Whitaker v. Appriss, Inc.
266 F. Supp. 3d 1103
N.D. Ind.2017Background
- Indiana State Police contracted with Appriss to run ARIES, an electronic crash-report system; completed crash reports were uploaded to Appriss’s site and sold to the public/subscribers for fees.
- Officers could populate crash reports either by typing information or by scanning barcodes on drivers’ licenses/registrations; the barcode scanning read data printed on the license and did not query the BMV database in the two incidents at issue.
- Plaintiffs Whitaker and Dunkin gave their licenses at accident scenes; their ARIES reports were later purchased by third-party businesses that used the information to solicit them.
- Plaintiffs sued Appriss under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), seeking statutory damages; the case survived earlier motions, discovery proceeded, and Appriss moved for summary judgment.
- The central factual dispute concerned whether officers obtained the plaintiffs’ personal data from the BMV (a motor vehicle record) or directly from the plaintiffs’ licenses at the scene.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the name, address, and license number taken from a license handed to an officer are “personal information, from a motor vehicle record” under the DPPA | Whitaker/Dunkin: data printed on a license is part of a motor vehicle record and thus DPPA-protected when disclosed | Appriss: information came from the license holders (or from forms filled at scene), not from the DMV; barcode read of printed license did not access DMV records, so DPPA does not apply | Court: Not DPPA-protected—information scanned/written from a license handed to an officer is not “personal information from a motor vehicle record” under the DPPA |
| Whether the driver’s license itself qualifies as the relevant “motor vehicle record” under 18 U.S.C. § 2725(1) | Plaintiffs: the license (and its printed data) ‘pertains to’ or is part of the motor vehicle operator’s permit and thus is within the statute | Appriss: the license is an operator’s permit; the relevant DMV record is the database entry underlying issuance; treating the printed license as the DMV record would expand liability beyond Congress’s intent | Court: The license itself is not the DMV record; the relevant DMV record is the underlying database/record maintained by the DMV, not the printed license data handed to a non-DMV actor |
| Whether involuntariness of disclosure (e.g., requirement to show license after accident) makes the data DPPA-protected | Plaintiffs: statutory or practical compulsion to show licenses at accidents means disclosure wasn’t voluntary and should remain DPPA-covered | Appriss: voluntariness not determinative; statute focuses on source of information, not how it was handed over | Court: Declines to adopt a voluntariness requirement; statute does not turn on whether disclosure was voluntary |
| Applicability of earlier law-of-the-case rulings (e.g., reliance on Senne) to compel a different outcome | Plaintiffs: prior rulings suggested DMV-origin information remains protected wherever it travels | Appriss: earlier rulings do not require DPPA liability here because the information did not originate from DMV queries | Court: Law-of-the-case did not decisively resolve whether data scanned from a license without accessing DMV records is a DMV-origin record; court analyzes statute and precedent and grants summary judgment for Appriss |
Key Cases Cited
- Senne v. Village of Palatine, 695 F.3d 597 (7th Cir.) (DPPA protects information obtained from DMV records used in municipal enforcement documents)
- Lake v. Neal, 585 F.3d 1059 (7th Cir.) (statutory interpretation of “pertains”)
- Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48 (2013) (Congress enacted DPPA to curb misuse and sale of DMV-held personal information)
- Pavone v. Law Offices of Anthony Mancini, Ltd., 205 F. Supp. 3d 961 (N.D. Ill.) (held license data can be treated as part of motor vehicle record; court here disagreed with that approach)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III standing guidance cited in procedural history)
