Wе granted certiorari to address the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court did not err by making Jim Phillip Hollie’s registration as a sex offender a special condition of
his probation.
Hollie v. State,
Hollie was indicted in December 2005 on charges of aggravated child molestation, aggravated sexual battery and child molestation (four counts) arising out of events that occurred in July 2005. He was convicted of all charges and sentenced in February 2007 under the version of OCGA § 16-6-4 then in effect to 30 years, to sеrve 15 in confinement.
1. It is well established that, as part of the broad discretion vested in trial judges by the probation and suspensiоn statutes in Georgia, the appellate courts will approve “any reasonable condition imposed for probation” of sentence by the trial court “[i]n the absence of express authority to the contrary.”
State v. Collett,
2. Hollie argues that, bеcause registration as a sex offender is for a lifetime, the designation of sex оffender registration as a special condition of probation exceeds the maximum penalty for his February 2007 conviction. Hollie’s lifetime registration is required by the sеx offender registration statute. See former OCGA § 42-1-12 (g) (2), effective July 1, 2005, Ga. L. 2005, p. 453, § 1 et seq./HB 106; see
аlso current OCGA § 42-1-12 (f) (7).
3
The period of time to which Hollie is subject to registration
as a special condition of probation,
however, is gоverned by OCGA § 42-8-34 (c) (the period of probation or suspension “shall not exceed the maximum sentence of confinement which could be imposed on the defendant”);
see Allen v. State,
3. Contrary to Hollie’s argument, the Court of Appeals сorrectly recognized that current law does not deem registration as a sexual offender to be punishment. See, e.g.,
Rainer v. State of Ga.,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
OCGA § 42-8-35 (b) became effective January 1, 2005. Ga. L. 2004, p. 761, § 4.
Due to the nature of Hollie’s convictions, it is uncontroverted that he is expressly subjeсt to the sex offender registration requirements. We decline to address Hollie’s hypothetical arguments regarding the failure of OCGA § 42-1-12 to set forth the official responsible for determining whether an individual must register as a sex offender in those cases involving offenses not specifically identified in the statute.
As noted above, Hollie was convictеd of felony aggravated child molestation, which was defined as a “sexually violent оffense” under former OCGA § 42-1-12 (a) (7) and is currently defined as a “dangerous sexual offense” under OCGA § 42-1-12 (a) (10) (A) (ix).