White Glove Staffing, Inc. v. Methodist Hospitals, 947 F.3d 301

Background

White Glove Staffing (a non‑minority‑owned staffing company) sought to provide temporary kitchen staff to Methodist Hospitals after initial meetings in May 2016.
Methodist’s chef Jose Soto allegedly expressed a preference for Hispanic workers; Methodist’s coordinator Jeff Jennings relayed Soto’s statements to White Glove personnel.
White Glove sent Carolyn Clay, an African‑American prep cook, to work at the hospital multiple times despite Soto’s stated preference; Clay was removed mid‑shift on one occasion and White Glove’s prospective contract negotiations were terminated.
White Glove and Clay sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (and Title VII), alleging racial discrimination and retaliation; the district court dismissed White Glove’s § 1981 discrimination claim for lack of standing and granted summary judgment to Methodist on White Glove’s § 1981 retaliation claim.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal (holding White Glove has statutory standing to bring a § 1981 discrimination claim), affirmed summary judgment on the retaliation claim, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a corporation may have standing to sue under § 1981 for racial discrimination	White Glove: § 1981 protects the right to make/enforce contracts and White Glove suffered direct harm when negotiations were terminated; corporate racial identity not required	Methodist: A corporation lacks racial identity and thus cannot be a § 1981 plaintiff	Reversed: Corporation need not have a racial identity; White Glove has statutory standing under Lexmark’s zone‑of‑interests and proximate‑cause tests
Whether White Glove’s claim falls within § 1981’s zone of interests and was proximately caused by discriminatory conduct	White Glove: Termination of prospective contract was caused by discrimination against the worker it sent, so harm is within § 1981’s scope	Methodist: The alleged discrimination was against the individual worker, not the company, so White Glove is outside § 1981’s interests	Held: White Glove falls within the zone of interests and alleged proximate cause is adequate
Whether third‑party standing doctrine bars White Glove’s § 1981 claim	White Glove: Harm was direct to company (lost contract), not asserted on behalf of a third party	Methodist: Claim improperly rests on rights of the individual worker	Held: Third‑party standing does not bar the claim; White Glove alleges violation of its own rights
Whether White Glove engaged in protected activity for § 1981 retaliation purposes	White Glove: It protested and continued to send African‑American worker despite Methodist’s preferences	Methodist: White Glove accommodated and repeatedly offered to replace worker, so it did not purportively oppose discrimination	Held: No genuine dispute that White Glove engaged in protected activity; summary judgment for Methodist on retaliation affirmed (White Glove’s statements also showed accommodation, so not protected activity sufficient to survive summary judgment)

Key Cases Cited

Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (discussed corporate racial identity language in Fourteenth Amendment context)
Gersman v. Group Health Ass’n, 931 F.2d 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (corporation may have standing to sue under § 1981 even without a determined "racial identity")
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (statutory standing requires falling within statute’s zone of interests and proximate causation)
Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (corporations can assert § 1981 claims when they suffer cognizable discrimination harm)
Body By Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognized allegation of corporate racial minority status in § 1981 context)
Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006) (describing § 1981’s protection of the right to make and enforce contracts)
Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Grp. Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 295 F.3d 1065 (10th Cir. 2002) (adopting D.C. Circuit approach that corporations have § 1981 standing when discrimination is based on an employee’s race)
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (third‑party standing doctrine explained)