141 A.3d 208
Md.2016Background
- Respondent B.A., a martial arts instructor, exchanged sexually explicit emails, texts, and telephone calls with his 15-year-old student, V.K., outside of class; no in-class sexual contact occurred beyond benign instructional touching.
- The Wicomico County Dept. of Social Services investigated and found "indicated" child sexual abuse based on the out-of-class communications.
- B.A. requested an administrative hearing; the ALJ concluded the exploitative conduct occurred when B.A. did not have "temporary care or ... responsibility for supervision" of V.K. and ordered the finding changed to "ruled out."
- The Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed; the Department petitioned to the Maryland Court of Appeals, which granted certiorari.
- The central factual dispute for liability was whether in-class interactions (alleged "grooming") linked B.A.’s supervisory role to his remote sexual communications so as to constitute child sexual abuse under FL § 5-701(x)(1).
Issues
| Issue | Petitioner (Department) Argument | Respondent (B.A.) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sexually explicit remote communications can constitute "sexual abuse" by a person who has "temporary care or ... responsibility for supervision" of a child | In-class grooming plus remote sexual communications form a continuous course of conduct tying the abuse to the instructor’s supervisory role | The sexualized communications occurred during times when B.A. did not have supervisory responsibility (outside class); no sexual exploitation occurred while V.K. was under his care | Held: The act must occur while the person "has" temporary care/responsibility; substantial evidence supported ALJ that responsibility had terminated when communications occurred, so "ruled out" was proper |
| Whether remote electronic communications alone can establish "temporary care" or substitute for in-person supervisory status | Remote communications can be part of an ongoing supervisory relationship and thus establish caretaker status in context | Remote communications alone do not create the contemporaneous supervisory status required by the statute | Held: Generally no; statute’s present-tense phrasing requires the abusive act to occur while the person "has" care/supervision; remote-only communications did not suffice on this record |
| Whether "grooming" during supervised in-person interactions, combined with later remote exploitation, can satisfy the statutory caretaking requirement | Grooming in class that was intended to facilitate future exploitation links the exploitative acts to the time of supervision | Absent evidence of overtly sexual or exploitative in-class acts or immediate in-class sexual conduct, grooming alone does not satisfy the statute | Held: Possible in principle, but here the ALJ reasonably found insufficient in-class evidence of sexual exploitation or specific acts intended to facilitate out-of-class abuse |
| Proper standard of review and evidentiary sufficiency on administrative record | The Department urged reversal of ALJ’s legal conclusion tying conduct to supervisory status | B.A. asserted ALJ’s factual findings were supported; judicial review limited to agency record | Held: Mixed question of law and fact; Court defers to ALJ’s factual findings unless unsupported by substantial evidence — substantial evidence supported ALJ and lower courts |
Key Cases Cited
- Crispino v. State, 417 Md. 31 (2010) (statutory list of sexual-exploitation examples is non-exhaustive)
- Walker v. State, 432 Md. 587 (2013) (context and content of in-person notes can constitute sexual exploitation where adult received benefit)
- Anderson v. State, 372 Md. 285 (2002) (teacher had supervisory responsibility during continuous school-related transport; no temporal break)
- Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309 (1979) ("temporary care or custody" equated with in loco parentis; "responsibility for supervision" is broader)
- Comptroller v. Science Applications Int’l Corp., 405 Md. 185 (2008) (review of agency decisions: court reviews agency decision directly on the administrative record)