Whitaker v. Wisconsin Department of Health Services
45 F. Supp. 3d 876
E.D. Wis.2014Background
- Whitaker, a correctional officer, injured her back in 2005 and again in 2010, resulting in permanent work restrictions and intermittent/continuous FMLA leave; DHS accommodated restrictions but terminated her employment for medical reasons in November 2010.
- Whitaker filed an EEOC charge and received a Notice of Right to Sue; she then sued pro se in 2012 under the ADA against DHS and Milwaukee County but did not assert a Rehabilitation Act claim in that suit.
- Judge Stadtmueller granted DHS’s motion (based on Eleventh Amendment immunity) and dismissed DHS from the 2012 case; Whitaker’s later attempts to amend to add a Rehabilitation Act claim and rejoin DHS were denied as untimely.
- In 2018 Whitaker filed a new suit asserting a Rehabilitation Act claim against DHS; DHS moved to dismiss this suit under claim preclusion (res judicata).
- The district court evaluated whether the earlier dismissal of Whitaker’s ADA claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds constituted a final judgment on the merits that would preclude the later Rehabilitation Act claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Whitaker’s Rehabilitation Act suit is barred by claim preclusion based on the earlier ADA dismissal | Whitaker contends the earlier dismissal does not preclude her Rehabilitation Act claim; the statutes and immunity analysis differ | DHS argues the prior final judgment dismissing Whitaker’s ADA claims against DHS bars relitigation of the same facts | Denied. The court held the prior dismissal for Eleventh Amendment immunity was not a judgment on the merits for claim preclusion purposes, so the Rehabilitation Act suit is not precluded |
| Whether dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity is a dismissal "on the merits" for res judicata | Whitaker argues Eleventh Amendment dismissal is not on the merits and thus not preclusive | DHS argues the dismissal (labeled "with prejudice") is final and should preclude relitigation | Court held Eleventh Amendment immunity functions like waivable defenses (personal jurisdiction/venue) and does not resolve the substantive legal sufficiency of the claim, so it is not a merits dismissal |
| Whether the parties and operative facts are identical for claim preclusion | Whitaker concedes the facts are the same but argues the earlier ruling did not resolve the merits | DHS notes the parties and operative facts overlap and prior judgment was final as to DHS in that case | Court found parties and operative facts the same but finality here did not equate to a merits judgment; claim preclusion therefore inapplicable |
| Whether any issues decided in the first case bind Whitaker now | Whitaker argues she is not relitigating any decided issue because the earlier decision only addressed immunity under ADA | DHS argues the prior judgment should have preclusive effect on matters decided | Court held only the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue was decided previously; because immunity may differ under ADA vs Rehabilitation Act, prior decision does not bind the new claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2010) (procedural posture for raising claim-preclusion defenses)
- Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 1997) (courts may take judicial notice of public records in prior cases on a Rule 12 motion)
- Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) (res judicata prevents relitigation of claims arising from same transaction)
- Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 2011) (same-opErative-facts test for identical causes of action)
- Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 649 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2011) (cause-of-action identity depends on same set of operative facts)
- Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. 2006) (court may independently characterize prior judgment’s preclusive effect)
- Higgins v. Mississippi, 217 F.3d 951 (7th Cir. 2000) (Eleventh Amendment treated as an affirmative defense)
- Schacht v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 524 U.S. 381 (1998) (Eleventh Amendment defenses are waivable and need not be raised sua sponte)
- e360 Insight v. The Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2007) (prosecutorial/defensive obligations regarding jurisdictional defenses)
- Harper Plastics, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 657 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1981) (definition of judgment "on the merits")
- Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (immunity analysis must be performed separately for different statutory claims)
- Amundson ex rel. Amundson v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Health Servs., 721 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2013) (Eleventh Amendment analysis may differ between ADA and Rehabilitation Act)
- Okoro v. Bohman, 164 F.3d 1059 (7th Cir. 1999) (non-merits judgments can have limited preclusive effect)
- Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) (scope of preclusion from non-merits judgments)
