305 Ga. 111
Ga.2019Background
- Charles White was convicted of multiple sexual offenses involving three victims, including S.M., who disclosed abuse after being adjudicated delinquent for molesting her stepsisters.
- At trial the State elicited testimony about S.M.’s prior sexual misconduct and introduced brief expert testimony suggesting sexually acting children may have been abused.
- White did not object at trial on Rape Shield grounds; he raised the issue in an amended motion for new trial and on appeal, so review is for plain error under OCGA § 24-1-103(d).
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the Rape Shield statute could not be invoked by a defendant to bar otherwise relevant evidence offered by the State; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Georgia Supreme Court interpreted OCGA § 24-4-412 (Rape Shield): the statute bars introduction of a complaining witness’s past sexual behavior by any party except where the statute’s specific defendant-centered exception for evidence relevant to consent applies.
- The Court concluded the trial court erred in admitting S.M.’s sexual-history evidence, but the error did not rise to plain error affecting substantial rights, so White’s convictions were affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant can invoke OCGA § 24-4-412 to prevent the State from admitting a complaining witness’s past sexual behavior | White: Rape Shield applies to bar such evidence from any party; defendant may invoke it to exclude State evidence | State/Court of Appeals: Rape Shield cannot be used by defendant to prevent victim from offering otherwise relevant evidence | Held: Yes. The statute’s plain language prohibits introduction by any party unless within the statute’s single exception (defense evidence relevant to consent) |
| Whether past sexual behavior is admissible if relevant to issues other than consent | White: Admissibility limited to consent-related exception in OCGA § 24-4-412(b) | State/Court of Appeals: Evidence otherwise relevant may be admitted notwithstanding Rape Shield | Held: No. Only the statutory consent-related exception permits admission; court rejects a broader "relevance" exception |
| Whether the trial court erred by admitting S.M.’s sexual-history evidence | White: Admission violated OCGA § 24-4-412 and was error | State: Evidence was relevant and admissible; no timely objection at trial | Held: Trial court erred — the evidence was inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-412 |
| Whether the erroneous admission amounted to plain error requiring reversal | White: Error affected substantial rights and likely affected outcome | State: Any error was harmless; White’s counsel used the evidence in defense; other victims’ testimony strong | Held: No plain error. Error was clear but did not likely affect outcome; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (Ga. 2013) (rules for statutory interpretation; give plain text its ordinary meaning)
- State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444 (Ga. 2006) (court may not rewrite statutes)
- Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586 (Ga. 2015) (Georgia Evidence Code compared to federal rules; divergences control intent)
- Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (Rape Shield statute applies to exclude evidence offered by the State)
- Demetrios v. State, 246 Ga. App. 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (Court of Appeals language limiting Rape Shield application; later treated as erroneous)
- Kelly, 290 Ga. 29 (Ga. 2011) (plain error test elements applied to evidentiary errors)