Whitaker v. El Cajon Police Department
3:18-cv-00171
| S.D. Cal. | Mar 13, 2018Background
- Plaintiff Darrell Whitaker, a state prisoner, filed a § 1983 suit alleging that three El Cajon police officers (Laroche, Boyer, Perham) used excessive force (two tasings) during his arrest on March 8, 2015, and fabricated an incident report; he seeks injunctive relief and $5.4 million in damages.
- Whitaker proceeded pro se and moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP); he submitted the required prison trust account certificate showing minimal funds.
- The Court granted IFP, waived the initial partial fee given lack of funds, and ordered CDCR to collect the remaining statutory filing fee by installments under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
- Because Whitaker is a prisoner proceeding IFP, the Court conducted sua sponte screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), applying the Rule 12(b)(6)/Iqbal plausibility standard.
- The Court dismissed the El Cajon Police Department as an improper defendant (not a "person" under § 1983) and for failure to plead a municipal policy/custom sufficient to state a Monell claim against the City of El Cajon.
- The Court found Whitaker’s excessive-force allegations against Officers Laroche, Boyer, and Perham sufficient to survive screening and ordered the U.S. Marshal to effect service on those officers; defendants must answer per Rule 12(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper party: Is the El Cajon Police Department a proper § 1983 defendant? | Whitaker named the department as a defendant for excessive force and report fabrication. | Police departments are subdivisions and not "persons" under § 1983; municipal liability requires policy/custom. | Dismissed the El Cajon Police Department for failure to state a § 1983 claim; Monell pleading against the City is also insufficient. |
| Municipal liability: Does complaint plead a municipal policy or custom? | Whitaker alleges officers used excessive force but alleged no municipal policy/custom. | City/department argued not applicable (implicitly). | Complaint fails to allege facts showing policy or custom causing the injury; Monell claim not stated. |
| Excessive force by individual officers: Do the facts plausibly allege excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment? | Whitaker alleges he was unarmed, surrendering with hands up, and was tased twice while not resisting. | Officers would argue their use of force was reasonable under Graham factors (not developed at screening). | Court held allegations are sufficient to survive screening; ordered service on Laroche, Boyer, and Perham. |
| IFP and fee collection: Should Whitaker proceed IFP and how are fees collected? | Whitaker submitted trust-account certificate showing minimal funds. | N/A (statutory framework applies). | Court granted IFP, declined to exact initial partial fee due to lack of funds, and directed CDCR to collect remainder by installments under § 1915(b). |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment excessive force standard)
- Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy or custom)
- Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (Graham factors and significance of immediate threat)
- Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (screening and sua sponte dismissal under § 1915)
- Zion v. County of Orange, 874 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2017) (objective reasonableness analysis for force)
- Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (§ 1915A incorporates Rule 12(b)(6) screening standard)