Wholean v. CSEA SEIU Local 2001, 955 F.3d 332

Plaintiffs Kiernan Wholean and James Grillo are Connecticut state employees and nonmembers of CSEA SEIU Local 2001; Local 2001 and state officials collected fair‑share (agency) fees from them pre‑Janus under state law and Abood precedent.
After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Janus v. AFSCME (overruling Abood), Appellees stopped deductions and refunded post‑Janus fees; plaintiffs amended to seek repayment of pre‑Janus fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment violations.
The district court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint, holding claims for prospective relief were moot and that retention of pre‑Janus fees was barred by a good‑faith defense for reliance on then‑controlling precedent and state law.
On appeal to the Second Circuit, plaintiffs argued § 1983 contains no good‑faith defense beyond qualified immunity and that defendants should have anticipated Janus; defendants argued they reasonably relied on Abood and Connecticut law.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding a good‑faith defense shields parties who complied with directly controlling Supreme Court precedent and valid state statutes from retrospective monetary liability under § 1983 for collecting fair‑share fees pre‑Janus.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1983 permits a good‑faith defense for private parties/entities who followed controlling precedent when collecting fair‑share fees	§ 1983 recognizes only qualified immunity; no implied good‑faith defense—First Amendment violation is motive‑neutral and no common‑law analogue exists	A good‑faith affirmative defense is available where defendants objectively relied on binding Supreme Court precedent and valid state law	Court: A good‑faith defense exists and bars monetary § 1983 liability when defendants acted in objective reliance on directly controlling precedent and state law
Whether defendants should have anticipated Janus and thus cannot claim good faith	Defendants should have foreseen Abood being overruled and are liable for pre‑Janus collections	Defendants reasonably relied on then‑controlling Supreme Court precedent and state statutes; cannot be expected to predict overruling	Court: Defendants could not reasonably have predicted Janus; reliance on precedent was objectively reasonable, so good‑faith defense applies

Janus v. American Fed. of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (overruled Abood and held mandatory agency fees from public‑sector nonmembers violate the First Amendment)
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) (left open possibility that private parties may assert good‑faith/probable‑cause defenses to § 1983 liability)
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (previously authorized fair‑share fees from public‑sector nonmembers)
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (courts should follow directly controlling precedent and leave overruling to the Supreme Court)
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) (Supreme Court decisions apply to the parties before the Court; distinguishing retroactivity questions)
Jarvis v. Cuomo, [citation="660 F. App'x 72"] (2d Cir. 2016) (recognized availability of a good‑faith defense to private defendants sued under § 1983 for First Amendment claims)
Pinsky v. Duncan, 79 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 1996) (it can be objectively reasonable to act on the basis of a statute not yet declared invalid)