury | Plaintiffs have standing: the alleged procedural violation presents a material risk of harm to the concrete interests Congress sought to protect, satisfying Spokeo |
| Applicability of Spokeo framework to FDCPA notice claim | Section 1692g was enacted to protect concrete economic and procedural interests; procedural violations can alone confer injury if they risk the harm the statute prevents | Spokeo requires additional concrete harm beyond statutory violation | Court applies Spokeo/Strubel/Spokeo II line: where statute protects a concrete interest, procedural violation that poses real risk of harm can establish concreteness |
| Class commonality and predominance under Rule 23 | Class members received materially similar form letters from same collector asserting same legal deficiency; common questions will resolve central issues | Plaintiffs lack individualized standing/injury; thus commonality and predominance fail | District court did not abuse discretion: commonality, typicality, adequacy, and predominance satisfied given common form-letter issue |
| Relevance of defendants’ post-complaint policy declarations (honoring oral disputes) | Plaintiffs rely on the complaint’s allegations; standing focuses on pleaded facts, not extrinsic merits evidence | GC argued declarations show no risk because GC honors verbal disputes, negating injury | Court limits standing analysis to complaint’s four corners; merits evidence about policy is not considered at standing pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (procedural statutory violations require a concrete injury; some procedural violations may suffice if they protect concrete interests)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (framework for injury-in-fact: concrete, particularized, actual or imminent)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (requirements for standing based on speculative future injury; distinguishes imminence standard)
- Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2016) (applies Spokeo to hold procedural statutory rights confer standing when designed to protect concrete interests and violation risks real harm)
- Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo II), 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017) (adopts Strubel’s two-part test for procedural violations under Spokeo)
- Lyshe v. Levy, 854 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 2017) (applies Spokeo; distinguishes procedural violations that do not protect the type of harm the statute was enacted to prevent)
- Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2018) (dismissing an FDCPA claim for lack of standing where plaintiffs alleged no risk of harm from the nondisclosure)