Whiting v. The Johns Hopkins Hospital
416 F. App'x 312
4th Cir.2011Background
- Whiting worked for Hopkins 1998–2007 as a patient financial service representative.
- She took FMLA leave June–August 2007; Hopkins projected remaining FMLA would exhaust August 8, 2007.
- Hopkins approved short-term disability through September 10, 2007 but terminated Whiting on August 25, 2007 after informing her she had been replaced.
- Whiting filed an EEOC discrimination charge alleging disability-based termination due to leave; mediation produced two settlements: MSA and RSA.
- MSA approved by EEOC barred claims under federal employment laws; RSA released Hopkins from all employment-related actions through December 20, 2007.
- Over a year later Whiting sued Hopkins in district court claiming FMLA violations; Hopkins argued the settlements bar the suit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| retroactive effect of revised § 825.220(d) | Whiting argues the revision does not apply retroactively. | Hopkins contends the revised regulation governs post-enactment conduct and applies here. | Regulation treated as clarifying and applied retroactively. |
| validity of the revised regulation under Chevron | Taylor undermines the revised regulation as inconsistent with the FMLA. | DOL’s interpretation is permissible and reasonable under Chevron deference. | Regulation upheld as reasonable interpretation under Chevron step two. |
| whether the FMLA permits unsupervised waivers of past claims | Whiting contends waivers of past FMLA claims are impermissible. | DOL permits unsupervised settlements of past FMLA claims to resolve disputes efficiently. | Waivers of past FMLA claims without court/DOL approval are permissible. |
| impact of Taylor on current interpretation | Taylor controls and forecloses past-waiver interpretation. | DOL may reinterpret the regulation; Taylor does not bind the agency's current view. | DOL interpretation preserved; Taylor does not foreclose current regulation. |
| application to this case | Old regulation would have barred the FMLA claim. | ||
| Revised regulation applies and permits the release of past claims. | District court correct to apply revised regulation; Whiting’s suit upheld as barred. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007) (original regulation construction questioned by Fourth Circuit)
- Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003) (waivers of past FMLA claims permitted under regulatory view)
- Brown v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2004) (circuit-related interpretation of FMLA waiver regulation)
- O'Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1991) (ADEA waiver analogies and contract principles)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (Supreme Court 1984) (establishes two-step framework for agency interpretations)
- National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (Supreme Court 2005) (court defers to agency interpretations under Chevron when reasonable)
- Bowen v. Georgetown University Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (Supreme Court 1988) (retroactivity considerations in administrative rulemaking)
- Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (U.S. 2011) (administrative interpretations and Chevron deference considerations)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (Supreme Court 2001) (limits on Chevron deference and agency interpretations)