Wiggins v. State
288 Ga. 169
| Ga. | 2010Background
- Wiggins was convicted of cruelty to children and violation of an oath of public officer, with this sentence and convictions affirmed on direct appeal.
- After a habeas corpus attempt, Wiggins moved in the court of conviction to strike an illegal sentence, challenging a lifetime sex-offender registration condition.
- The trial court denied the motion; Wiggins appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court challenging OCGA § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B)(xi) as applied to probation.
- The court held sex-offender registration as a probation condition is required by statute and does not exceed the permissible maximum.
- The court rejected challenges based on vagueness, Sixth Amendment rights, Eighth Amendment cruel-and-unusual punishment, and lack of statutory authority, citing Hollie v. State and related authorities.
- Appellant’s conviction for child molestation involved conduct described as a sexual offense against a minor, which supports the registration requirement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is lifetime sex-offender registration as a probation condition illegal? | Wiggins: registration exceeds maximum penalty under OCGA 42-8-34(c). | State: statute requires registration and does not exceed maximum sentence. | Not illegal; permissible under the statute. |
| Is OCGA 42-1-12(a)(9)(B)(xi) vague as applied? | Registration definitions are vague and undefined. | Statute is sufficiently definite when applied to conduct here. | Not unconstitutionally vague as applied. |
| Does the statute fail to designate the official authorized to require registration? | Statute fails to identify responsible official. | Hollie v. State confirms authority of proper tribunal; hypothetical issues need not be addressed. | Not necessary to resolve; based on Hollie, proper authority exists in this case. |
| Does Blakely/Apprendi apply to the registration condition? | Registration constitutes punishment requiring jury admission of facts. | Registration is regulatory, not punitive; not within Blakely/Apprendi. | Not within Bir; regulatory, not punitive. |
| Did the superior court have authority to impose sex-offender registration as a special probation condition? | Statute does not authorize such condition. | Hollie authorizes the court to impose it; valid application here. | Yes, authority exists; valid as applied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hollie v. State, 287 Ga. 389 (Ga. 2010) (authorized to impose sex-offender registration as a probation condition)
- Baker v. State, 280 Ga. 822 (Ga. 2006) (due process notice standards for vagueness)
- Thelen v. State, 272 Ga. 81 (Ga. 2000) (case-based approach to vagueness sufficiency)
- Sequeira v. State, 243 Ga.App. 718 (Ga. App. 2000) (definition of sexual offense for registration purposes)
- Spivey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 834 (Ga. App. 2005) (expanded sex-offender registration definitions)
- Jenkins v. State, 284 Ga. 642 (Ga. 2008) (statutory scope of sexual offenses for registration purposes)