Whyte v. Lynch
807 F.3d 463
| 1st Cir. | 2015Background
- Anthony Whyte, a lawful permanent resident, faced removal after DHS relied on his 1999 Connecticut conviction for third-degree assault (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61(a)(1)) with a one-year sentence (45 days served).
- DHS initially charged a 2011 marijuana-distribution conviction; the case was remanded after Moncrieffe v. Holder altered the legal effect of that conviction. DHS then proceeded based solely on the 1999 assault conviction.
- The immigration judge found Whyte removable by treating Connecticut third-degree assault as a categorical "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), an interpretation the BIA affirmed despite contrary Second Circuit precedent.
- Whyte challenged the BIA's conclusion that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61(a)(1) necessarily includes the element of "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" (interpreted as "violent force") required by § 16(a).
- The First Circuit reviewed de novo whether the state offense categorically matches the federal § 16(a) definition and examined state statutory text, Connecticut case law, model jury instructions, and precedent interpreting "physical force."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Whyte) | Defendant's Argument (DHS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61(a)(1) is categorically a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) | (Whyte) Statute requires only intent to cause physical injury and causing injury; it does not require violent force as an element | (DHS) "Causing physical injury" implies use of physical (violent) force; BIA precedent treats the statute as a crime of violence | Held: Not a categorical match. Subsection (a)(1) does not require violent force as an element and thus is not a § 16(a) crime of violence |
| Whether Connecticut law or judicial interpretations supply an element of violent force | (Whyte) Connecticut authorities and jury instructions define "physical injury" broadly (impairment or pain), not by the means used; no CT cases indicate violent-force is required | (DHS) Absence of contrary CT case law is evidence that force is implicit; federal precedents (e.g., Nason) support reading "cause physical injury" to require physical force | Held: Court rejects implication of violent-force element—Connecticut law and authority do not show violent force is an element |
| Whether precedent interpreting similar statutes (Nason/ACCA/Castleman) controls | (Whyte) Johnson and Castleman show context matters; Castleman narrows Nason's reach and Johnson supports requiring "violent force" for § 16(a) | (DHS) Nason (1st Cir.) supports reading "cause physical injury" to require physical force; BIA relied on similar reasoning | Held: Court distinguishes Nason; section 16(a) requires violent force (Johnson), and Nason's different statutory context (broader meaning) is inapplicable |
| Remedy: Whether Whyte's removal order must be vacated | (Whyte) Conviction alone does not establish an aggravated felony; removal order should be vacated | (DHS) Conviction qualifies as aggravated felony under BIA reading; removal stands | Held: Petition granted; BIA decision vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Villanueva v. Holder, 784 F.3d 51 (1st Cir.) (framework for comparing state elements to federal § 16)
- Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir.) (Connecticut third-degree assault not a § 16 crime of violence)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (U.S.) (limits aggravated-felony consequences for certain marijuana offenses)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (U.S.) ("physical force" in ACCA means "violent force")
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (U.S.) (statutory context can yield a broader common-law meaning of "physical force")
- United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (method for categorical analysis under § 16)
- United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir.) (interpreting "physical force" in Domestic Violence Gun Ban context)