White v. State, 305 Ga. 111

Background

Defendant Charles White was convicted of multiple sexual offenses after a victim, S.M., disclosed abuse; S.M. previously admitted in juvenile court to molesting her stepsisters.
At trial the State elicited limited testimony about S.M.’s prior sexual misconduct and presented an expert who testified that sexually acting-out children may have been abused.
White did not object at trial on the statutory ground later pressed; he raised the Rape Shield objection for the first time in an amended motion for new trial and invoked plain-error review on appeal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding a defendant cannot invoke OCGA § 24-4-412 to bar the State from offering otherwise relevant sexual-history evidence.
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide (1) whether a defendant may invoke OCGA § 24-4-412 to prohibit the State from introducing a complaining witness’s past sexual behavior, (2) whether such evidence is admissible for purposes other than consent, and (3) whether any erroneous admission was harmless or plain error.

Issues

Issue	White's Argument	State's Argument	Held
1. Can a defendant invoke OCGA § 24-4-412 to bar the State from introducing a complaining witness’s sexual-history evidence?	Yes; statute’s plain text bars such evidence "in any prosecution" unless an exception applies.	No; prior appellate decisions said the Rape Shield cannot be used to stop a victim from offering relevant evidence.	Held for White: Defendant can invoke OCGA § 24-4-412 to prohibit the State from introducing sexual-history evidence not covered by the statute’s exception.
2. Is victim sexual-history evidence admissible if relevant to issues other than consent?	No; the statute’s sole exception limits admissibility to evidence relevant to consent involving the accused.	Yes; relevance to other issues can permit admission under ordinary evidentiary rules per Court of Appeals precedents.	Held for White: Evidence is admissible under OCGA § 24-4-412 only where it fits the statutory consent-related exception; relevance alone is insufficient.
3. Did the trial court improperly admit S.M.’s sexual-history evidence?	Yes; the admission violated OCGA § 24-4-412.	Admission was acceptable or harmless because evidence was minimal and relevant to credibility.	Court: Admission was error but not plain error affecting substantial rights; conviction affirmed.
4. What is the proper treatment of conflicting Court of Appeals precedents on the Rape Shield statute?	Older Court of Appeals decisions correctly applied the statute to bar State evidence and remain binding absent en banc or Supreme Court reversal.	More recent Court of Appeals panels treated the statute as non‑exclusive and allowed relevance-based admission.	Held: The Supreme Court overruled the later inconsistent Court of Appeals panel decisions to the extent they permitted a relevance exception; earlier authorities were correct.

Key Cases Cited

Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (2013) (statutory interpretation: give text its plain and ordinary meaning)
State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444 (2006) (court may not rewrite statutes)
Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277 (1978) (Rape Shield statute applied to bar State evidence; defendant may timely object)
Demetrios v. State, 246 Ga. App. 506 (2000) (Court of Appeals held Rape Shield could not be invoked to bar a victim from offering otherwise relevant evidence; later limited/overruled here)
Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586 (2015) (when Georgia rule differs from federal counterpart, assume legislature meant difference)
Kelly, 290 Ga. 29 (2011) (plain‑error four‑part test)
Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424 (2016) (harmless‑error discussion where introduced evidence benefited defendant)