Widomski v. State University of New York (Suny) At Orange
748 F.3d 471
| 2d Cir. | 2014Background
- Widomski was a full‑time student in SUNY Orange’s Medical Laboratory Technology program and began clinical rotations in fall 2008. A non‑college proctor (Rebecca Sander) told him she would not let him draw blood because his hands shook; the department chair (Contarino) agreed.
- Contarino told Widomski he could complete the program and obtain employment as a lab technician but would not be permitted to perform phlebotomy or obtain an MLT license for hospital work.
- Contarino and Widomski entered an agreement requiring Widomski to submit weekly clinical reports; Widomski later submitted forms that were nearly identical to earlier forms, which Sander disputed signing.
- Contarino referred falsification charges to student services; after a Board of Inquiry found Widomski falsified documents, he was expelled from the MLT program.
- Widomski sued under Title II of the ADA claiming (1) discrimination based on a perceived disability (shaky hands) and (2) retaliation for counsel’s letter; the district court granted summary judgment for SUNY Orange.
- The Second Circuit affirmed, holding the ADA’s statutory definition of “disability” applies to Title II, and Widomski failed to show (a) he was perceived as substantially limited in a major life activity and (b) the disciplinary referral was pretext for retaliation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ADA’s definition of “disability” applies to Title II | The statutory definition should apply to Title II (Widomski relied on district court error) | The definition in 42 U.S.C. §12102 applies to the ADA chapter and thus to all Titles | The definition in §12102 applies to all Titles of the ADA; affirmed |
| Whether OCCC perceived Widomski as disabled (substantially limited in working) | Sander and Contarino’s refusal to let him perform phlebotomy shows they regarded him as substantially limited in the major life activity of working | Contarino told Widomski he could still be employed and many jobs don’t require phlebotomy; no evidence OCCC viewed him as excluded from a broad class of jobs | Widomski failed to show he was perceived as substantially limited in working; discrimination claim fails |
| Whether initiation of disciplinary proceedings was retaliation | Counsel’s October 27 letter was protected activity; referral to student services was retaliatory | Contarino had a good‑faith belief Widomski falsified clinical documents, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for referral | Plaintiff established prima facie retaliation but failed to show pretext; summary judgment for defendant affirmed |
| Whether there is evidence of pretext for retaliation | Similarity of forms and Sander’s alleged refusal to sign raise doubt about OCCC’s explanation | OCCC points to the Board finding and Contarino’s good‑faith belief in falsification | No competent evidence of pretext; plaintiff’s evidence insufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (definition of "regarded as" impaired requires showing substantial limitation)
- Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (ADA definition of disability applies beyond Title I)
- Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003) (ADA definition of disability applies to all Titles)
- Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713 (2d Cir. 2002) (retaliation claims analyzed under Title VII burden‑shifting framework)
- Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000) (plaintiff must produce competent evidence of pretext)
- Widomski v. State Univ. of N.Y. (SUNY) at Orange, 933 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (district court decision granting summary judgment to defendant)